Performing Imperceptibility: Google Street View and the Tableau Vivant

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Abstract

When Google introduced its Street View technology in 2007, by taking panoramic photographs of ordinary street scenes around the globe, it brought us one step closer to the dystopian reality of universal surveillance. In response to Google’s roving camera, some people have staged street-side performances in hopes of being photographed and uploaded online. We think of these performances as contemporary iterations of the historical performance genre known as the tableau vivant: “living images” that resist biopolitical control by “performing imperceptibility.” Drawing upon Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics and Jon McKenzie’s general theory of performance, we argue that the tableau vivant staged for Street View cameras subvert the dividuation of control societies by affirming, through their affective intensity, the possibility of enduring as a subject.

Introduction

Google Maps launched its Street View service as an experimental project in 2007. Using an SUV loaded with some computers, a GPS device, and multiple cameras, Google employees drove around northern California taking pictures of ordinary American street scenes. Today, that ramshackle experiment has become one of the most comprehensive surveillance mechanisms in human history. Spanning seven continents and boasting fleets of sophisticated, 360-degree cameras mounted on everything from cars to backpacks, trolleys to tricycles, camels to snowmobiles, Google Street View (GSV) has systematically documented unprecedentedly large portions of the planet, and then posted it all online. Now, from the privacy of one’s networked screens, anyone can access a seamless, panoramic map of digitally stitched photographs taken from street-level all over the world.

GSV is only one component of Google’s larger mapping suite. Others include the vertiginous satellite imagery of Google Earth and the navigational tools of Google Maps. But there is also a social networking service called Photo Sphere, which solicits geo-tagged photos from its members, then stitches them together in order to, according to Google, “turn your photography into an immersive experience” (Google n.d.). The company’s “Indoor Maps” and “Business View” programs bring GSV cameras into such quasi-private spaces as museums, architectural and cultural landmarks, and restaurants or commercial establishments, all of it displayed online as a virtual tour. Considering this breadth, it seems feasible to say we have nearly realized the dystopian science fiction of ubiquitous surveillance.

Some even say that time has already arrived. John McGrath (2012) identifies the first decade of the 20th century as the coming to fruition of a long history directed toward universal surveillance. Today, he
suggests, “a universal system is more or less effectively in place—the product not of a governmental plan, but of the semi-chaotic interplay of Google’s mapping ambitions and the widespread embrace of social networking—whereby an extraordinary amount of public and private activity is recorded, uploaded and shared online” (2012: 83). For McGrath, though, the arrival of universal surveillance isn’t all that disquieting. The story of surveillance, he argues, is “less one of technology, government, law or rights, than one of cultural practice. It is the way in which we have come to produce and exchange surveillance of ourselves that is defining the experience of surveillance going into the second decade of the twenty-first century” (2012: 83). This notion of surveillance as a cultural practice, as something to experience, sets the stage (so to speak) for the importance of scholarship addressing the relationship between surveillance and performance.

In this article, we explore some cases in which the experience of GSV surveillance involves microactivist performance-events by people who stage tableaux vivants for passing GSV cameras. Drawing upon Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics, we argue that these events “perform imperceptibility” by making temporarily manifest a sustainable future beyond Google’s biopolitical control. By “imperceptibility” we do not mean to evoke a near equivalent to invisibility or camouflage. To perform imperceptibility is precisely to make oneself seen, but to be seen going unseen, that is, to resist being perceived as a fixed and discrete subject. Because the key warrants for this argument will rest upon articulating a series of difficult concepts, we proceed in the following four stages. First, we discuss how GSV exemplifies the biopolitical surveillance mechanisms of what Deleuze (1992) named “societies of control,” which always demand sustained performances. Second, we ground our understanding of performance in a model suited to the dispersed agencies of surveillance and biopower endemic to control societies. Third, by expounding upon the distinction between zoe and bios discussed (but discussed differently) by Giorgio Agamben and Rosi Braidotti, we develop our central position that “performing imperceptibility” is an affectively charged and sustainable form of microactivism in the face of near universal surveillance. Fourth, we present a brief history of the tableau vivant as a form in order to draw parallels between its historical and contemporary presentations. Throughout these stages we illustrate our claims with reference to the particular cases of tableaux vivants staged for GSV cameras. Ultimately, our aim is to situate the imperceptibility of tableaux vivants as a vital (if not quite revolutionary) mode of microactivism within the visual paradigm of Surveillance Studies.

Google Street View in the Control Society

Well before Google even existed, Foucault noticed that when new technologies seize a “massifying” kind of power, “directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species,” the anatamo-politics of disciplinary surveillance becomes a biopolitics of the human race (2003: 243). Biopolitics, as Foucault describes in the 1976 lectures where he shares this insight, thus emerged as the product of a historical shift in the kind of biopower exerted over the governed around the second half of the 18th century. In the Foucauldian argument, surveillance societies began with the sovereign model of panopticism, which exercised its power through the disciplining of individual bodies in enclosed spaces—hospitals, prisons, factories, schools—by claiming the right “to take life or let live” (2003: 241). The shift to biopolitics, however, established a nondisciplinary form of power by reaching beyond such enclosures and claiming a right that wasn’t a tacit threat, but a less visible yet far broader right “to make live and to let die” (2003: 241). Both forms of power operate through surveillance mechanisms that regulate human life, though the latter on a much larger scale. In nondisciplinary societies, Foucault saw, surveillance no longer entailed just power over individual bodies, but over whole populations at once.

