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Abstract
The US Department of Homeland Security’s new “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign displays a renewed drive to redistribute surveillance responsibilities to the public. Using this campaign as its point of departure, this article examines the relationship between conditions of sovereign governance and public lateral surveillance campaigns. As the police and other sovereign institutions have receded from their traditional public responsibilities, many surveillance functions have been assumed by the lay population via neighborhood watch and other community-based programs. Comparing this development with the policing functions of lateral surveillance during the Norman Conquest, this article provides a historically grounded analysis of the potential for this responsibilization to fracture the social by transforming communal bonds into technologies of surveillance power.

In 2010, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unveiled a new anti-terrorism initiative called the “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign. Working in cooperation with sports stadiums, hotels, local transportation departments, airports, and Wal-Mart, the DHS installed a series of telescreens that repeatedly broadcast a sixty-second video of the DHS secretary, Janet Napolitano, imploring citizens to look out for suspicious activity. As shoppers pay for their goods at Wal-Mart’s automated checkout stands, many of them now see Napolitano urging them to do their part in the fight against terror:

Homeland security begins with hometown security. . . . If you see something suspicious in the parking lot or in the store, say something immediately. Report suspicious activity to your local police or sheriff. If you need help, ask a Wal-Mart manager for assistance. Thank you for doing your part to help keep our hometowns safe.

(US Homeland Security 2010)

The video commercial campaign accompanying the new initiative features seemingly average Americans acting out the “suspicious” activities of potential terrorists, such as leaving one’s backpack unattended, talking nervously on a cell phone, using cash, or repeatedly checking one’s wristwatch.

This national campaign, which was first developed by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority after 9/11, has encountered a measure of legal resistance: although the “see something” part of the campaign is gaining technological and cultural momentum (Andrejevic 2006; Monahan 2010; Hay and Andrejevic 2006: 334–7), the “say something” part is still mired in legal difficulty. Under ordinary circumstances, if your neighbor saw you having an angry cell phone conversation and falsely accused you...
of terrorism, s/he would be vulnerable to libel action. But American civil law is being quickly amended to accommodate the evolving needs of a homeland security state. The “See Something Say Something Act of 2011,” which will almost certainly pass into law with broad bipartisan support during the 112th US Congress, protects from libel action those who accuse their peers of terrorism. With sharp foresight, one of the bill’s corporate backers predicted that it will promote a “vigilant mindset” amongst citizens. Since September 11, 2001, he argued, “elected leaders have repeatedly called on everyday people to be the eyes and ears looking out for the next potential terrorist act. By this Act, Congress will give weight to that request by providing common-sense protections to citizens who do just that” (NASCO 2011).

With the “See Something, Say Something” campaign and its accompanying legal amendments, the DHS is taking action to encourage and facilitate a new vigilance in peer-to-peer monitoring—in making it as easy and natural as possible for lay individuals to be the “eyes and ears” that listen to and watch their neighbors, family members, and fellow shoppers, travelers, and sports fans. This effort of responsibilization, according to David Garland (1996), coincides with a general recession of the state from its traditional law enforcement and crime prevention practices. Garland argues that, as the myth of sovereign invincibility fades in the face of the state’s inability to harness criminal activity and protect citizens, the responsibility for crime prevention is being (re)channeled to an increasingly insecure and suspicious population. More and more communities are relying on volunteer policing and neighborhood watch programs, for example, to strive for the ideals of security and safety once promised, though left unfulfilled, by agencies of the state (see Sampson 2011: 210–12). In effect these new community-policing practices operate as governmental technologies, as individuals are empowered to strengthen homeland security objectives while ostensibly providing for their own safety and security (Stenson 1993).

The modern police force, with its professional organization of officers and its exclusive privileges and technologies, is peculiar to certain logics of institutional sovereign governance (Agamben 2000; Foucault 1979; Garland 1996). Hence, in an ambivalent post-sovereign era—one in which extreme expressions of state sovereignty, such as unilateral war, are coupled with the erosion of domestic sovereign institutions—it is unsurprising that law enforcement and terrorism prevention have begun to resemble practices of pre-sovereign community policing (see Zedner 2006). Amid this crisis of domestic institutions and the related rise of neoliberal community-based policing programs, citizens are being called on more and more to fill surveillance duties once reserved for the police. This development is noteworthy on a number of levels. For one, although the democratization of some policing roles has been a positive development for some communities, the ongoing recession of the police from whole sectors of urban life—and their increasing reliance on community-based surveillance and enforcement initiatives—has been particularly disastrous (Stevens 1998). Moreover, the widespread lateral surveillance encouraged by agencies like the DHS is alarming because, while the private lateral surveillance described by Mark Andrejevic (2005, 2006) is insidious enough, the organs of a redistributed and increasingly uninhibited policing apparatus are now being plugged into every computer, camera, and other mobile communication device. As policing responsibilities continue to be dispensed to a tech-savvy populace, we should be mindful that these market-driven surveillance technologies will take on an even more pernicious character as the state increasingly relies on technologized citizens to be the eyes and ears of the post-sovereign police (see Stenson 2008).

