Surveillance, Suspicion and Stigma: Brown Bodies in a Terror-Panic Climate

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Abstract

This paper considers hard and soft surveillance measures, processes of racialised labelling and the allocation of stigma within a post-9/11 terror-panic climate. Using qualitative data from the first stage of a wider study, the paper reports on the perceptions and experiences of those marked as ‘hyper-visible’ (Khoury 2009); that is, those of middle Eastern appearance, or of South Asian or Arabic heritage and of the Muslim faith, who are presented as members of a suspect community. The paper considers ‘browning’ (Bhattacharyya 2008; Burman 2010; Semati 2010; Silva 2010) and ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 2003a) in relation to perceptions and experiences of surveillance. The paper argues that ethnic hostility features heavily in surveillance, and the impact has serious negative consequences for its subjects. Anti-terror surveillance therefore needs to be understood within the wider context of a racially defined citizenship agenda. This would allow us to more accurately understand its impact, and to ask questions about its fulfilling of safety. More significantly, it would also allow for the mapping of mobilised resistance to problematic and discriminatory surveillance.

Introduction

The surveillance of bodies is viewed in this paper to be the prolonged observation of person(s) who are considered to be at risk of causing potential harm or threat. Surveillance can be carried out by ‘hard’ means, such as CCTV, biometric gathering, data mining and profiling systems, or by ‘soft’ means, for instance the enhanced gaze of the public in everyday interactions. A variety of factors are used to inform markers of risk, including biological and social variables, as well as wider political features of the given context. With its selective nature, the surveillance of bodies is about pre-determining and reinforcing ideas of ‘suspect bodies’—those persons who, for whatever reason, are marked out as a problem. Ultimately they are of enemy status, a threat to the well-being and social order of society. A key component of surveillance is suspicion. Norris and Armstrong (1999: 112) provide us with a list of seven types of suspicion, which can be used to highlight the (legitimate and illegitimate) use of suspicion in surveillance strategies. Writing in 1999 at ‘the brink of the millennium’, Norris and Armstrong (1999: 59) argued that ‘we are approaching the maximum surveillance society’. I argue that in 2012 we are much closer to this state of surveillance than one would expect within the short space of time between Norris and Armstrong’s work and this paper. Not only are we the objects of an interconnected ‘surveillance assemblage’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Haggerty and Ericson 2000), as used by official
big brother’ crime-prevention bodies, but we are also subjected to the everyday enhanced gaze of fellow citizens, i.e. big brother’s army of little brothers, if to take from Norris, Moran and Armstrong’s discussion (1999: 100).

There are a variety of concerns regarding the selective nature and suspect marking powers of surveillance. These concerns are rooted in claims made about the infringements on (discrimination and privacy) rights. The promise of greater safety and security has been used to convincingly sell surveillance. Fuelled by an overwhelming fear of crime (Norris, Moran and Armstrong 1998: 90) and increasing ‘moral panics’ (Cohen 2002) about ‘Islamic terrorists’ (Jackson 2006), the allure of safety promised by increased surveillance allows mainstream society to be distracted from the over-focus nature of surveillance and ultimately how whilst enabling some, it also constrains others (Hier and Greenberg 2007). Dubious yet widely believed claims made about the crime fighting benefits of surveillance along with an equally dubious belief in ‘technological neutrality … – if people have nothing to hide they have no need to fear’ lead to the general public’s dismissal of civil liberty concerns (Norris, Moran and Armstrong 1998: 91).

Within the current terror-panic climate, it is argued that a ‘convenient opportunity’ for increased surveillance emerged (Haggerty and Gazso 2005: 169), which resulted in the normalisation of a more routine and intrusive surveillance system. This occurred despite an inability to actually assure our security (Ball and Webster 2003). In using ‘colour-coded suspicion’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 123), terror-related surveillance over-focuses on all those of middle Eastern appearance, or of South Asian or Arabic heritage and of the Muslim faith, or, what I term in this paper ‘brown bodies’, who are marked out as members of a ‘suspect community’—a label which is applied on a regular basis, despite the lack of any actual evidence of criminal wrongdoing on their part. Terror-related labels, i.e. anti-Western, the enemy within, illegal immigrant, sympathiser of terrorist activity, radicalised student etc., are presented as truth within the white imagination. This has serious implications for the status of brown bodies in society. Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) argue that brown bodies experience enhanced, discriminatory and unnecessary surveillance on all levels, and that the consequences lead to further limited freedoms. This paper will begin by considering established knowledge on the surveillance of bodies in relation to deviance, selectivity and control. In particular, there is an examination of hard and soft surveillance, and the allocation of stigma on brown bodies within the current terror-panic climate. Using the findings of a small qualitative study which examined racialised experiences of surveillance in Manchester (England), this paper then reports on the perception, impact and challenges to these surveillance methods.

Surveillance Within The Terror Panic Context

Surveillance controls and disciplines bodies (Gilliom 2001), and has often been presented as an effective way to reduce crime—although actual firm evidence to confirm whether this is actually the case has yet to be provided, as Skinns (1998) notes in his study of crime rates and CCTV use. Although we are all under some form of surveillance, a select population are constructed as especially deviant and are placed under enhanced surveillance. The problem with this lies in how categories of deviance are constructed, and especially how notions of fear, panic and bias go on to determine who is labelled as deviant, or as an

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1 This refers to the heightened panic following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11th September 2001 – commonly known as ‘9/11’, and later other related terrorist activity, for example, the attacks in Bali, London and Madrid.

2 It is not disputed that some individuals who have participated in such terrorist behaviour, have been of a South Asian or Arabic heritage and of the Muslim faith, and have carried out these attacks, as they alone declared, in the name of Islam. What is questioned though is the ways in which their individual criminal behaviour is applied to others of the same ethnic group, meaning that a profiling process takes place whereby ‘whole categories of phenotypically similar individuals are rendered pre-criminal and morally suspect’ ( Covington 1995: 547).
undesirable body unwanted within a given space, or unwanted per se. Surveillance therefore is much more than a tool to be used in the ‘fight against crime’. It is a means by which spaces are ‘sanitised’—they are purified of perceived troublesome others (McCahill 2002). Existing work on hard surveillance (usually CCTV surveillance) and control of spaces has focused on urban regeneration projects, city centre locales and consumerism to argue that surveillance acts as a cleansing mechanism privileging some, such as potential consumers,3 over others (see for instance Coleman and Sim 2000; Norris and Armstrong 1999).

This paper builds on this body of literature to argue that sanitising-surveillance practices are used as a means to satisfy a racial/ethnic citizenship and social ordering agenda. This involves marking out some groups are ‘dirty bodies’. Here, a set of particular markers are used to identify dirty bodies, for example, skin tone and dress. Such markers are used to label bodies, and therefore need to be fairly simplistic—as to be readily understood and easily applied by all those undertaking surveillance, including members of the general public. In this sense, surveillance has a more sinister side than the (crime control) one that is often presented to us.4 Its ‘social sorting’ function ‘produce[s] coded categories through which persons and groups of persons may be sorted…and provided differential treatments’ (Lyon 2006: 404). Surveillance is therefore also about ‘social justice’ (Lyon 2003a: 1).