Although one might understand how Google’s tendency toward universal surveillance necessarily comes after this historical transition to biopolitics, it was Deleuze who more pointedly explained the mechanisms of surveillance unique to our digital age. Expounding upon Foucault’s 1976 lectures, he observed a shift from discipline to control societies (1992). With just one short essay devoted to surveillance, Deleuze
opened our understanding of surveillance to include more dispersed agencies other than the state’s top-down monitoring of individuals in relatively contained spaces. “Rhizomatic” in nature, these agencies include digital technologies that collect, sort, and categorize data about those “dividuals” being watched across a far wider range of public and private contexts (Deleuze 1992: 5). As David Lyon observes, the resultant emphasis among surveillance scholars on control instead of discipline corresponds with “the increasing use of networked electronic technologies that permit surveillance of mobile populations rather than only those confined to relatively circumscribed spaces” (Lyon 2014: 2). Deleuzian societies of control, in other words, abandon the “targeted scrutiny” of individuals or groups and instead turn to “mass monitoring,” which is exemplified by “Big Data surveillance” (Lyon 2014: 2; see Andrejevic and Gates 2014 for more on “Big Data surveillance”).

Google, of course, is a corporate technology engaged in such massive data collection. And it can do so thanks to the complicity of its users. It is now a widely known trope of control societies that by electing to use new media technologies, people leave behind data trails on which the corporations providing these services can capitalize. This is what Deleuze means when he says surveillance in control societies monitors dividuals: networked technologies shatter the non-reducibility of the embodied human individual into infinitely divisible parts, each reducible to data representations that can be sorted into various categories. Thanks to the automated surveillance of our web searches, our online purchases, our posts to social media, the music or movies we stream, and so on, whenever we use networked products or services, like it or not we become immaterial laborers, providing corporations with huge amounts of personal data upon which to capitalize by creating more customized services that only control us further.

In short, we are constantly being drawn into what Mark Andrejevic calls “digital enclosure” (see 2002: 237-239; 2004: 35-38; 2007a: 104-111; 2007b). Digital enclosure is “the process whereby activities formerly carried out beyond the monitoring capacity of the Internet are enfolded into its virtual space” (2002: 238). The concept refers to a sort of funneling-toward-the-digital that happens across different aspects of our lives, partly due to the digital’s consumer convenience and partly from “public acceptance of the penetration of digital surveillance into the realm of ‘free’ time” (2002: 238). The notion of “enclosure” Andrejevic envisions is a flexible one, marked by the virtuality of technology and not the physicality of space, which is why he explicitly links his use of “enclosure” to Deleuzian societies of control (2007a: 106). Becoming digitally enclosed, then, “is not a matter of crossing physical boundaries but of equipping oneself with the appropriate technology: devices that allow users to communicate with the network, to gather information from it, and to supply information to it. Entering the enclosure is about embracing interactive technology” (2007a: 105).

The bulk of Andrejevic’s work on digital enclosure predates Street View and the ways its surveillance performs biopolitical control over the masses even without the prerequisite of their embracing interactive technology. Unlike the data trails people leave behind online, that is, when a fleet of GSV cars is patrolling a street near you, you need not be equipped with networked technology, not even a phone in your pocket, to become digitally enclosed. In other words, even if you withdraw from the digital altogether, the digital now comes to you. This suggests that the dispersed nature of surveillance in control societies is not just a product of the human subject being reduced to myriad data representations, which someone motivated to retain their unitary individuality could theoretically avoid by going off-grid. Instead, as automated digital processes patrol the streets and “take” photos from physical spaces you may or may not happen to be embodying at that time, the digital enclosure becomes universal, flexing the already flexible boundary of the virtual and physical.  

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1 As boundaries go, in the context of GSV, it is interesting to note that Deleuze thought of Foucault as a cartographer (1988: 23-44). One implication of which is that the emphasis on confinement associated with so much of Foucault’s work (e.g., on madness and discipline) is, for Deleuze anyway, misleading. Confinement is less...
Of course, GSV operates in a historical conjuncture when, at any given public moment, other people are as liable to post our photo online or Tweet about our activities, unbeknownst to us, as is a Google car to photograph us while we’re bringing groceries into the house. The growing phenomenon of e-shaming (see Ronson 2015) attests that we are vulnerable, whenever in the vicinity of networked recording and writing technologies, to digital enclosure. This vulnerability puts whole populations in a perpetual state of exposure. We are always uploadable, capable of being reduced to time- and geo-tagged bits of data. What makes GSV different from e-shaming or other forms of networked exposure is twofold. First, GSV cameras are automated, their pictures not the product of curated selection but rather an indifferent biopolitical mechanism whose operationalized logic reduces everything to ones and zeroes. No one is pressing the camera’s trigger. As the car rolls by, the panoramic GSV eyes cannot not photograph.

Second, GSV cameras have a perceivable randomness about them that underscores their biopolitical function. Unlike disciplinary panopticism, which is incessant, Foucault reminds us that, “the phenomena addressed by biopolitics are, essentially, aleatory events that occur within a population that exists over a period of time” (2003: 246). This may as well be a description of GSV, whose cameras address the unpredictable events occurring on the streets at particular (un)remarkable moments over time (Google sends its cars back to the same streets periodically to keep its Street View photos current). Foucault knew that what mattered to disciplinary societies was not just individual bodies being seen by the sovereign, but the ability of individual bodies to see one another. In Bentham’s panopticon, for instance, guards could see the inmates, but the inmates could also see one another. This symmetrical transparency, whereby one could always count on being seen, carried the advantage of at least some certainty (a kind of video ergo sum). It made each person “his own overseer . . . exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself” (Foucault 1980: 155). As mechanisms of control societies, though, the chance inherent in automated GSV cameras creates an unsustainable state of perpetual exposure. No performance of individual identity within an ethic of non-reducible human subjectivity can preclude the possibility of our digital “dividuation” from public life.