Because state-driven lateral surveillance thrives on this ambiguation of citizens’ public and private responsibilities—on the state mobilizing citizens, by “soft” persuasion or by coercion, to integrate lateral surveillance into their daily lives—it is a problem that is ripe for historical study alongside the evolving relationships between governmentality and sovereign power that it accompanies. In particular, it is important to examine the potential for this responsibilization to fracture the social by transforming communal bonds into technologies of surveillance power, thereby subsuming social responsibility into the operations of homeland security. By re-vising contemporary lateral surveillance practices within the broader framework of policing and surveillance history, I offer an expanded historical context for DHS
initiatives like the “See Something, Say Something” campaign. In doing so I chart out some new territory for the historical study of lateral surveillance, stopping along the way to analyze how one particular moment in that history sheds light on contemporary lateral surveillance practices. I conclude by cautiously assessing the potential for resistance that is inherent in this redistribution.

**The New Work of Watching One Another**

In his pathbreaking analysis of “the work of watching one another,” Mark Andrejevic (2005) finds that lateral surveillance has its roots in specifically contemporary phenomena: the emergence of new information technologies, a “postmodern” epistemological skepticism, and emergent ideologies of risk and responsibilization. These conditions, he argues, have given rise to a new style of monitoring that accompanies, if not overshadows, the “top-down” strategies of the past (e.g., employer-employee surveillance, and state-citizen surveillance). Andrejevic suggests that today we are seeing a growth of new “lateral” surveillance techniques—such as Googling new friends on the internet, or installing low-cost lie detection devices on our computers—by which lay citizens can effortlessly monitor and assess the behaviors of one another. “With increasing rapidity,” he writes, “technology once restricted to the realm of large corporations and law enforcement organizations is flowing into the hands of individual consumers” (2005: 493). As the public has taken advantage of these technological advances, it has developed a taste for lateral surveillance that complements our society’s pervasive climate of risk and suspicion.

It is difficult to disagree with Andrejevic’s assessment. Technological advances have made it surprisingly simple to listen to, watch, record, and research our friends, our foes, and even our employers and police officers (Mann, Nolan and Wellman 2003). As these new technologies have become the playthings of a growing segment of our population, the culture of watching one another has gained fresh impetus. Arguably new socialities have emerged, such as those based upon the reciprocality of exhibitionism and lateral surveillance (Andrejevic 2002; Andrejevic 2004; Lyon 2006) so evident in the meteoric rise of Facebook, Twitter, and similar web-based social media. Yet, as Andrejevic clarifies, these technological advances are best analyzed alongside the ideological frameworks that naturalize these social behaviors:

> The proliferating lateral surveillance cannot be explained simply in terms of technological development. Rather, the dissemination of surveillance tools and practices has to be read alongside a climate of generalized, redoubled risk. The conjunction of risk and responsibility derives from another intersection: that of reflexive skepticism with the participatory promise of the market—the injunction not to trust in discredited social institutions and traditional practices, but to take matters into one’s own hands through the mechanism that has helped corrode them.

>(2006: 494)

As Andrejevic argues, we monitor one another not simply because we have the technological resources to do so, but because in the digital age we have developed an assertive, skepticist self-reliance that has eroded our confidence in mainstream social institutions and popular opinion.