Surveillance is a powerful means by which negative labels are created and strengthened. It marks out ‘suspicious bodies’—or ‘dirty bodies’, and carries out more often than not, visible displays of enhanced attention. Labelling theory and Goffman’s (1963) work on ‘stigma’ is relevant here as it allows us to consider how a deviant status is assigned, and the impact of this label. A majority segment of the population, i.e. the ‘normals’, come to view the actions, behaviour or presence of another given group as problematic for the social cohesion or general well being of society (Leary and Schreindorfer 1998). The ‘normals’ assign negative labels and adopt strategies of public shaming, or seek to correct behaviour through use of crime control strategies, such as surveillance. Often ‘normals’ have little sympathy for those who are stigmatised, given that they view their behaviour as something that is controllable, and the fault therefore to lie with them (LeBel 2008). Goffman (1963) describes the process by which a person comes to be negatively labelled, or stigmatised, i.e. in possession of ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ as a ‘moral career’ (Goffman 1963: 3). This is where the stigmatised subject’s lifestyle is changed by a series of events, both formal and informal, which ‘spoils’ their social identity, meaning that they are subjected to further devaluation, discrimination and disadvantage (LeBel 2008). Drawing on the work of Goffman (1972), Norris and Armstrong (1999: 4) argue that the surveillance gaze is a form of ‘unsolicited intrusion … a violation of the boundaries of self’. Unlike other ‘looks’, there is no equality of interactional resources. Whether formal or informal, mechanical or in-person, at a distance or close-by, those undertaking surveillance are able to use wider structures of power to simultaneously control bodies and veil their gaze—see Foucault’s (1977) work on the panoptic gaze for a much deeper consideration of discipline, power and control. As Coleman (2004) argues, the faces of those behind surveillance, and all those systems which limit freedom of movement, must be rendered visible and challenged, ‘if only in calling the powerful to account for their increasingly intrusive and unjust surveillance practices’ (Coleman 2004: 305).

The stigmatising process means that the actual repercussions of the enhanced observation event have a much more prolonged and widespread impact, both for the individual and for others belonging to the same group. Often it is the same bodies that are marked out as undesirable. In white majority society, such as Britain, black and minority ethnic (BME) groups are often seen as a threat for their supposed ‘foreign’ and

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3 See Lyon (2006) who highlights how surveillance is also used to increase public perception of safety, for instance at airports, which helps to maintain air-business.

4 Interestingly, Lyon (2003a: 2) argues that surveillance in itself is not sinister, neither is discrimination in itself damaging. Rather, it is the stereotypical or prejudicial sources which go on to shape risk categories in surveillance that are the problem—see Smith’s 2004 study of CCTV control room operators for an insightful account of operator prejudice.
‘infectious’ nature. Over the years, fear and loathing about BME groups have resulted in a range of panics, each bringing their own ensuing practices of victimisation—for more on this see Patel and Tyrer (2011). Cohen’s classic work on ‘moral panics’ (2002) notes that panic occurs due to the construction of a suitable enemy, suitable victims, and a consensus that the ‘folk devil’ is harmful to society. Although irrational and disproportionate, these types of panics often emerge from some genuine, albeit misplaced, sense of fear, which in turn sanctions action that would otherwise be seen as victimising. The long tradition of racist hostility in countries such as Britain further legitimates attacks on BME folk devils.

In more recent times, a concern about ‘new terrorism’, by which within the white imagination, we read ‘Islamic terrorism’ (Jackson 2006: 11), has resulted in a revision in the construction of the BME deviant other. This is framed by xenophobia and Islamaphobia, and delivered through a ‘new popular racism’ discourse (Kundnani 2001). This has led to a rapid increase in fear levels about terrorism (Mythen and Walklate 2006), and increased hostility towards all those imagined to be responsible. This was illustrated in the numerous attacks on brown bodies (many of whom involved cases of mistaken identity) in the weeks following 9/11 in the USA, and July 7th 2005 (often referred to as 7/7) in the UK—see Freyd 2002 who provides an interesting explanation of human emotions and responses towards brown bodies following 9/11. Linked into debates about citizenship and multiculturalism, a particular type of hostility has emerged, which selectively presents one BME category—‘brown bodies’—as especially dangerous (Razaak 2008). As Burman (2010) and Semati (2010) note, the browning of bodies is a strategy of identification, which ‘seeks to sort the ally from the enemy, the model minority / informant / “good Muslim” from suspect / extremist / “bad Muslim”, but also to cast the net of suspicion widely in order to justify new policy frameworks’ (Burman 2010: 203). Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo (2010: 239) note how some mistakenly perceive the browning of bodies from a more celebratory stance, assuming that it will be embraced within and passively accepted by the mainstream. They go on to argue that rather, what is actually occurring in a post-9/11 environment, is that a growing allocation of ‘brown’ labels has created fear and insecurity—what they call the ‘browning of terror’ (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2010: 240). Browning in this sense is a process, unlike other racialised identities, like ‘black’ or ‘white’. This is because ‘brown’ is not tied to a specific racial or ethnic group, with a shared culture or history (Burman 2010; Harewood 2010). Rather ‘brown’ represents ‘the perceived performative aspects of deviance and danger’ (Silva 2010: 169). It is about articulating the perceived security threats of the national imaginary, which originates from racialised constructions of the dangerous ‘other’—merging issues of immigration and terrorism. It acts to ‘relegitimise state racism’ (Bhattacharyya 2008: 75). Browning does this by highlighting notions of brown difference that are cultural, non-essential, and unlike past violence against other BME groups (such as Africans). Yet, at the same time, it continues to link the brown body with a particular set of social meanings (Bhattacharyya 2008: 58). For example, consider the use of terms such as

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5 For example, one USA poll from September 2011 showed that 36 per cent of Americans felt ‘very or somewhat worried’ that they or a family member could be a victim of terrorism (USA Today/Gallup Poll 2011). Unsurprisingly, this fear places terror prevention work as a high priority, as seen with a recent UK YouGov survey, where 51 per cent of people thought that the British government’s top priority should be to protect the country from terrorist threats (Knight, Niblett and Raines 2012).

6 This paper recognises that racism and ethnic-based tensions in white majority societies, such as Australia, Canada, UK and the USA are far more complex than space in this paper permits. For a greater analysis of these relations, please see Patel and Tyrer (2011).

7 For example, consider the case of turban-wearing Sikh, Balbir Singh Sodhi who was shot on September 15th 2001, outside his petrol station in the US state of Arizona. It was revealed that Sodhi’s killer had spent the hours before the murder in a bar, bragging of his intention to ‘kill the ragheads responsible for September 11’. Similar attacks took place against members of the Sikh population in Britain following ‘7/7’, when Gudwaras in Kent and Bradford were petrol bombed.

8 Harewood (2010) notes how a process of body-browning was occurring prior to 9/11. Similarly, Semati (2010) reminds us how imagination of those marked as ‘brown’ are rooted in Orientalist ideas of the ‘West’, which have been produced for many centuries.
Canadian-born (Muslim) as opposed to Canadian, to mark out that although one may be born in that country, they are never really part of that country (Fisk 2006 in Burman 2010: 201; Razack 2008). Similarly, the use of terms such as ‘homegrown terrorist’ and ‘enemy within’ which were heavily used following the 7/7 attacks, moves beyond the link between terrorism and immigration, so to present all brown bodies as outsiders. This allows for a wider casting of the surveillance net.