And yet, if Foucault is right that the phenomena addressed by biopolitics are “aleatory events,” then that sounds not unlike performance itself. For what is performance if not an aleatory event, fleeting but intensified on that account? Rachel Hall argues that performance is an integral and not just incidental response to biopolitics. “Performance,” she writes early on in her book on airport security, “is the mode in which the citizen’s episodic affirmations of life and futurity are rehearsed, compelled, enacted, repeated, and confirmed” (2015: 4). One of her key points is that performance must be sustained, or performed continually if it is to be believed. As we’ll try to show presently, the felt experience of surveillance in the age of Street View comes fraught with performances that, in daily and vernacular ways, resist our exposure to reducibility by affirming the sustainable potential of fleeting but intensive affective encounters. The question is, what sorts of performances are these, and who, if the digital enclosure reduces us to dividuations, is doing the performing?

Theorizing Performance in the Control Society

In Convergence Culture, Henry Jenkins’s seminal exploration of the reticulated nature of new media, Jenkins observes that newly released technologies almost always inspire creative tinkering by early
adopters: “No sooner is a new technology—say, Google Maps—released to the public than diverse grassroots communities begin to tinker with it, expanding its functionality, hacking its code, and pushing it into a more participatory direction” (2006: 244). It’s not accidental that he chooses Google Maps as his tossed-in example. Google’s mapping suite has inspired a particularly robust assortment of “participatory” activity since its rollout. Some of this activity, to be sure, has contributed to the reach and applications of Google mapping technologies by writing code to expand and amplify its capabilities. Other activity, though, has had a more playful, if critical, edge. Of the many forms it has taken, one is the staging of faux-naturalistic scenes for passing Street View cars.

In 2008, for instance, the artists Ben Kinsley and Robin Hewlett organized a whole neighborhood of residents in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania’s Northside to perform a series of tableaux for a GSV vehicle photographing Sampsonia Way. Unlike the other tableaux we will discuss, this one was organized in conjunction with Google to ensure its GSV car passed the performances as they occurred. The resultant “Street With a View” included a parade (replete with confetti and a marching band), a pack of marathon runners, a garage band, a cupid figure firing a string “laser” that apparently made anyone it touched fall in love, and a mock-up 17th century sword fight (see Kinsley 2008). All of which, in turn, Google photographed and uploaded to the web (Figure 1).

More than just a send-up or hoax, the jubilant performance can be read to undertake the serious business of refusing to let the pictorial representation of everyday life’s quotidian public moments give the impression of public despondence. In other words, “A Street with a View” celebrated the experience of surveillance by punctuating it with an affirmative performance, one marked by the affective intensity that recognizes no distinction between virtual and actual naturalism. To perform marching in a marching band is still to march in a band.

Kelly Gates has shown that surveillance depends upon the production of an epistemological premise that visual evidence is “an index of real events,” though this produced indexicality is neither natural nor disinterestedly objective (2013: 244). In this light, we might say of the “Street with a View” performance...
that the “actors” were producing their own kind of meta-indexicality by playing at being public individuals before the audience of a passing vehicle they knew in advance would publicize their performance in a context that would pass it off as ordinary, that is, as not a performance at all. There is no need to try forcing a political motive onto performances that are, above all, just for fun. To the contrary, the just-for-fun ethos of this event is what gives it such affective resonance. This performance is not only a hoax, in other words. It is also an aesthetic actuation of affects that cannot be represented because they only emerge in the experience of the performance that brings them about, an experience that may be staged, but still gives rise temporarily to a vision of a sustainable future.

If these are performances, though, what kind of performances are they? Jon McKenzie offers a starting point in his general theory of performance for post-disciplinary societies (2001, 2005). He distinguishes between cultural, organizational, and technological performances. Cultural performances, which include those widely associated with the name of art, strive for the efficacy of their symbolic actions, often with an eye toward social change (2005: 22). Organizational performances meanwhile strive for efficiency in the ways employees and businesses work to better “perform” their jobs (2005: 22). Finally, technological performances include the ways that technologies function. From cars to computers to rockets, the challenge for these performances is effectiveness: “the optimizing of technological functionalities” such as speed, precision, balance, temperature, and so on (2005: 23).

McKenzie’s three-part system is helpful for showing some different paradigms of performance and for underscoring the different challenges (efficacy, efficiency, effectiveness) that each one faces. The value of his argument, though, is not that it now allows us to put a given performance-text into its proper box, but rather that it underscores the highly imbricated nature of all three performance-types. In the case of GSV tableaux, it would be insufficient to label them either cultural, organizational, or technological performances and leave it at that. The tableaux should rather be understood as performances that operate across each performance system, such that the processes of each come into conflict and converge in ways that create the performance-event as an emergent phenomenon that is always the “becoming-event” of performance, and never its actual or fixed realization.