In this essay I will build upon Andrejevic’s work by examining the “See Something, Say Something” campaign through the lens of the history of lateral surveillance campaigns. While Andrejevic spends little time discussing the relationship between lateral surveillance and policing, official police agencies play an integral role in the conduct of lateral surveillance, as the new “See Something, Say Something” campaign demonstrates. Bolstered by institutional and rhetorical shifts toward insecurity and enterprising self-responsibility, the “See Something, Say Something” campaign endorses an important version of contemporary lateral surveillance—a version that, although fueled by modern technological advances and the climate of responsibilization identified by Andrejevic, emerges in part from a largely public lineage of
surveillance practices. Reflecting on these efforts by state agencies to harness the sensory capacities of its citizens, Janet Chan has identified a “new” lateral surveillance, arguing that we are beginning to see top-down surveillance and policing roles naturalized for ordinary citizens: “The new lateral surveillance of interest to the current discussion is spearheaded by government campaigns that tell ordinary citizens to be vigilant and report unusual or suspicious objects, people, and circumstances to the authorities” (2008: 225). While I agree with Chan, I would like to argue that the “new” lateral surveillance, while certainly reinforced by a distinct techno-cultural milieu, is in many ways a remediation of surveillance practices that were adopted in the pre-sovereign era to fill needs later addressed by beat policing.

Community Policing and the Recession of Sovereignty

In metropolitan America, the retreat of the police and the public diffusion of surveillance responsibilities began to pick up steam in the 1970s. In Los Angeles, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department developed a new position called the “senior lead officer” (SLO), whose responsibility was to coordinate policing efforts with local communities. When the SLO scheduled meetings with his/her assigned community, in addition to taking notes and fielding complaints s/he would also coordinate community-oriented solutions to citizens’ crime concerns. One of these solutions was the “Community Mobilization Project,” which organized citizens into neighborhood watches and other surveillance teams. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore and David M. Kennedy (1990), who have carried out extensive research on community policing efforts, recall the activities of one of these ad-hoc public surveillance teams:

One resident and her neighbor kept tabs on a woman living up the street who was wholesaling drugs to the street retailers. “I saw her coming over here in her car delivering drugs, and called Ellen up and say this is what’s happening,” the resident says. “She can watch all the way up in one direction; I can see over on my side. They usually come down here, and turn and go straight over past her house. So Ellen will say, ‘Who is that? Isn’t that so-and-so?’ And I’ll drop the phone, go over here where I can see it. ‘Yep, that’s so-and-so.’ So we know that. Or she’ll get half the license number, I’ll get the other half. I went and got the make of the car; it was a Mitsubishi.” As time went on the neighborhood watches grew increasingly savvy and extraordinarily active. “When the time comes to actually make an arrest, it takes a lot of surveillance,” one member says. “We’re getting tuned in to making sure our information is accurate... So our people are getting information all the way down to how dealers are traveling over the fences and things like that. Where we can catch them, what they’re wearing today, how they come and go.” (1990: 13)

This neighborhood watch regimen is just one example of how individuals, in communities let down by the police’s inability or unwillingness to respond to crime, join together to aspire to total sensory awareness of their neighborhoods. Faced with the prospect of crime and violence in their communities—or at least perceived threats of crime and violence—many citizens have assimilated into their everyday lives suspicion-driven rituals of lateral surveillance.

According to the US State Department, more than 20,000 neighborhood watch programs are listed in the nation’s official registry, and it is estimated that, in addition to these government-recognized programs, there are more than 50,000 others that operate on an unofficial basis (Morse 2009). This growing presence of neighborhood watch programs has coincided with a general, if reluctant, recognition of the inadequacies of sovereign policing. Even police bureaucracies themselves, according to Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, are coming to realize that everyday citizens “are the first line of defense in controlling crime and fear. The police cannot succeed without an effective partnership with the communities they serve. Without the eyes and ears of residents to extend the scope of police surveillance, the reach of police control is pathetically thin” (1990: 46).
Yet as the police have increasingly relied on peer-to-peer surveillance teams, once-policed communities have gradually lost faith in the police as a sovereign institution. This transformation has helped constitute an environment in which the kind of vigilant lateral surveillance described above can thrive, as citizens adopt preventive peer monitoring as a means to strive for security in their communities (see Larsen and Piché 2009).

David Garland (1996) has developed an influential account of this decline of institutional sovereign power, focusing especially on the recession of the traditional police force amid its failures to adequately address crime. Garland shows that the gradual development of the modern police force was an expression of sovereignty, arguing that the idea of a unified sovereign power that could police all aspects of social life “was enhanced in the mid-nineteenth century by the creation of a strong state apparatus, and in particular, by the development of a public police force which came to be regarded, however inaccurately, as having a professional monopoly over the function of crime control” (1996: 448).