Within the terror-panic climate, all those marked out as brown are at worst considered to be (potential) terrorists—or at least sympathetic to it; or, at best, they have their citizenship status questioned, they are ‘illegals’ (Sivanandan 2006: 2), or more specifically ‘crimmigrant’ others (Aas 2011). This has fed into an intensification of state powers under anti-terror and immigration legislation, which presents the suspension of rights as a legally authorised necessity (Razack 2008: 4). To do this effectively relies on the construction of brown bodies as a unique type of evil, both within criminal classifications, and particularly within terrorist typologies. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009: 646) point out that the presentation of this group as a ‘new suspect community’—which followed a similar construction of an ‘old suspect community’, i.e. the Irish in the mid-1970s (Hillyard 1993)—is vital. Panics about newer forms of terrorism outweigh any panics around older terror threats, not least because of claims about the indiscriminate nature of the first. This is illustrated in the following comment made by a high ranking police officer of an English police force, about the introduction of new anti-terror measures following the July 2005 attacks in London. Such a comment has the ability to fuel panic and defends the ever intrusive security measures by comparing the ‘old’ and ‘new’ terror activities, and by emphasising the inherent evil of the latter: ‘Al-Qaeda have re-written the manual of attack ... [the IRA] was somewhat easier to manage ... They didn’t want to commit suicide. The aim of the game now is mass murder’ (Detective Chief Supt Tony Porter, Head of Counter Terrorism Unit, Greater Manchester Police, cited in Scheerhout 2008). The result is that all brown bodies are marked out as ‘hyper-visible’ (Khoury 2009) and become the focus of disproportionate attention for anti-terror security bodies and criminal justice agents. Taking from Adey’s (2004) examination into the airport surveillance of non-humans, it is argued that objects belonging to, or stereotypically associated with brown bodies and the terror-panic context, i.e. headscarf, Hijab or rucksacks, are also subject to sorting and increased monitoring. When attached to a brown body they move away from being an everyday item to a suspicious one.

A variety of hard technological surveillance measures are used by security bodies to monitor ‘suspects’, and although their use has intensified since 9/11, they were actually being proposed or in existence in some form or another before the attacks (Lyon 2003c; Lyon 2006). These surveillance measures include CCTV, often enhanced by facial recognition software; communication interception; automatic number plate recognition; biometric extension, i.e. iris scans and fingerprinting; and, secret property searches. For example, consider the body scanners at Manchester airport in England (BBC News 2010a); the Visionics ‘Face It’ CCTV-facial recognition system at Boston Logan airport in the USA (PR Newswire 2001 in Lyon 2003c: 670); ‘Echelon’, the international multi-communications interception system (Lyon 2003c); Canada’s ‘Advanced Passenger Information / Passenger Name Record Program’ (Lyon 2006); the secret property searches proposed by the American government (Haggerty and Gazso 2005); or, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (Graham and Coaffee 2008). Adey notes that subjects ‘are not proving their identity, rather ... authorities are identifying them’ (2004: 507). This type of surveillance exists not only at border crossing and transport hubs such as airports and train stations, or sites housing important information or especially vulnerable bodies, such as schools, hospitals, police stations and government offices, but are increasingly found in everyday public areas, such as local neighbourhoods and heavily used pedestrian streets. The continuous monitoring of movement and verification of identification acts as a means of ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 2003a), and is widespread due to the global interconnectivity of the ‘surveillance assemblage’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Of greater concern

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9 ‘Anti-terror’ refers to defensive enhanced security and surveillance measures designed to deter or prevent terrorist attacks (Martin 2010: 463).
though is their inability to actually guarantee our safety—as Matsumoto’s testing of biometric (fingerprinting) scanners indicated (Costello 2002 in Lyon 2003c: 668), or indeed as the actual occurrence of attacks such as 9/11 demonstrate.

On another level, brown bodies are also subjected to everyday forms of ‘citizen surveillance practices’, i.e. person-to-person gaze (stares) in public spaces undertaken by ‘ordinary’ citizens (Finn 2011: 413). This gaze goes beyond the usual ‘hate stares’ (McVeigh 1998) often reserved for BMEs—which say, ‘you’re different’ and ‘you do not belong here’ (McVeigh 1998: 12). Rather, it is motivated by suspicion and fear, so that brown bodies are labelled as deviant, and constructed as morally and legally problematic, not only in their expected criminality, i.e. as a terrorist, but also in terms of their citizenship as a whole. Citizen surveillance is something that is actively encouraged, as demonstrated with the comments made by Michael Roach, former Assistant Director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, who, following the London bombings in 2005, asked the public to use their mobile phone cameras to photograph figures of middle Eastern appearance, who were acting suspiciously (AAP 2005 and Lateline 2005 in Pugliese 2006: para. 14). The ‘success’ of citizen surveillance is rooted in the ‘permission to hate’ context (Perry 2001: 79) which presents citizen-to-citizen surveillance as one’s national and civic duty, and in doing so actively reproduces and reinforces ethnic based social divisions and structures of power (Finn 2011). Although always the subject of ‘colouring’ and boundaries, these brown bodies have moved from being a ‘little bit foreign’ to being seen as the ‘anti-British’ threatening other (i.e. terrorist). Brown bodies are therefore ‘casted out’ as they are subjected to stigmatisation, surveillance and expulsion (Razack 2008: 5). This also keeps society as a whole in a ‘permanent state of emergency’, marked by ‘practices of exceptionalism’ (Bigo 2009: 47). Such ‘colour-coded suspicion’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 123) is common. In the mainstream however, it is viewed as an acceptable response to a specific risk—a fear about ‘new terrorism’. Even when faults are exposed, problematic action is excused, as demonstrated in the shooting of 27 year old Jean Charles de Menezes in London’s Stockwell Tube station on July 22nd 2005 (Justice4Jean 2011), and the Metropolitan Police force’s use of the element of ‘error’ and the ‘what if’ rationale (Sir Ian Blair, quoted in NBC News 2005).

The impact of such surveillance can be devastating. Research in Britain by Spalek (2010) into the experiences of counter-terrorism11 and profiling under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 200012 highlighted ‘significant and multi-layered emotional, psychological’ effects and other associated impacts on those who had experienced enhanced observation and attention, such as being stopped and searched, and subjected to the various hard policing strategies, i.e. raids on homes; detention without charge; being approached by security services to act as informants, which due to their serious and intense nature, could be construed as a form of state victimisation (Spalek 2010: 27). As a result, high levels of fear, anger and distrust were reported by Spalek’s respondents. Similar findings were produced by Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2009: 736-737), whose respondents (young Pakistani Britons residing in the North-West of England), reported several wider consequences of counter-terror strategies for their mobility, self-expression and their behaviour in public spaces. This left them feeling disenchanted and infuriated. Respondents in Spalek’s study also felt as if they were being viewed as a ‘suspect community’ (Spalek, El Awa and McDonald 2009: 17), and that there were very real consequences of this label in other parts of their lives, and which went on to hinder any interest to participate in wider police–community engagement initiatives (Spalek, El

10 For an insight into the shooting, see official investigations, known as ‘Stockwell One’ and ‘Stockwell Two’ (Independent Police Complaints Commission 2007a; 2007b). See also the works of O’Driscoll (2008); Pugliese (2006); and, Vaughan-Williams (2007), for a critical reflection of the case.