As it turns out, McKenzie has a name for this kind of performance assemblage as well. He calls them, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (1995), machinic performances. Machinic performances involve multiple agents and sites, human and nonhuman, virtual and actual. In Perform or Else, McKenzie’s important argument that performance has become the predominant stratum of power/knowledge since the late 20th century, he used the NASA Challenger disaster to underscore the inextricability of cultural, organizational, and technological performances (2001: 139-153). Though the components of his machinic performance concept are evident there, it is only later, in the context of a study about “hacktivism” (2005), that he names the idea as such. “One thing that has struck me in my research of machinic performance,” he writes there, “is how technological, organizational, and cultural performances can embed themselves within one another, how the values of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness can enter into different arrangements” (2005: 26). Machinic performances, then, are the name given to dispersed assemblages that exemplify the entangled nature of cultural, organizational, and technological performance types.

If so, the “Street with a View” tableaux illustrate the machinic quite plainly. The actors undertook a cultural performance in their topical choice of choreographed actions. The marching band might well have been a picket line, the medieval sword fight a game of double-dutch. Acting the parts they did, though, achieved some symbolic effect that may be more or less efficacious depending upon its execution, its audience, and the interpretive context of its reception. Clearly, there’s a cultural performance here. Just as clear, though, are the organizational vectors of the tableaux. People needed to be assembled together, dressed in costume, given their cues, and put in position in a timely and organized way in order to execute their roles efficiently, that is, in coordination both with one another and with the passing GSV car. In fact, the choreography necessary to pull off the cultural performance of these jubilant activities required not
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just the organizational performance of multiple people working together in different places at different times, but actual coordination with Google so the artists would know in advance when the GSV car would arrive. In turn, then, the GSV car and its mounted cameras undertook a technological performance such that it showed up as scheduled, drove at the proper speeds to capture images with minimal blur, and operated effectively to ensure the utmost functioning of its technical specifications and purposes. Take any one of these performance types away and the whole thing falls apart.

Such is the dispersed nature of performance in the experience of surveillance today, that its subjects are multiple and its agents diverse. And it is a model appropriate to the widespread conditions of surveillance and biopolitical control that mark our time. After all, if control societies flatten the top-down surveillance of the sovereign that characterized disciplinary biopower, the model of performance that suits such a societal shift must be equally dispersed. It is important to emphasize, though, that machinic performances implicate the human and nonhuman alike. This is not just a matter of supposing a distributed agency to coexist between people and things, but of acknowledging that machinic performances transpire across the wider territory of biopolitics and the control over life and non-life. It is no wonder, then, that some of the most intense performances undertaken for GSV cameras have involved staging tableaux vivants of life and death itself.

Reclaiming Zoe in the Control Society

We suggested in our introductory remarks (and in the title of this article itself) that when tableaux are performed for Google Street View, they are invested in “performing imperceptibility.” Imperceptibility, as we use it, is a complicated term, but we are now in a better position to explore what it means and to contend with its importance for Surveillance Studies. That importance will hinge upon an understanding of life and death as coextensive, that is, not just as dialectical opposites comprehensible only relative to what the other is not. Imperceptibility does not mean that it is impossible to know if something (Schrödinger’s cat, for example) is “alive” or “dead.” Rather, it means that the human subject is perpetually becoming what it will have been, and hence that origins and ends like life and death cannot account for this state of becoming that characterizes who and how we are. To perform imperceptibility is to call attention to the movement, the always-in-formation process of becoming that the operationalized logics of surveillance (among other things) are unable to process. It is, in short, to claim our sustainability against those mechanisms that would reduce us to our perceptibility. This should become clearer after our discussion of Rosi Braidotti’s work, which we introduce through the following example.

When Edinburgh, Scotland resident Dan Thompson saw the Google car approaching his auto repair shop, he acted quickly. He shoved a pick axe handle in his buddy Gary’s hand and threw himself face-down on the cobblestone street. As the Google car passed, it photographed what appeared to be a grisly murder scene (Figure 2). Although Google’s software automatically blurs faces, Gary’s ghoulish grin, as he loomed over Dan’s body and stared directly at the camera, was unmistakable. Presumably, the friends shared a laugh and carried on with their day. A few months later, the police knocked on the door. When they found Thompson alive and well, they left the garage laughing. A handful of newspapers, mostly Scottish and British, reported the prank as a diverting filler piece.

It’s hard to imagine that the murder scene faked for GSV is the sort of participatory tinkering Henry Jenkins had in mind when he observed the social uptake of new technologies. Nor is it quite the “hacktivism” that Jon McKenzie links to machinic performance. Rather, we read such tableaux vivants as the “Street with a View” or the Scottish mechanic’s spontaneously conceived murder scene as vital, though probably not all that consequential, forms of microactivism. Several features of the mechanic’s tableau fit the scale of “micro” activism. The planning, execution, and resources required to create the murdered mechanic scene were trivial. Its immediate audience was tiny, its effect on the larger GSV surveillance apparatus negligible. No one could say that this act dismantled the control society. However,
we argue that the value of the microactivist *tableau* performance lies not in its effects of outward resistance, but in its production of positive affects for the performers and their audience. The cultivation of positive affects, in turn, produces subjects that can sustain and endure imperceptibly. In order to explain this, we turn to Rosi Braidotti’s “nomadic” ethics.

![Figure 2: A phony crime scene staged in Edinburgh for a passing GSV car.](image)

Nomadic ethics are micro-political. Rather than grand interventions or revolutions, a nomadic ecophilosophy supports multi-moded daily practices of resistance. Crucially, the cultivation of positive affects is essential for living a nomadically ethical life because positive affects make subjects sustainable. The sustainable self is the subject that can endure—the subject that can keep on moving on, nomad-like, in the face of despair. For Braidotti, the production and expression of positive affects is what makes the subject last. She writes, “It is like a source of long-term energy at the affective core of subjectivity” (2006a: 135). In Braidotti’s framework, the auto mechanics’ playful *tableau* mobilized their capacity to sustain “the impact with the complex materiality of the outside” (2006c: 145). The source of this flow of positive, transformative affective charges is *zoe*, or the vital force of life that humans share with all living beings.