The extraordinary societal fissures wrought by late modernity—especially the rising presence of crime and poverty—have made this vision unsustainable as agencies of the state have proven unable or unwilling to provide for social welfare and community security (Wouters 1999). Because the postwar welfare state fulfilled so many of the functions once handled in civil society, the neoliberal state

[1] is now faced with its own inability to deliver the expected levels of control over criminal conduct. Moreover, it now operates in a context where the social control functions of ‘private’ agencies and organizations have been much reduced over a long term, partly through the disorganizing processes associated with late modernity, partly through the monopolizing tendencies of the state apparatus. (Garland 1996: 448–9; see also Coleman 2004: 127–9)

This recession of domestic sovereign institutions has left a gulf of responsibility that private citizens are being forced to address, what Garland and others (especially Burchell 1996; Rose 2000) have called the “responsibilization” of the public.

This change is not an expression of the “death” of sovereignty; rather, as the domestic institutions in which sovereign power once resided deteriorate, formerly public responsibilities are being infused into the population via newly redistributed policing practices. Thus it is important to note that, while the “decline” of sovereignty can be easily overstated, the evolution of its role in governance and its recession from traditional public responsibilities are quite clear. In policing, these shifts have led to a gradual diffusion of practices for which the sovereign police force once took responsibility (Loader 2000). Although police officers have (obviously) not disappeared—in many communities, in fact, their numbers are growing (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009; Travis 2009)—their tasks have been reoriented to accommodate a new political economy (Fussey 2004: 257–8; Hinds and Grabosky 2010; Schneider, Chapman and Schaprio 2009). Once oriented toward definite goals of prosecution, punishment and criminal justice, the police have recalibrated their duties more toward the vague ideals of prevention, security, “harm-reduction,” “loss-reduction,” and “fear-reduction” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). And while, as Garland notes,

[T]he most prominent measures of crime control policy are increasingly oriented towards punitive segregation and expressive justice, there is, at the same time, a new commitment, especially at the local level, to a quite different strategy that one might call preventive

1 See Foucault’s (1977, 1991) cautious accounts of the recession of sovereignty and its stubborn institutional persistence. In his later lectures on the history of governmentality and its present manifestations in advanced liberal societies (2004, 2010), Foucault emphasizes the micropolitical functioning of power beyond the state.
partnerships. Today’s most visible crime control strategies may work by expulsion and exclusion, but they are accompanied by patient, ongoing, low-key efforts to build up the internal controls of neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to police themselves. (2001: 17)

In addition to a growing presence of private police professionals (Rigakos 2002), these “preventive partnerships” are the governmental technologies by which surveillance responsibilities are being distributed to the public. As official police forces become narrower and more specialized in their practices, community “partners”—like the above Los Angeles citizens who turned into a surprisingly thorough surveillance team in order to bust one of their neighbors—are becoming the sensory extensions of the state’s governmentalized police apparatus. The police, then, have not disappeared; they have simply trimmed from their modus operandi many of the beat-based, neighborhood-oriented activities that organically tied them to the populations they patrol.

This responsibilization of the public—and the climate of suspicion that sustains it—have revived certain methods of pre-sovereign surveillance and policing (Zedner 2006). Hence while many sociologists have hailed the birth of a “new” police (e.g., Bayley and Shearing 1996), we are now witnessing a nuanced resurrection of certain surveillance and policing models that existed before the anomalous institutions of modern sovereign governance. One of the defining characteristics of this old/new policing system is its organization around the affordances and demands of lateral surveillance.

The Norman Conquest and Pre-Sovereign Lateral Surveillance

It is difficult to imagine how a pre-sovereign police apparatus would function without lateral surveillance. In fact, in Europe and North America lateral surveillance was one of policing’s dominant manifestations until the rise of the modern police forces of the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Godfrey and Lawrence 2005; Zedner 2006). For example, as the Anglo-Saxons conquered and settled Roman Britain between the 5th and 7th centuries, they carried with them dispersed systems of governance that relied on communal pacts of mutual responsibility and a relaxed regime of lateral surveillance. Most of these systems were democratically organized around the local community, the “hundred,” each of which comprised a district of roughly one hundred households. The leader of each hundred, its elder, was responsible for judging disputes and maintaining order. Hundreds were further divided into “tithings,” or groups of ten men each—usually all family members—who were responsible for capturing and punishing the other members of their tithing should they commit a criminal act.