11 Counter-terrorism refers to proactive policies designed to eliminate terrorist environments and groups (Martin 2010: 463).

12 Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (2000) is a piece of UK legislation that has widened the stop and search powers of the police. It has been criticised for allowing officers to take into account the individual’s ethnicity in their selection of persons to search. In January 2010 these stop and search powers were ruled illegal by the European Court of Human Rights, and at the time of writing the British Government is reviewing its use and powers.
Awa and McDonald 2009). Of interest though is how respondents in Mythen, Walklate and Khan’s (2009: 744) study reported feelings of ‘victimisation’, and that this was based on their perception of surveillance that is motivated by a suspicion of skin colour, as oppose to a suspicion of action.

To suggest though that brown bodies passively accept the over-focus of surveillance would be inaccurate. Here we can draw on the work of Becker who argued ‘…the deviant is one to whom the label has been successfully applied’ (Becker 1963: 4). Hence, for a deviant label to be so, it must be accepted as such by the subject themselves, through their internalisation and obeying of the rules, with little or no challenge. This paper argues that the internalisation and obeying of rules has not occurred for many of the hyper-visible bodies picked out for specialist surveillance measures. This is supported in Mythen, Walklate and Khan’s study (2009: 743), where respondents reported a keenness to challenge negative re-presentations of Islam, especially the equation of ‘Muslim’ with ‘terrorist’. More recently, this form of resistance was illustrated in the response to increased CCTV in the Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook wards of Birmingham in England (BBC News 2010b). Challenging the assigning of a deviant label is especially important for those who have been labelled a deviant, but who in fact have not broken a rule (Becker 1963).

Managing Stigma and Challenging Surveillance

The use of ethnic profiling in anti-terror surveillance is widespread across the UK. The Manchester area though has especially witnessed increased forms of surveillance being used on those considered suspect. The ‘terror prevention’ appeal is presented in such a way, that the ever encroaching forms of surveillance on the lives of all citizens, whether deviant or not, are accepted by the majority. Consider for instance how in October 2010, we saw the first national use of body scanners at Manchester’s main airport (BBC News 2010a), or the network of 15 automatic number plate recognition systems, dubbed Manchester’s ‘ring of steel’, monitoring every car entering and leaving the city’s central district (Heath 2008). Considerable support has also been given to Greater Manchester Police’s Counter Terrorism Unit, which since being set up in April 2007 has seen an increase in staffing numbers and funding. In 2009, the Unit boasted of having secured 17 terrorism-related prosecutions since being set up, which was held up as an indication of both its necessity and success (Greater Manchester Police Authority 2009). A number of projects have also been popular, such as Prevent, and Project Griffin, designed ‘to raise awareness among security personnel about counter-terrorism measures so they are better equipped to deal with their organisation’s security challenges on a day-to-day basis and in the event of a major incident’ (Greater Manchester Police 2011).

For this reason, Manchester is an interesting location. As a sample site, the city contains a high population (in comparison to surrounding cities) of BME groups, especially South Asian, Black African Caribbean, Arabic or middle-Eastern individuals. For example, according to 2007 mid-year population estimates, all non-white ethnic groups accounted for 24.2 per cent (111,000) of the population (Manchester City Council 2011a; 2011b). Of this figure, there were 14.8 per cent (66,000) belonging to an ethnic group, i.e. Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, and, Black African (Manchester City Council 2011a; 2011b), which are in the main often categorised, perceived or misidentified as belonging to the Muslim faith. As a city that contains such high BME populations, and which has experienced acts of terror in the

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13 Known to be predominantly populated by Muslims and having been told that the cameras were there as part of a general crime-reduction strategy and to protect residents against vehicle crime, drugs offenses and anti-social behaviour, it was later discovered that the cameras had been paid for by a Government grant from the Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund.

14 Manchester is located in the north-west region of England. It has an estimated population of 967,600 (Office for National Statistics 2010).
past,\textsuperscript{15} it can be argued that this city, and others like it, are experiencing new urban security strategies in response to perceived risk of terrorism (Coaffee and Rogers 2008). In particular it is argued that within the terror-panic climate, brown bodies have experienced increased surveillance, and have especially been subjected to disproportionate profiling, which use (perceived, imagined or real) ethnic markers as criteria upon which monitoring decisions are based. This process not only privileges elites who gain feelings of safety—which is in itself different from the actual delivery of safety—but does so by reducing the liberty of other citizens (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006).

The following presents some interview data from a small sample of respondents—the first of three groups.\textsuperscript{16} The wider study seeks to understand how the profiling process is determined and experienced by the key parties involved. The first stage of the study is reported in this paper.\textsuperscript{17} This focused on subjects’ perceptions, impact and responses to hard and soft surveillance strategies within a terror-panic climate. The data presented here reports on the interview narratives of five respondents—all those who participated. These respondents, all of whom have been given pseudonyms, had all at some point been identified by others as brown bodies of the Muslim faith. They were all born in Britain, and came from a range of other backgrounds in terms of age, gender, sexuality and so on. This was seen as methodological acceptable given that the study is not a comparative one. Respondents participated in the study on a voluntary basis and were recruited via the snowballing method, drawing on contacts made with youth and cultural groups located in the study site. Semi-structured interviews, lasting approximately 60 minutes each, were used with the five respondents. Although a fairly small number, this sample size was considered appropriate for this stage in light of the wider study, and produced approximately five hours’ worth of narrative, from which insightful data and criminological analysis on the subject was generated. Entering the field as a criminologist, and using semi-structured interviews with this sample group allowed for a greater level of understanding to be obtained regarding the thoughts, views and experiences of those directly involved in the ethnic profiling and increased surveillance process because we are directly accessing the meanings attached by the respondent in their understanding, interpretation, negotiation and response to their experiences. In this sense, the study takes direction from Kundnani (2009) whose study into the Prevent programme was considered to have been significantly enhanced by having used interviews with those who had direct experience and knowledge of Prevent projects. This was also illustrated in Spalek’s (2002) study into Muslim women’s experiences of victimisation. Significantly, this method also allows an avenue to be provided for the empowerment of those respondents who have previously been marginalised in research.

Taking from the body of literature discussed earlier in this paper, this section now goes on to use empirically collected data to examine perceptions of racialised surveillance within a terror-panic climate; its impact on emotional wellbeing and use of space; and, the possibilities for challenging the over-focus of surveillance and converting negative labels into positive ones. In developing existing work on ‘stigma’ (Goffman 1963), there will be a testing of two key arguments—firstly that hard and soft surveillance is used as a tool to socially sort bodies and sanitise spaces (Lyon 2006; McCahill 2002; Coleman and Sim 2000; Norris and Armstrong 1999); and secondly, the browning of bodies within a terror-panic climate allows for racist practices to be normalised (Bhattacharyya 2008; Burman 2010; Semati 2010; Silva 2010).