Nomadic ethics, and what we mean by imperceptibility, begins with revaluing *zoe* as the source of these transformative affective charges. *Zoe* has a long history of playing second fiddle to *bios*—a relationship that Braidotti would like to subvert. Before Braidotti, Giorgio Agamben argued that the power relations of the modern moment can be understood by the relationship between *bios* and *zoe*. In Giorgio Agamben’s *Homo Sacer*, he references a distinction between the two Ancient Greek words for life, specifically in the work of Aristotle (1998). According to Agamben, *zoe* (ζωή) is an Ancient Greek word for life that describes the spectrum of all living entities, including humans, animals, and plants. It is the source for contemporary English words like “zoo” and “protozoa.” Agamben positioned *zoe* against the other Attic Greek word for life, *bios* (βίος), which referred to the way of life proper to a group. *Bios*, life that meets a certain set of conditions and qualifications, is restricted to but not guaranteed for humans. Like most Western thinkers, Agamben privileged the flows of *bios* over *zoe*. (To be fair, some scholars have quibbled with Agamben’s reading of Ancient Greek etymology. Laurent Dubreuil dismissed Agamben’s
In Agamben’s reading, bios is the element that makes human life political.

Like Agamben, Braidotti believes that the power relations around zoe/bios are the “defining feature of our historicity” (2006c: 132). Yet, Braidotti is much more interested in zoe than bios. Smuggled into Agamben’s preference for bios is the rational sovereign individual of Western culture—the phallic arboreal stronghold against which Braidotti’s Deleuzian rhizomes labors. Braidotti writes, “Zoe has a monstrously strong capacity for becoming and for upsetting established categorical distinctions of thought” (2006c: 142). She elaborates:

Life is half animal: zoe and half discursive: bios. Zoe, of course, is the poor half of a qualitative distinction that foregrounds bios defined as intelligent life. Centuries of Christian indoctrination have a left deep mark here: bios is divinely ordained and holy, whereas zoe is quite gritty. [...] Zoe is mindlessly material and the idea of life carrying on independently of agency and even regardless of rational control, is the dubious privilege attributed to the non-humans. [...] Nomadic thought loves zoe and sings its praises by emphasizing its active, empowering force against all negative odds. (2006a: 138)

The micro-political modes of tableaux vivants for Google’s all-seeing camera reclaim a kind of gritty, vital zoe as a practice of promoting positive affects. Nomadic subjects actively create encounters with GSV and the larger control society that refuses to recognize their becoming in favor of an insistence on evidential irrefragability. Furthermore, the monitored performance of the tableau vivant veers toward zoe in content as well as practice.

We think it is no coincidence that these staged scenes tend thematically to center around life and death. For what greater intensity, what more positive affects, can there be than those experienced when reclaiming “control” over life and death? The ebullience of the parade in Pittsburgh and the grimness of the staged murder in Edinburgh are only two examples. A staged birth, performed in Berlin in 2010, further affirms the active and empowering force of zoe as a microactivist response to the experience of surveillance today (Figure 3). In a mimicry of the classic childbirth scene, a man dangles a naked baby just above a sprawled woman’s bare knees. What could be more redolent of zoe’s excess than the precise moment of birth, where one body actually overflows with another body?
The staged birth prompted ensuing debates from various news sources. Not only was the authenticity of the birth questioned, but also whether or not Google took the image at all. Given that Google’s German headquarters disavowed responsibility for the image, some speculated that a German art collaborative created not only the scene but also the image itself, framing the photograph to resemble Street View’s blurred, widescreen aesthetic (Daily Mail Reporter 2010). Was the scene created for Google’s cameras or a mimicry of Google’s cameras? The slippage between these draws attention to the participatory surveillance of the control society.

In each case, the goal is to form an assemblage where life can be more fantastical or sinister than it “really” is. Life is what is being “staged” here, what is being performed. The camera captures not “real life” or reality TV, but rather a “faked” performance of “real life” events such as parades, deaths, and births. For just a moment, people play at becoming public individuals. For this reason, it is aesthetically and rhetorically important that such monitored performances take the form of tableaux vivants.

**Tableaux Vivants: “Living Images” Beyond Representation**

The term *tableau vivant* (“living image”) was coined in 1838 to name a kind of collaborative performance that involved actors assembling in such a way as to represent through scenery, costume, and bodily positioning the image of a famous painting, sculpture, or well-known historical scene. Such performances had existed before they had this name, going by “*tableaux mis en action*” or “*tableaux fugitifs*” (Vouilloux, quoted in Satz 2009: 168). By taking the name “living images,” though, such performances joined a myth- and morphological tradition, going back to antiquity, of turning living bodies into non-living objects and turning objects into living bodies. Homer’s *Iliad*, for instance, tells of the proud mother Niobe being turned to stone on Mt. Sipylon, and Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* recounts several such transformations, the most famous being the myth of Pygmalion, the sculptor whose workmanship was so impeccable as to bring a statue to life (Homer: Book 24; Ovid: Book 10). Even Shakespeare stages a prototypical *tableau vivant* in *The Winter’s Tale*, when Hermione’s statue comes to “be stone no more”—or perhaps reveals that she may have been living all along (5.3.11). 3 No matter the example, in this tradition the stakes are life and death, the conversion of the nonliving into life and vice versa, such that an indistinguishability between the two becomes tacitly manifest.