After the Norman Conquest, the violent rupture that marks the emergence of sovereign governance in England, the Anglo-Saxons’ mutual responsibility was fragmented by the intervention of a loyalty-extracting state apparatus. After the Conquest in 1066, William I implemented a community policing system that manipulated the Anglo-Saxons’ feudal community justice organizations, solidifying his social control over them by extending community culpability to the entire village or hundred (Morris 1910: 1–8). For a number of reasons, among them to prevent the assassination of Norman officials, the Normans leveled severe, community-wide penalties for criminal acts. This new system of laws and deprivations transformed the traditional rationalities of Anglo-Saxon lateral surveillance and policing, addressing two principal goals of the Norman ruling class: first, their own financial enrichment, and second—and more importantly, for our purposes—the more or less seamless integration of the conquered Anglo-Saxons into the machinery of their own control. Michel Foucault recounts a plausible historical account of how, even

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2 This is not to romanticize Anglo-Saxon modes of governance, however. While the “Norman Yoke” legend—which idealized feudal, Anglo-Saxon England as a classless utopia—is typically acknowledged to be mythical fuel for English nationalism, it is nonetheless important to recognize the real social shifts instituted by the Norman ruling class (see Chibnall 1999 and Hill 1997).
when the Anglo-Saxon population would attempt to dampen the powers of the Norman regime, they were able to react only within the narrow political parameters erected by their colonizers; thus the only palpable “change” that resulted was that the Anglo-Saxons themselves became actively integrated into the enforcement of Norman rule: “those elements the [Saxon] parliamentarians claimed would restrict Norman right—even the Magna Carta, Parliament, and the practice of the courts—are all basically part of the Norman system of exactions. The only difference is that part of the population now helps to run it” (2003: 108). This strategy of governance was especially visible in the community policing system that the Normans used to maintain order and exact restitution from the Anglo-Saxons. The thinly spread Norman ruling class, which lacked the manpower and social structure to deploy teams of professional officers of the peace (Thomas 2008: 143), required the conquered Anglo-Saxons to police themselves. This early integration of policing into citizens’ everyday lives reflects a long trend in the self-disciplining and responsibilization of local populations via peer-to-peer policing, signaling for early policing historian William Alfred Morris a significant moment in “the union of police and mutual responsibility” (1910: 2). Yet this union, of course, is quite different from more ideal, altruistic forms of mutual responsibility; what we see instead is the transformation of communal bonds into a technology of networked surveillance power that is activated at the pleasure of the new sovereign.

One of the harsher aspects of this responsibilization was the frankpledge system. By imposing community-wide financial responsibility for the apprehension of criminals and the recovery of stolen goods, the frankpledge effectively conscripted the entire English populace into a policing and lateral surveillance apparatus. And no longer was punishment distributed merely between the members of a tithing—all members of a village were held responsible for the criminal acts of their neighbors. According to Eric H. Monkkonen, this was a crucial development in the responsibilization of the Anglo-Saxon population:

frankpledge, described by its historian as a “system of compulsory collective bail fixed for individuals, not after their arrest for a crime, but as a safeguard in anticipation of it,” forced the community to accept responsibility for the behavior of its individual members, to produce offenders for trial, or, if unable to discover the offender, to pay the fines. 

(1981: 33)

Lacking the means to centrally organize and deploy this new surveillance-policing network, in the 13th century Edward I officially sanctioned the verbal “hue and cry” method of crime response and patrol organization, a method that would survive well into the 19th century. Once an individual witnessed a crime, he was required to chase the perpetrator with a loud, accusatory “hue and cry” which would ring out through the community. (Women would typically produce their cries from within their homes.) As these shouts alerted other citizens who would join the manhunt, the ad-hoc crew would chase the criminal until they apprehended him and returned him to a constable for internment, thereby releasing the collective bail imposed upon their community (Fisher and Lab 2010: 198–9). However, if the criminal eluded the posse and ran to a neighboring village, the citizens of both villages—now facing the threat of defaulting on their frankpledge—would gather to apprehend the fleer, forming an ever larger mob of civilian police (Roth and Olson 2001: 63).

Because of the crushing financial impact of the frankpledge, the Anglo-Saxons were forced to organize their labor into mobile lateral surveillance teams. Communities began to employ what is known as the “watch-and-ward,” which was a civilian surveillance network that deployed groups of day wardens and night watchmen to immediately raise a loud “hue and cry” following a criminal act. These groups would work in shifts, sometimes occupying watchtowers in order to initiate a hue-and-cry as soon as an offense was committed. But because the frankpledge indebted all members of a community—not just those who were designated watchmen when the offense occurred—those who refused to put down their work and follow the criminal were themselves arrested and tried for the fugitive’s crimes (Critchley 1967: 2–6). The
colonialist depriva tions of the *frankpledge* system thus forced the conquered Anglo-Saxons to remain watchful of their peers, each of whom threatened to disrupt the delicate stability that kept the new Norman elites at bay.