\textsuperscript{15} This refers to the act of terrorism in Manchester city centre on June 16\textsuperscript{th} 1996, carried out by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Although there were no fatalities, there were 212 injuries, and an estimated damage of £1 billion caused.

\textsuperscript{16} The wider research project is divided into three stages: (i) a focus on those encountering ethnic profiling; (ii) a focus on those charged with undertaking ‘hard’ surveillance; and, (iii) a focus on non-government organisation groups who assist subjects in challenging what they believe to be the victimisation or denial of human rights via ethnically based profiling.

\textsuperscript{17} The author of this paper is currently undertaking the second stage of the research—the data from which will be reported in forthcoming publications.
Irrational Fear and Negative Stereotyping
All of the respondents had recalled a time within the terror-panic climate when they had been identified by someone or something else as a ‘brown body’. Their experiences of browning had varied, meaning that for some it was a momentary label, whereas for others the label was more long-term. Regardless though, all had recounted browning experiences akin to that described by Bhattacharyya (2008), Burman (2010), Semati (2010) and Silva (2010). One of the respondents had at the time of interviewing, self-defined as ‘brown’, which they suggested was an attempt to differentiate themselves as a particular type of BME group—one which did not have the same political, historical or cultural identity to Black African Caribbeans, which she argued was the group that was often seen as the BME group in the UK. Rather, for her, ‘brown’ was used to positively mark herself out as a BME of South Asian heritage with a particular history and culture. For this self-identifying ‘brown’ respondent however, her (Muslim) religion did not contribute to her brown identity—given that ‘really, anyone of any colour can be Muslim’ (Alana).

Although it was felt that negative stereotypes about BMEs and Muslims had existed for a number of decades—as one respondent said, ‘it’s inevitable in a place like this ... because of the proportion of whites compared to others and ’cause of the history, like slavery and Empire and all that’ (Alana)—there was a strong belief shared by all respondents that particular events, namely 9/11, had been a marker in the history of racism. This event had seen an intensification and acceptability of discrimination against all those considered to be Muslim; as one respondent said: ‘Islamaphobia has always been there, but I just think it’s been enhanced in the last decade’ (Dawood).

Respondents talked about how, following this period, they felt more visibly marked out, because of ideas constructed in the wider imagination about their ethnicity:

_I recall after the 7/7 bombing and travelling to London, and I did have a rucksack and I was very aware as to how I was travelling ... I did feel very visible as a Muslim at that time, even though I don’t dress in the formal Islamic way, in terms of the Hijab or anything like that ... I just felt more visible but I felt that was more to do with what had happened and the public’s general view of Muslims being quite distorted._

(Naila)

This echoes the idea of a ‘colour-coded suspicion’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 123), and in particular the recognition by respondents that it does occur. In addition, they also noted that this ‘suspicion’ is based on a distorted view, as oppose to a factual one.

Regardless, respondents became more ‘visible’. This state of visibility, or what Khoury (2009) calls ‘hyper-visibility’, not only presented respondents as deviant, but as being of a particular category of deviance—that associated with an evil of their own choosing, i.e. their difference is cultural and non-essential. Respondents noted their own perceptions of such ‘enhanced evil’ and located this on a broader deviance spectrum: ‘Being a terrorist is the worst possible thing you can be’ (Alana). Another respondent said: ‘For me when you say you are a Muslim, it’s like a dirty word. You may as well say you are a paedophile’ (Amina). These negative presentations, argue critical race theorists, are located within and are heavily reliant on the ordinary nature of discrimination (Delgado and Stefancic 2001), as well as a browning process that allows for racist behaviour to be normalised, legitimated and presented as rational, as one respondent highlighted:

_I [Islamaphobia] has become acceptable as dinner talk, and I think it has, that in a way being Islamaphobic is something that is fashionable, that can be joked about. It’s just been mixed into popular culture, so when it reaches that point, so when you have friends or former friends on Facebook making some racist comments and they think it’s_
acceptable, it makes you think, wow this is really ingrained, its everyday, it’s part of people’s lives, you know ‘Muslim scum, they should fuck off back to Pakistan’ and this is someone who I was really good friends with at school, but it was wow, this is how easy it was to be this way, and I think Islamaphobia still ranks really low in terms of a hate crime, it’s not considered to be a hate crime, you know, it’s just seen as bad manners or something or just jokes.

(Dawood)

This comment supports the existence of a ‘permission to hate’ context (Perry 2001: 79), and tells us the power of such a context to both enable and excuse ethnic hostility, especially in relation to newer panics about terrorism. As this respondent’s comment illustrates, there are a number of outlets in popular culture where such ethnic hostility is exhibited and normalised including social network sites. The normalisation of discrimination was considered by respondents to create further panic and hostility, which they felt went on to contribute to the public’s support for increased surveillance measures: ‘I think they think it’s ok where ‘cause they’re in a climate now when they can say anything they want about Muslims, they’re in a situation where they can do anything they want to do in terms of surveillance’ (Nadia).

These narratives indicate that processes of ‘browning’ (Bhattacharyya 2008; Burman 2010; Semati 2010; Silva 2010) were clearly occurring, often on a regular basis. Respondents felt that they were being identified in negative ways—i.e. suspect, anti-British, (potential) terrorist, and so on—due to (i) an existing anti-BME hostility; and, (ii) a newly updated demonisation of those perceived to be Muslims within the terror-panic climate. The respondents’ comments tell us that a negative labelling process occurred in a range of environments; a consequence being that they are marked as bodies attracting special attention or being made to feel ‘hyper-visible’ (Khoury 2009), and thereby face real consequences of direct and indirect victimisation. This also allows ethnic hostility to be normalised or, more dangerously, as one respondent thought when talking about Islamaphobia, to be ‘fashionable’. This ‘normalisation’ further excuses increased hard and soft surveillance measures to be targeted on those like the interviewed respondents. Although there was a clear case of negative stereotyping, fed in part by an irrational fear of ‘new terrorism’, we must question the degree to which irrational fear can be used to excuse ethnic hostility, asking instead is it actually the case that irrational fear is largely used to mask the real racist character and ‘social sorting’ agenda (Lyon 2003a; 2006) of white majority societies. This would enable hostile actors / bodies to remove blame from themselves, attaching it instead on those subjected to exclusionary practices. This would add to the victim-blaming nature of the browning and labelling process, i.e. ‘we have been kind to them and given them everything, but they have chosen to attack us’. This allows labels such as ‘anti-British’ or ‘enemy within’ to be all too readily applied to all those considered hostile and suspect, even when there is no evidence to support the label.

Surveillance within a Terror-Panic Climate

In inviting respondents to talk about experiences of surveillance, all respondents associated it with the idea of ‘being watched’ (Dawood), for both hard and soft measures. Although there was not always overt evidence of this surveillance, the feeling of being watched was strong. This is highlighted in a comment made by one respondent:

The surveillance of the general public on me, viewing me with a suspicious eye, because that is profiling, not only by the official body but also by the lay person, fellow shoppers here at the shopping centre. So that’s been a bit of a transformation. They just look, and I know that might sound almost ... it’s hard to gratify that statement with evidence, unless you were following me for a day or I wore a head camera for a day, but I think it’s partly linked into other factors, such as the rise of Islamaphobia, so others view me with particular suspicion.