Our observation is that to hold open the possibility of this conversion, to make it possible at all, is to exercise the ultimate expression of Braidotti’s nomadic ethics, claiming *zoe* as the horizon of the possible, and therefore not succumbing to the control of “bios-politics.” If *zoe* is, as Braidotti suggests, “the endless vitality of life as a process of continuous becoming” (2008: 182), then emphasis on *zoe* as the foundation of a nomadic ethics requires rethinking the temporality of the subject such that the human is no longer constrained by death, but rather an evolving biophysical form. The mytho-morphological tradition of *tableaux vivants* certainly illustrates this possibility by doing more than giving birth to living images or sentencing the living to a calcified death-by-representation. Instead, *tableaux vivants* operate in a perpetual state of becoming—becoming-live, becoming-dead—and hence evade the biopolitical by bringing forth the affective intensity that attends any encounter one has with life or death’s nearness. In a *tableau vivant*, life and death, subject and object, are always emergent because they’re always coextensive. Hence their sustainability.

To put it differently, we could say that a *tableau vivant*, a “living image,” both gestures toward its referent (which, in the case of sculpture or painting, is itself a represented image) and re-represents that image in

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3 For more on the history of statues coming to life and people turning to statues, see Hersey (2009) and Stoichita (2008).
an embodied and living way. In that sense, *tableaux vivants* reclaim from the representational regime of the arts a living vitality beyond representation’s fixity. Theirs is a vitality vouchsafed by the body and the aleatory nature of live performance, in which anything might happen. If *tableaux vivants* momentarily suspend life and death, it is not as an either/or proposition, but as a both/and openness to the coextensiveness of life and death. This affective intensity affirms futurity and endurance, the essences of microactivism’s resistive potential.

Beyond its mytho-morphological antecedents, though, the more modern history of the *tableau vivant* as cultural practice confirms these claims as well. In Victorian England, for instance, the term “*Tableaux Vivants*” was the name of a parlor game like Charades, a sort of Scattergories or Cranium for the 19th century gentry. Here’s a telling passage from *Cassell’s Book of Amusements, Card Games and Fireside Fun*, a social activities guide from 1881: “We must not be led to think that individuals devoid of character are the most eligible to take part in *Tableaux Vivants*; no greater mistake could be made. The affair is sure to be a failure unless the actors not only have the perfect command of feeling, but are able also to enter completely into the spirit of the subject they attempt to depict” (Cassell 1881: 45). From the standpoint of nomadic ethics, to have a “perfect command of feeling” and “to enter completely into the spirit of the subject,” are two different things altogether. The former is marked by the apparent control of a whole and autonomous self; the latter by the outright abandonment of an autonomous subject that necessarily accompanies entering into spiritual communion with the other. Even in the context of a playful Victorian handbook for parlor games, then, the *tableau vivant* seems to succeed to the extent it performs what Braidotti—via Deleuze and Guattari (2005: 232-309)—calls the “becoming-imperceptible” of the microactivist subject (2006a).

For Braidotti, becoming-imperceptible is the crucial response to biopolitics—and, we suggest, to its control through widespread surveillance. To become imperceptible is not to assert a coherent and personal subjecthood in the face of mass dividuation, but to subject the subject to its own plasticity by embodying the Spinozist freedom always to affect and be affected. In short, it is always already to exhibit the manifold and vital potential to carry on, to be better, to be otherwise. “The becoming-imperceptible,” Braidotti writes, “is about reversing the subject towards the outside: a sensory and spiritual stretching of our boundaries. It is a way of living more intensively and of increasing our *potentia* with it... Becoming-imperceptible is the event for which there is no immediate representation. All we can aspire to is the recording of the experience which cannot be located either in relation to the past or the future as one may know it” (2006a: 156).  

Just as becoming-imperceptible is “the event for which there is no immediate representation,” a *tableau vivant* unfolds in a way that resists representation, even as its performance becomes representational. This state of becoming delivers its activist power precisely because GSV cameras cannot capture it. It is imperceptible to them. *Tableaux vivants* may not be meant to last long, but their formation is their essence; it sustains their potentiality. As performances, they take place in non-linear time; indeed, their “taking place” is entirely that of which they consist. Audiences watch a *tableau* come to life as actors move into place, assume their positions, only to disperse again once their position is held static. The moment when the image most comes to life is the moment it ceases becoming alive. Once formed, when the performers finally hold their pose, coalescing in a materially produced moment of maximum verisimilitude, the living image dies. That’s the moment of the Google camera’s gun-like click. As Aura Satz puts it, “the *pose* becomes a *pause* in the general process of aging, dying, disintegrating” (2009: 170). It is a process, in other words, both of becoming-alive and of becoming-object, “a mode of slowing down, 

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4 Aside from Spinoza, another theoretical in-road to becoming-imperceptible is Zen Buddhism, a spiritual tradition from which Braidotti draws inspiration. The meditator’s spiritual stretching is about “respecting a creative void without forcefully imposing upon it” the author’s own intentions or desires (2006c: 173).
of enduring, of surviving, of halting the ravages of time” (2009: 170). The rest is disassembly and dispersal.