This medieval policing apparatus—which enforced loyalty to the state’s security objectives via threats of various punitive reprisals—was a defining expression of Norman sovereignty in its pre-institutional condition. Unassisted by the institutional competencies that would later characterize sovereign governance—e.g., the modern police force—Norman control required coordinated, distributed programs of lateral surveillance. In Norman England, the mindset of a pre-institutional sovereignty revolutionized the logics of Anglo-Saxon mutual responsibility. Because individuals were made to remain watchful of everyone in the village, not only did the threats of crime and its response become ubiquitous, but the community’s sociality was now forced to revolve around disciplined rituals of mutual suspicion. These old methods of justice and state-sponsored lateral surveillance lasted for centuries, and were not significantly reoriented until the institutional revolutions of modernity. In England, the hue and cry surveillance-policing scheme was not eliminated until just before the foundation of Robert Peel’s modern police force in 1829 (Godfrey and Lawrence 2005). The sovereign police force, which developed amid the trials of industrialization and urbanization, proved somewhat successful in quelling crime during this period of drastic social change. Although these successes proved so apparent that Queen Victoria soon required all jurisdictions to develop a professional class of police officers—a move that, in effect, relieved from the populace an oppressive debt of responsibility to the state—the police nevertheless relied on a large degree of lateral surveillance to bolster their own activities anyway (e.g., informants, spies, and private complainants). Amid widespread crises of advanced liberal governance, the ongoing recession of this deeply entrenched public institution has unsurprisingly coincided with the reemergence of large-scale, state-encouraged/enforced lateral surveillance initiatives.

**Citizen-Officer-Suspects: Ambiguity and Control**

The foregoing analysis illustrates how in the early days of Norman England—when a burgeoning project of sovereignty was being carried out under the participatory auspices of the population itself—there arose a remarkable ambiguation of the responsibilized citizen. One of the defining characteristics of this responsibilization was that it transformed responsibility-toward-others into duty to sovereign power. The goal of maintaining community integrity and safety was subordinated to the sovereign, whose reorganized policing structures operated under logics of extraction and control. With this history in mind, I will take cues from James Hay (2007), who has described the “citizen-solider” that vigilantly provides for his/her own security—and from Rachel Hall (2007), who has spoken of the “citizen-suspect” that submits to rituals of suspicion in places like airports—to examine the contemporary creature we might call the *citizen-officer-suspect*. As suggested by the “See Something, Say Something” campaign, in an increasing number of social arenas we are asked to be watchmen, suspects, and everyday citizens whose de-differentiation and territorial fluidity grants an almost ubiquitous surveillance potential. This ubiquity makes the officer/suspect potentialities always operative: in the acts of being social, one is always potentially being watched and one should always be watchful. As under the coercive hand of the Normans, the gentler hand of today’s homeland security rhetoric helps constitute a lateral surveillance ethic that contributes not only to widespread suspicion and ambivalence among neighbors, but also to the insinuation of the techniques and mentalities of policing into citizens’ everyday lives.

Just as the Normans’ attempt to coercively enforce “full security” (Critchley 1967: 325) inaugurated a fractured sociality based in mutual suspicion, today’s DHS initiatives—such as the “See Something, Say Something” campaign—are reorienting our social relationships toward a more apprehensive and guarded
ambivalence. With the resurrection of large-scale, coordinated lateral surveillance initiatives, Andrejevic warns that, when every citizen has been turned into both officer and suspect, there arises a tendency “to pit all against all in a manner that undermines a sense of the social and threatens to replace community with a variant of hypersuspicious survivalist individualism” (2006: 43–4). Discourses of homeland security, especially since September 11th, have only exacerbated this old problem. “See Something, Say Something,” therefore, is not just an isolated campaign by which Americans are being persuaded to watch one another; it is also a pithy statement of the surveillance and policing demands of a society riven by what Gary T. Marx has called “categorical suspicion” (Marx 1988: 227). Perhaps an official publication of DHS puts it most clearly:

Since September 11, 2001, it has become apparent that homeland security is not an effort that can be conducted by any one branch of public safety. Instead, an effective national homeland security plan must include partnerships between law enforcement organizations at all levels of the government, as well as with businesses, citizens, emergency management, public health, and many other private and public organizations. . . . One easily understood example of the applicability of the community oriented policing model’s reliance on the community for collaboration is the instance of citizens who observe the unusual—for example, groups of men living in apartments of motels, or unusual behavior at flight schools—in their own community. . . . [W]ho but the citizens and businesses of this country, in collaboration with local police, are capable of providing the active, comprehensive, and continuous vigilance within every community essential to preventing acts of terror?