(Dawood)
The idea that surveillance was also about ‘feeling’ and ‘perceptions’, and not always about hard evidence of its use, was also echoed by another respondent:

> I think in the organisation where I worked before, we were a registered charity [for Pakistani people], and we did feel we were under surveillance, and we never had any hard evidence to [dis]prove that ... and we had some colleagues that were very active and vocal in human rights for Muslims, and we were sure that that was being monitored.

(Naila)

These comments illustrate the power of surveillance, especially in relation to its negative psychological impact. Not only is the existence of such an impact recognised—supporting the findings of Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2009) and Spalek (2010)—but, in addition, it also reveals the intensity of psychological and emotional harm on those who encounter surveillance and ‘border control’ measures in the everyday spaces of their lives, such as whilst shopping or when at work.

Often we are told that increased surveillance, even if informed in part by ethnic profiling, allows safety, protection and security, and is a ‘minor inconvenience’ for those under observation, who need not worry if they have nothing to hide. This claim though only holds weight if surveillance is fair and equal—which by its very ‘selective’ nature, we know it is not, especially within a terror-panic climate where there is an abundance of ethnic stereotypes being used to mark out ‘suspect’ bodies. However, an atmosphere of fear and panic, sustained in part by the mass media, political figures and partial accounts of foiled terror plots carefully revealed to the public (Mythen and Walklate 2008), continue to present the idea of pursuing ‘safety at any cost’. Although equally vulnerable to terror attacks as their white counterparts, and in some agreement about the need for a safe society, and even for some use of surveillance to achieve this safety, not all respondents associated surveillance and the promise of safety as being concerned with their safety, as one respondent said: ‘It doesn’t make me feel safe, not at all, no’ (Amina). For these respondents, increased surveillance made them feel victimised and unsafe, largely because it was often hidden from view or excused from accountability and regulation. Surveillance therefore was seen as a powerful mechanism for control and regulation of undesirable bodies. It was, if we draw on Lyon’s (2003a) argument, a form of ‘social sorting’, which within the terror-panic climate, was underwritten by a racist agenda. This view was highlighted in a comment made by a respondent who talked about the Birmingham CCTV case:

> For me the cameras in Birmingham were a real watershed moment, because it was like, wow, they are really, really focusing on us ... and that is their lack of trust in us that they have to do it covertly, and even when it is exposed they first try and deny it; for me that was a big watershed moment, because that really opened my eyes to what was going on and what is going to happen in the future.

(Dawood)

Respondents did not dispute that some of the individuals who have participated in acts of terrorism were of a similar ethnic background to themselves, and that they had carried out these attacks in their self-declared name of Islam. Following this, some respondents noted that there may be a need for heightened security measures in particular environments, as one respondent said:

> In terms of surveillance at airports, because I know that has been increased and I can understand why, you know, I believe we have to be realistic, we do live in an environment, we do live in a world where terrorist acts are happening worldwide, and I do think yes increased security is a positive thing, but it has to be on reasonable grounds.

(Naila)
What was questioned though, as this respondents last few words suggest, was the discriminatory and insensitive over-surveillance practices that were occurring. This was seen as especially invasive, especially in terms of religious beliefs. It was also considered by respondents to be largely about exercising control over the respondents’ body (and others like them), in order to publically display attempts to relocate them outside the borders of citizen inclusivity—in very much the same way that use of terms such as ‘Canadian-born’, to refer to Muslims of Canadian birth, seek to do (Fisk 2006 in Burman 2010: 201; Razack 2008). For instance, one respondent recalled an experience of the body scanner at an airport:

> With the airport body scanners and searches, and when I’m asked to remove my headscarf, it does feel intrusive and invasive, you may have asked me to have taken my top off ... I felt like if I didn’t have a head wrap on or look this way, I wouldn’t have been stopped that day. I do find it personally offensive. Don’t get me wrong I do understand about security, but the scanner that’s really bad, because why do you want to look at me in that way, because as a Muslim and as someone who has been raised to protect their modesty, it’s fundamentally offensive to who I am and how I carry myself. I would rather be in a room with a single female searching me.

(Amina)

These comments illustrate that surveillance is generally viewed in negative ways, and it is done so because of a belief that it is biased and a selective tool of discrimination. In this sense, they are clearly about ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 2003a). However, surveillance per se is not considered to be problematic—supporting Lyon’s (2003a) argument; rather, there are particular types of, and perceived (racist) motivations for, surveillance that are the problem. For instance, respondents in the study differed on what they felt were problematic and unacceptable forms of surveillance, which depended on their own biological variables, i.e. gender; the wider environment that the surveillance was occurring, such as of it was at a site of vulnerability (such as airports); and the body undertaking the surveillance measure, for example, one respondent preferred to being pat-down at the airport by another female officer as opposed to being processed by the non-faced gaze of the body scanner. What comes from this is the observation that it is not just the racially / ethnically loaded factors informing selective surveillance that is the problem: it is also the ways in which surveillance is carried out that is highlighted as a concern. In particular, mechanical, faceless and ethnically selective surveillance measures that don’t respect the intimacy and religious sanctity of the body are viewed as problematic.

The Impact of Over-Surveillance

Surveillance was considered by respondents to ‘be absolutely everywhere’ (Amina), and not just in environments where one would typically expect it to be, such as airports for instance. Some respondents drew attention to soft forms of surveillance, the focus of which is not equally distributed on everybody, namely the everyday informal ‘citizen surveillance practices’ that were carried out by members of the public (Finn 2011: 413). The impact of over-surveillance, including citizen-to-citizen surveillance, was regularly felt on the lives of respondents:

> I see it every day, for example where we are now [shopping centre], I was aware of surveillance, not really from cameras but I guess from people, but that was not only from people who were official bodies, security guards, police officers, but also surveillance from others ... In my experience in airports and on public transport, I have felt a lingering eye when I’ve boarded a train or plane, and I have, I think been viewed with suspicion and I guess I’m aware of surveillance on me on a daily basis.

(Dawood)
Some respondents felt as if their behaviour could be misinterpreted or maliciously used to criminalise non-criminal behaviour. This was especially so if they owned particular objects which, when attached to a particular ethnic group, would enhance a status of suspicion—reminding us of Adey’s (2004) work. This was noted by one respondent who said:

*I feel you have to be very careful. I used to be a hairdresser and I stored bleach, and if some coppers came round there they’d say ‘yeah, jihad’ and I’d be done. There’s a fear, I mean I know guys, who have gone to Asia and obviously there’s guns over there, in the villages for protection, and for loads of boys its like ‘I’ve got a picture of a gun’ and I say ‘you’d better get rid of that, because someone is gonna say you’ve been to a training camp’, and I feel that, honestly, all the time.*

(Nadia)

Regularly in the media, political arena and in some academic work, support for the growth in surveillance strategies is tied to the idea of it being necessary in order to achieve security and safety for its law abiding citizens. This has for instance been one of the claims made about enhanced security measures at those sites marked as especially vulnerable to security threats, such as airports. Some respondents though were suspicious of this claim. For example, in referring to the Manchester airport body scanners, one respondent said:

*It’s a bit of a scaremongering tactic, and from my critical eye, it’s another way to keep people in fear and another way to keep the government comfortable in employing their strategies that target the Muslim community … and most recently its immigrants, and I think that the use of body scanners is a similar tactic, not really to prevent terrorism, but to keep people in fear.*

(Dawood)

This supports Bhattacharyya’s (2008) point that certain measures are about articulating the perceived security threats of the national imaginary, which originates from racialised constructions of the dangerous ‘other’—merging issues of immigration and terrorism. This serves to ‘relegitimise state racism’ (Bhattacharyya 2008: 75).