But the microactivist power of *tableaux vivants* exceeds their formal or aesthetic properties. It originates rather in the affective intensity the medium evokes. Frans-Willem Korsten, for instance, argues that the “tableau vivant functions to intensify a particular, decisive, moment” (2010: 19). This intensity, he argues, is related not just to the past, to the image or historico-cultural referent that a tableau’s frozen moment temporarily represents—a painting, a parade, a murder, a birth. It is also related to a future that remains unknown. And “even when this future is known,” he writes, “the tableau vivant destabilizes it, and points to the possibility that it is not known. The frozen moment or tableau vivant is an in-between, a medium that, as such, forms an excellent carrier of affect” (2010: 19). This affective suspension between past and future is the heart of sustainability. As Braidotti herself admits, “What matters to my thought is the affective dimension, the affinity, not the political or theoretical correctness” (2006b: 26). By imbuing the historical present with the intensity of infinite possibility, the becoming-event of a tableau vivant accomplishes the transpositions that constitute nomadic microactivism, whether its performers realize it or not.

When it comes to the tableaux performed for Google cars, it is important to locate this affective intensity not in the photos uploaded to GSV, though they ostensibly offer indexical records of the frozen moment. The intensity rather derives from the wider machinic performance that attains its microactivist power by exceeding what photographic surveillance can capture. The “vivant” part of tableau vivant takes on a double meaning here. These are not just scenes created by the “living” but also the living created by the scenes. “Live performance,” Aura Satz tellingly notes, “has no copy, each repetition marks it as different, and its documentation is in itself an alteration” (2009: 180). The documentation, in this case, consists in the photos stitched together and posted online. And, certainly, as experienced, these digitized images differ in intensity from the embodied performance-event that, at a certain time and place, transpired on actual streets as a Google car rolled by.

For Satz, though, the tableau vivant is extraordinary because it upends this common take on live performance’s singularity. As she explains, “The irreproduciability of performance is subverted in the tableau vivant, where one might say the performer is the copy, rendered startlingly original. The ephemeral ‘tracelessness’ of performance is brought to a standstill. Its relentless present is paused in a timeless statue. In the midst of our inevitable disappearance, the slipping away of both the live performance and the life of the performer, the tableau vivant ‘appears’” (2009: 180). In a time when photographic surveillance approaches ubiquity, the monitored performance of a tableau vivant manages to evade the post facto rationalization of what the cameras merely operationalize as indistinguishable from anything else.

**Seeing the Imperceptible**

The question remains, though, of just how effective the GSV tableaux are as modes of resistance. Are they really more than just playful “hacks” or amusing gags? We think that they are, but with a caveat. Such tableaux can be more than ineffective yet still not inspire any large-scale social change. Certainly they need not dismantle Google or its mechanisms of digital enclosure for us to identify an activist purchase to their performances. Nevertheless, we share Torin Monahan’s desire to resist “the impulse to celebrate uncritically artistic interventions that seem progressive or innovative” (2015: 3) without actually undermining surveillance society logics. In his analysis of those who exhibit their “right to hide” by donning masks, fractal face paint, and other camouflaging technologies to evade being recognized by surveillance cameras or sensors, Monahan concludes that such anti-surveillance practices “offer narrow forms of resistance that are unlikely to challenge current regimes of visuality” (2015: 15). The same could be said of the various GSV tableaux. But that neither means they accomplish nothing nor that they offer
no insight about what it means to sustain a positive way of life under conditions of widespread surveillance. To illustrate how, compare the tableaux to the performances of a more concentrated and deliberate group of activists, the Surveillance Camera Players (SCP).

Side by side, the SCP highlight the ephemeral and nonrational zoe-driven qualities of the tableaux. Mostly from 1996-2006, the SCP composed and performed original and adapted plays in front of security cameras. Openly identifying as subversive activists, the SCP implemented what they called the “guerilla programming” of video surveillance equipment (2006: 21). Their performances concentrated in New York City, but they have performed across other cities in the United States and the globe. Perhaps most famously, their silent adapted version of George Orwell’s 1984 made the rounds at contemporary art exhibits for years afterwards. The SCP performed in front of fixed, public security cameras, resulting in continuous video footage. By contrast, the tableaux performers perform to moving, private commercial cameras, resulting in still frames. Despite these differences, the ludic humor that these performances share in response to the camera’s gaze is palpably similar.

Tellingly, however, the performances differ sharply in political purpose. While the SCP combat the control society with a sophisticated activist strategy tailored to a well-articulated ideological position (Schienke and Brown 2002: 360-361), the tableaux performers offer no such rational explanation for their impromptu, seemingly random, performances. It would even be hard to identify them as deliberate forms of resistance. With the exception of the Sampsonia Way “Street with a View” tableau, the tableaux performers have little or no time to prepare. They have time only to say “yes” to the fleeting kairotic moment. A spur-of-the-moment decision like this is the opposite of rational. Rather, Braidotti would call this yes-saying the “fragile and yet enduring affirmation” of becoming-imperceptible (2006a: 159).

We are not questioning the effectiveness of the awesome activism and funky art that the SCP manifest in the world. Rather, we are pointing to the ways in which the tableaux operate within a different register—a register that taps the vital force of zoe on a microactivist scale. To be sure, it is possible that the tableaux vivants encourage a quiescent, obedient relationship with Google writ small, or with the larger control society writ large. These performances might even help Google, as the company’s complicity in the “Street with a View” piece seems to suggest. Monahan warns us against valorizing the “aestheticization of resistance,” an impotent form of activism that “generates media attention and scholarly interest without necessarily challenging the violent and discriminatory logics of surveillance societies” (2015: 2). These objections are valid, but perhaps they are asking the wrong question.