(Docobo 2006)

Indeed, DHS and other security agencies are increasingly vocal in their efforts to encourage vulnerable citizens to become vigilant in the fight against terror. And because all citizens in the post-9/11 era have been declared potential walking/driving/flying bombs, this vigilance against terror translates into vigilance against one another (Packer 2006). The secrecy and potential ubiquity of terrorists, argues Jeremy Packer, “creates a situation in which combatants cannot be known in any field of battle, which means everyone will be policed as if they are potential terrorists. At the same time, all citizens are asked to join in the war on terror as part of DHS initiatives” (2008: 273). The ubiquity of this threat is a key impetus of public lateral surveillance, further ensuring the ambiguation of individuals’ citizen/officer/suspect roles. When everyone has become a potential suspect, there is no way that the police can keep up with its surveillance demands. But if lay citizens can be encouraged to watch one another—not only when using Facebook or Twitter, but when they shop at a supermarket or peer out their kitchen windows—the official representatives of the governmentalized state, like the constables in Anglo-Norman England, can be freed to devote themselves to activities that have little to do with community improvement.

In addition to addressing this climate of categorical suspicion, we should keep in mind that the recession of the sovereign police force—and the recruitment of lay citizens into roles once filled by the police—reconfigures sovereign antagonism via the ambiguously embodied citizen-officer-suspect. Whereas sovereign governance developed its own specialized institutions to address criminality through the professionalized policing, prosecution and punishment of criminals, today we are seeing post-sovereign efforts that exploit and discipline the bodies and energies of civilians through the redistribution of these once-specialized practices (see Yesil 2006). As Lyn Hinds and Peter Grabosky have pointed out, “the targets of the state’s responsibilisation strategy are you and I. Its objective is transformative: to encourage us to change the everyday, normal pattern/s of our lives to routinise out crime risk” (2010: 95). There is more at stake here than Foucault’s (1980) recognition that the watcher internalizes his/her watchfulness,

3 Recent research in social psychology reports that this social suspicion can result when private citizens integrate into their daily lives the methods and mindset of vigilant, preventive policing (Thacher 2005).
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governing his or her own conduct as s/he scrutinizes that of others. Just as important is the reorganization of citizens’ social existence, integrating them into the active policing apparatus of the state. This “subtle logic of interactive participation,” warns Andrejevic, “invites unexamined identification with the priorities of those in power” (2006: 44). When the suspicious, responsibilized public is equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment that was only a few short years ago the privilege of a few major metropolitan police departments, it is no surprise that the public’s everyday social practices are coming to closely resemble the activities of the police. In this sense, Jamais Cascio’s (2005) notion of the “participatory panopticon” is useful, if redundant. While we are becoming increasingly disciplined by the gazing masses, we are in turn adopting the disciplined identities of ever-vigilant agents of a homeland that needs us. This recalibration of citizen-subjectivity, which is realized through the adoption of ambivalent and conflicting identity positions, coincides with one’s permanent recruitment into the agonistic interactivity of a homeland security society.

The hybrid subjectivity of this citizen-officer-suspect arises from a post-sovereign milieu characterized by the ambiguation of citizens’ social and moral existence. Analyzing the vicissitudes of subjectivity in a “control society,” Gilles Deleuze (1995) argues that such heterogeneous activities and identities typify the citizens who inhabit it: their subjectivities are “hybrid and modulating,” shifting in different proportions between multiple institutional roles. Whereas in a disciplinary society one’s identities were more definitely tied to the spaces in which one circulated—one was a worker at the factory, a patient at the hospital, a student at school, a mother at home, and so forth—in the control society these boundaries that defined our constitutive subjectivities have become more fluid and modulating. In the words of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “A hybrid subjectivity produced in the society of control may not carry the identity of a prison inmate or a mental patient or a factory worker, but may still be constituted simultaneously by all of their logics. . . . [T]he subjectivities of control have mixed constitutions” (2000: 331–2). The control society, according to Deleuze, has given rise to “individuals,” rather than individuals: it cultivates subjectivities that are everywhere and at all times “undulating” and multiplicitous, instead of shifting along with the specificities of our surroundings. As the modern institutions by which sovereign-disciplinary power grasped us recede, there has arisen a different sort of power that thrives on the ambiguation and versatility of our identities—a versatility that is quite evident in the rise of the citizen-officer-suspect.