Another respondent was suspicious in general about such surveillance strategies and, what they felt to be, their ethnically biased nature: ‘I just think they are very, very heavy handed if you are Muslim or a brown face, the community are being targeted’ (Nadia). For some, this suspicion was at an especially enhanced level. This is illustrated, for example, by two respondents, who both spoke about the use of ‘harder’ surveillance strategies to monitor bodies: ‘No one admits to it but officers going around and checking in the property and moving things’ (Nadia), and:

*I mean, I’ve got sisters who work in the legal profession and, you know, even when I have a simple telephone conversation with either of them, they don’t use the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’, or anything like that because, they feel like their phones are being tapped…*

(Naila)

Respondents’ feelings, perceptions and experiences of over-surveillance also impacted on social networking, political associations and physical movements. For example, in follow-up to the last quote, the same respondent added: ‘… I am aware of it more depending on who I interact with … I am careful when I have conversations with them, or even in text messages because of the work they are involved in, because of the people they represent’ (Naila). To some degree, all but one respondent avoided particular spaces, which they considered to be under increased surveillance and where they felt especially
vulnerable: ‘I don’t go to Islamic forums or debates that might discuss terrorism or war ... and I suppose I am careful as to which causes I do support’ (Naila).

In instances where an avoidance strategy hadn’t been adopted, respondents noted consequences for their emotional and psychological well-being. Those felt to be marked out for special attention talked about situations of stress: ‘I feel like, panicky’ (Amina). This intensified their already-existing feelings of self-consciousness:

> I think being in a place like this [shopping centre], just really heightens my sense of surveillance, because I just feel it much more. I’ve been walking around with a bag today, it’s a laptop bag, and I can feel people looking at me and looking at the bag.

(Dawood)

On another level, this same respondent also talked about the negative impact this had on their ability to develop personal and intimate relationships:

> For example, there may be a girl who may look and I think, is she looking at me because she likes me or because I’m suspicious to her? If she just looks at you, I don’t know, it’s hard to say, but now it’s so confusing for me.

(Dawood)

What this tells us is that there are very real consequences of both hard and soft forms of surveillance. Taking from Goffman (1972), and Norris and Armstrong (1999), I argue that such ethnically determined surveillance and over-focus is a violation because it is rooted in an unequal interaction. It is therefore about exercising power over a body, and in doing so, renders that body vulnerable. This sense of vulnerability can be momentary or pro-longed. It can manifest in physical, social, psychological or emotional forms, such as experiencing personal distress, difficulties interacting with other people, or restricted movement in particular spaces. Although varied in experiences and intensity levels, it is clear that such surveillance clearly impacts negatively on those innocent subjects who come under its gaze. This challenges the idea of ‘minor inconveniences’ caused by surveillance, as well as its claim to ‘technological neutrality’ (Gilliom 2001); the studies undertaken demonstrate instead that there is a deeper level of harm for the innocent body under the terror-panic surveillance gaze.

**Resistance and Challenge**

Drawing on the ‘stigma’ work of Goffman (1963), Cohen’s ‘moral panics’ and folk devils’ (2002), and the process of browning (Bhattacharyya 2008; Burman 2010; Semati 2010; Silva 2010), it is argued in this paper that within the terror-panic climate particular ethnic bodies are stigmatised and negatively labelled. None of the respondents attempted to ‘cover’ these labels, in contrast to the respondents in Mythen, Walklate and Khan’s (2009) study. However, as previously discussed, some respondents did attempt to avoid stigma-associated objects or spaces, for instance, recall one respondent’s comment: ‘I don’t go to Islamic forums or debates that might discuss terrorism or war ... and I suppose I am careful as to which causes I do support’ (Naila).

However, there was an indication of a desire to challenge the negative label in itself, especially in terms of how it is assigned to a particular ethnic body or object, as one respondent said:

> I’m not going to let anyone tell me that if I wear this scarf round my head that it means they can think these things about me or say ‘oh, she must be a terrorist or hiding something’. My headscarf means something to me and my faith and I’ll say ‘hold on a minute, who do you think you are and do you really know what it means and why I wear it?’ For me it’s a positive thing and it’s about modesty, which is important to me as a
Muslim woman. My scarf for me is a positive thing.

(Alana)

Another way of challenging negative labels was for respondents to question the very power and status of those who allocate, re-enforce or use the label. Here respondents were keen to engage in encounters which would give them the opportunity to challenge power relations, as one respondent said:

Believe it or not, in some contexts I want to be stopped by the police, because I’m fascinated in how they would receive me how they would challenge me. Because if they do treat me inappropriately, then I want to challenge that, because I hear many cases of how they have treated friends and family, I mean I have stories of when I was ten years old and watching them treat my older brothers, with the lack of respect and in my eyes blatant racism.

(Dawood)

This certainly echoes Coleman’s (2004) point about surveillance transparency and calling the powerful to account. It also suggests that this desire to challenge is often motivated by frustration following an accumulation of problematic surveillance that is encountered on a regular and disproportionate basis.

Using Becker (1963), I argue that, despite the risk of extended victimisation or labelling, it is especially important for those who are labelled as deviant, but who have not actually broken a rule, to challenge ethnically-loaded stigma and over-surveillance. In explaining the occurrence and reasons for this, one respondent said:

But I also feel it’s gone the other way in terms of Muslims wanting learn about the faith. I meet women who wear headscarves 24/7 and wear the niqabs. I think they are making a statement about their religion, that ‘I can do it’. I think they will be a target. I know a lot of women who have had verbal name-calling and their scarf pulled off and they can deal with it, but (women) wear it out of choice, because it is what they want to do. You have to be very confident and strong in society to wear it, but the majority wear it out of choice. I think a lot of women [who wear headscarves] have gone to faith and are understanding it a bit more ... and maybe it’s about resistance and identity, ‘this is me, what you gonna do, don’t deny me my rights’.

(Nadia)

Similarly, in talking about being the subject of surveillance measures, another respondent stated:

It actually boosts my confidence, it actually makes me more confident because it makes me. I almost feel sorry for people because they don’t know the real truth, as in they have nothing to fear, I am no danger to them, so in a way, I just feel sorry for a state of fear that people are in. I feel empowered by Islamaphobia because it’s made me more stronger and more self-aware that I want to protect my identity, of which Islam is a part.