What if the purchase of these performances didn’t derive from their capacity to initiate change, but from how they affect sustainable ways of carrying on? Sometimes the generative, non-logocentric life force of zoe is exactly what is needed in the face of despair. Nomads care not for formalized modes of political or identitarian resistance, precisely because their dispersed subjectivities exceed the ego-indexed habit of political identity. Ultimately, the street tableau performer expresses the imperceptible nonunitary subject that is already there. Her momentary, fleeting tableau vivant charts just one sustainable way of carrying on.

Other such ways would have to reorient our relationship with the visual: that is, with how we see ourselves, and how we see ourselves being seen. This is not just a challenge addressed to the operational logics of surveillance societies, but to the ways we as academics think and talk about those societies. Although surveillance societies involve innumerable practices and methods of sensory recognition—technologies detecting noises, temperatures, motions, odors, and so on—sight remains the sense that most organizes Surveillance Studies as a field. Big Brother is watching, after all, not smelling or tasting, touching or hearing. There are plenty of reasons for this. In part, no doubt, the privileging of sight follows from the etymology of “surveillance” itself, a French word dating to the end of the 18th century meaning to “watch over” (sur- “watch” + -veiller “over”), and further back from the Latin vigilare, to “keep watch.”
The ocularcentricism in Surveillance Studies can also be linked to Foucault’s insight that surveillance societies begin historically with the disciplinary power attained by “just a gaze” (1980: 155). Whatever the explanation, this emphasis on the visual has infused Surveillance Studies with a whole vocabulary associated with sight. One legacy of Google’s mapping suite, and Street “View” in particular, may well be to entrench that idiom even further. Indeed, a number of prominent scholars have recently produced excellent work that only affirms the prevalence of this visual paradigm. The premise is often the same. If surveillance mechanisms are that which control by seeing, there must be a potential to resist such control through efforts to go unseen. Of course, as surveillance mechanisms get better at seeing, efforts to evade being seen develop in complexity as well. Hence books like Invisible (2015), Phillip Ball’s treatment of invisibility’s timeless but growing allure—and the evolving methods for its production. Hence books like Obfuscation (2015), Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum’s guide to evading big data surveillance by obscuring that which surveillance societies see and take as salient. Count Hanna Rose Shell’s Hide and Seek (2012) among the lot, too, with its engrossing history of camouflage and reconnoissance media technologies. Torin Monahan’s work on anti-surveillance camouflage belongs in this camp as well, as does, in a different register, Rachel Hall’s emphasis on transparency in The Transparent Traveler (2015), among a number of other examples.

To this fruitful idiom of the visual, we have tried to add Braidotti’s nomadic ethics of becoming-imperceptible—but to do so from a different set of premises. One way to interpret these tableaux, for instance, might be to suppose the performers are striving for perceptibility. Their underlying motive would thus be a desire to be recognized as a subject, a desire to say, like a kind of curbside bathroom graffiti, “I was here. Here I am.” Following this interpretation, the novelty of such desire to be noticed would derive from its basis in a surveillance society that now sees all, and in seeing all, sees nothing—or, more precisely, identifies nothing, allowing no one to stand out as singular. The all-seeing eyes of the GSV cameras so catholically document their surroundings that they affirm nothing of them; they denude their subjects of being subject. In turn, the quest for comprehensive photographic naturalism ends up denaturalizing, and the performed tableaux operate to call attention to the sham of Google’s representational verisimilitude.

Another way to interpret the GSV tableaux might be to understand them as “culture jams,” what Christine Harold describes as a rhetorical strategy of protest that “usually implies an interruption, a sabotage, hoax, prank, banditry, or blockage of what are seen as the monolithic power structures governing cultural life” (2004: 192). Such micro-political acts would thus be read to undermine Google’s project of capturing life on the street in its “natural” state. This disruption of the naturalistic enterprise would presumably reveal that Google, in fact, does not see—or sees, but does not see what is merely performed, and cannot differentiate the world from the stage. Following this interpretation, the novelty of the tableaux would be their impulse toward interruption and exposure. They would signify an effort to show that Google’s logic of a universal “view” is always susceptible to not noticing what it is really seeing, and hence the tableaux would reveal the possibility that an alternative logic exists which escapes the one driving a surveillance society’s produced indexicality.

Against both of these hypothetical readings, though, we have tried to suggest that “performing imperceptibility” involves something different, a new approach to enduring and affirming the positivity of life under Google’s watch. The people who perform tableaux vivants for GSV cars are decidedly not trying to go unseen or undetected. Just the opposite. From how it appears, they want to be seen, and the staged tableaux are their efforts to do so. But the acceptance of their exposure to Google’s surveilling cameras, in fact their active pursuit of it, has little to do with the identity politics of asserting one’s own narrative and self-conception in the face of those reductive and controlling mechanisms that see what, who, and how they choose. What we call “performing imperceptibility,” in other words, is not a matter of hiding or evading or obfuscating. It is an active mode of positive critique—a way of “putting the active
back in activism,” as Braidotti says (2010). To perform imperceptibility is to embody a state of becoming zoe that cannot possibly be fixed or despondent because its emergence is its essence. We make no claims for the revolutionary potential of the performances we have discussed. In the end, alas, they are likely to have no significant impact on the logics of surveillance that show all signs of continuing to organize contemporary life. Yet, performing tableaux vivants for Google’s street-crawling cameras is not for nothing. Doing so sustains the perpetual possibility of becoming-imperceptible.

References