(Dawood)

This demonstrates that challenges are seen as important for the protection of one’s civil and human rights. It also indicates a desire and ability to use imposed negative labels in positive ways—all this depended though on the meanings that respondents attached to the label in the first place. This also suggests that respondents didn’t always see themselves in objectified ways. Although they did discuss how attempts to dehumanise them had occurred, it also demonstrates their ability to counteract these negative processes, as to minimise their degree of harm on perceptions of self.
Becker argued that ‘...the deviant is one to whom the label has been successfully applied’ (Becker 1963: 4)—hence, for a deviant label to be so, it must be accepted as such by the subject themselves, through their internalisation and obeying of the rules, with little or no challenge. It is suggested that such internalisation and obeying of rules has not been the case for many of the respondents picked out for specialist surveillance measures—recall for instance Dawood’s last comment. However, some of the respondents in the study reported here had considered attempts to challenge or resist negative labels and over-focus as relatively futile, largely because of the power imbalance in the surveillance scenario, which placed them in a relatively vulnerable position. Although there was a desire to resist, conformity and a lack of challenge was common, not least because it was assumed that it would reduce the risk of drawing greater attention to oneself as a ‘troublemaker’, as one respondent highlighted:

You just don’t want them [young Asian relatives] to get into any trouble ‘cause I think if you do challenge them, they will think ‘ok he’s not conforming or he is showing aggression’ so he will be arrested. At the end of the day you’ve got more to lose. I want it to be challenged, but I don’t think it ever will. I think it’s like they’ve got the power and the biggest thing is protecting society ... and on their side they’re going to be justified.

(Nadia)

Similarly, another respondent said:

I think even though people are questioning them, and there are a lot of politics and organisations happening on the grounds of human rights, I think the government and the authorities have this agenda and they want to deliver that no matter how much people protest. People are being vocal, and they can continue being vocal, but I think very little is going to change. It’s all about people in positions of power.

(Naila)

These narratives tell us that respondents were aware of power relations in society, which in the recent terror-panic climate, were racially defined and selective in focus. A variety of powerful bodies were identified, including all those undertaking hard and soft surveillance measures. Ultimately the state was identified as the body from which all directives for surveillance came from. This led respondents to exhibit anger at those undertaking surveillance, but to reserve a particular level of contempt for the state— which they saw as using terror-panics to secure public support for wider governance of the brown body and to satisfy a racialised social sorting agenda. In this sense, the executors of racist state practices, especially members of the lay public undertaking citizen surveillance practices, although dangerous and sinister, were also viewed with pity, specifically for their lack of awareness and disproportionate fear of the brown body. Although respondents had a desire to challenge what they perceived to be racialised social sorting—and all the surveillance mechanisms this entailed—there was a feeling that to do so successfully would be impossible, given their current vulnerable position and the widespread public support for racist practices. For these respondents, this was the chilling effect of surveillance-fed governmentality: the exercise of control by those in power with little or no accountability and regulation.

Concluding Thoughts

The ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Haggerty and Ericson 2000) is constantly growing and spreading, and often uses the fears and ‘moral panics’ (Cohen 2002) of the time to legitimise itself. Given its various forms, it is impossible to avoid encountering surveillance. This paper challenges the ways in which surveillance selectively over-focuses on those it perceives or seeks to label as deviant, which, within a white majority society gripped by terror-panics, refers to all those of middle Eastern appearance, or of South Asian or Arabic heritage and of the Muslim faith, or, what I have termed in this paper, ‘brown bodies’. This sees the open use of ethnic discrimination to mark bodies as ‘hyper-visible’ and to render them suspect (Khoury 2009). Citizens are also encouraged to undertake surveillance
measures on a regular basis (Finn 2011), which increases brown bodies’ subjectation to the enhanced gaze and opportunities of negative labelling. All this serves to satisfy a wider racist social sorting agenda, or a Razack argues, to accomplish ‘a racial project’ (2008: 6). This paper has considered some key knowledge in this area. The process of ‘browning’ as a negative identity strategy (Bhattacharyya 2008; Burman 2010; Semati 2010; Silva 2010) is especially useful as it allows a specific contextualisation of a racialisation process to be understood. Surveillance as a means to sanitise spaces and to socially sort bodies (Coleman and Sim 2000; Lyon 2003a; Lyon 2006; Norris and Armstrong 1999) is also useful to understand the wider directive of enhanced observation measures, both hard and soft. Goffman (1963) and Becker’s (1963) work on labelling and stigma further allows us to consider the ways in which negative labels are assigned and responded to. In using this body of knowledge, this paper sought to develop existing work on stigma. It explored two arguments specifically within the post-9/11 terror-panic climate: firstly, that hard and soft surveillance is used to socially sort bodies and sanitise spaces; and, secondly, that the browning of bodies allows for racist practices to be normalised. To explore these two arguments, qualitative data from the narratives provided by five respondents considered perceptions of racialised surveillance within a terror-panic climate, its impact on emotional wellbeing and use of space, and the possibilities for challenging the over-focus or surveillance and converting negative labels into positive ones.

The study reported that, firstly, browning occurred on a regular basis and led to subjects being seen in negative ways, often as a particular type of evil that was culturally defined, and so of the deviant’s own choosing. This led to respondents’ increased experiences of victimisation. For the respondents, ethnic hostility, especially Islamaphobia, had been normalised and even popularised, and was common in a range of environments. Fear and hostility was seen by respondents as excusing hard and soft surveillance measures. Secondly, the study found that actual experiences or suspicions of being under surveillance were so powerful that they had very real emotional, psychological and physical consequences for respondents. Although some respondents viewed surveillance as a useful tool for crime-prevention, all felt that surveillance measures were not being used fairly, equally or to satisfy their safety concerns—indeed, surveillance was often seen as being used to reassure the safety concerns of white others, at the expense of brown bodies. This was especially so with the case of public displays of surveillance, which respondents also saw as an attempt to relocate them outside the borders of inclusive citizenship. Surveillance was therefore seen as biased, selective and underpinned by a ‘social sorting’ agenda (Lyon 2003a), that within the terror-panic climate was based on an agenda of ‘white governmentality’ (Hesse 1997). Of interest are the views held about different forms of surveillance, which picked out those measures which lacked evidence of wrongdoing, or which invaded the intimacy and religious sanctity of the body, as well as those that were of a faceless nature, as especially unacceptable. Thirdly, the study found that surveillance is perceived as being carried out on an unequal basis, further rendering the brown body as vulnerable and more often than not, negatively impacting on them in a variety of short and long-term ways. This challenges the ‘minor inconveniences’ and ‘technological neutrality’ excuse often used in surveillance (Gilliom 2001). Finally, the study found that respondents understood there to be a set of racially defined power relations in society, which since 9/11 had especially placed them in a vulnerable position. Respondents were therefore angry at executors of hard and soft surveillance, and the state as a whole, which often motivated their desire to challenge ethnically determined surveillance and negative labelling. However, respondents noted that their actual ability to execute challenge successfully was not always possible.

To conclude, this paper has contributed to the understanding of surveillance, labelling and stigma within a post-9/11 terror-panic climate. In applying ‘browning’ and ‘social sorting’ to perceptions and experiences of surveillance, it argues that ethnic hostility features heavily in surveillance, the impact of which has serious negative consequences for subjects under the enhanced surveillance gaze. Anti-terror surveillance therefore needs to be understood within the wider context of a racially defined citizenship agenda. This would allow us to more accurately understand its impact, and to ask questions about its fulfilling of safety.
More significantly though, it would also allow for the mapping of mobilised resistance to problematic and discriminatory surveillance.

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