Following Deleuze and Hardt and Negri, it is apparent that, as we have moved beyond the sovereign-disciplinary logics of confinement and the seclusion of our constitutive identities, the present conjuncture imposes upon us multiple and at times conflicting subject positions. The recession of the sovereign police force has contributed to a climate in which citizen-officer-suspects are forced to jump between these subject positions as they sit in their homes, shop at Wal-Mart, and go to the airport—especially when they go to the airport. This collapse of institutional sovereignty and the rise of the responsibilized citizen-officer-suspect appear to have resurrected certain logics of a pre-sovereign policing culture, especially in their penchant for transforming configurations of the social into networks of surveillance power. Without their well-entrenched institutional accomplices, both of these iterations of governance have resorted to techniques of control that thrive on the energies of responsibilized citizen-officer-suspects.

**Conclusion**

While I do not want to make too bold a comparison between our predicament and that of the conquered Anglo-Saxons—without doubt they are radically different—I do want to emphasize that the post-sovereign, securitized logics of today’s lateral surveillance campaigns are not entirely new or spontaneous phenomena. On the contrary, neighborhood watch programs, community policing, and DHS initiatives like the “See Something, Say Something” campaign are nurtured by certain “weakened” conditions of domestic sovereignty—“weakened,” that is, in the sense that the governmentalized functions of sovereignty are often being expressed in and through the activities of citizens rather than by traditional
sovereign institutions. To better understand our current predicament, then, we can look to the conditions and expressions of sovereignty that oversaw earlier programs of state-sponsored lateral surveillance.

When examined alongside the historical example of Anglo-Norman England, contemporary manifestations of peer-to-peer monitoring help the following general observations come to light: that state-sponsored lateral surveillance (1) thrives on a culture of social suspicion, one that is more plainly coercive or one that, as in the current era, relies on a gentler, more rhetorical responsibilization; (2) engages the physical habits of its enforcers, disciplining their bodies, ambiguating their subjectivities, and aiding in their identification with agencies of the state; and (3) manipulates structures of social responsibility, subsuming them under loyalty to state objectives like community tranquility or homeland security. And because the era of strong sovereign policing institutions is relatively short-lived and anomalous, lateral surveillance-based policing has more often been the norm rather than the exception. The gradual reversion to large-scale public lateral surveillance, then, is merely one symptom of the sociopolitical changes that underlie the ongoing crisis of advanced liberal government. Perhaps the defining characteristic of this present shift is the capture of community responsibility for the service of homeland security objectives.

Lucia Zedner, among others, is optimistic about these contemporary developments of community policing and lateral surveillance. She argues that, while the governmentalized state apparatus can no longer claim a monopoly over policing practices, it can play a positive role in upholding reasonable standards of civility, ensuring a more equitable distribution of public resources, and protecting marginalized groups. According to Zedner,

Defending policing as a public good accords strongly with the eighteenth-century neoclassical belief in policing as an integral aspect of civic virtue and a necessary precondition of liberty. According to this ideal, active engagement in the maintenance of liberty was a duty laid upon every citizen. Contemporary calls for “community engagement,” “active civic participation,” and “local capacity building” might just signal a renaissance of this classical notion of civic virtue.

(2006: 92–3)

I agree with Zedner that these initiatives do have a certain democratic appeal, and that the state could play a positive role in reinforcing positive values of citizenship. Yet I would like to conclude by suggesting that we remain cautious in the face of the governmental shifts that Zedner is applauding. I think it is clear that, as Andrejevic, Packer, and others have recognized, the DHS’s rhetoric of “community engagement” and “active participation” has not produced an engaged, altruistic citizen, but rather has tended to create the ambiguaged citizen-officer-suspect. Neoliberal policing strategies and the rhetoric of “community engagement,” in fact, too often rationalize the state’s abandonment of communities plagued by crime (Hall 2011: 726–8), just as discourses of “participation” often have the effect of identifying citizens with the policing imperatives of the state. Moreover, these citizen-officer-suspects are undeterred by legal restraints and other judicial obstacles that somewhat hinder official state surveillance efforts. Unlike official police officers, co-workers and neighbors do not need a warrant to monitor and record your activities, deem them “suspicious,” and then submit their findings to local law enforcement agencies. In fact, as I described in this article’s introduction, the US Congress—acknowledging the deficiencies of the institutions that bolster the sovereignty of which it is the maximum expression—is working to legally protect those citizen-officer-suspects who spy on and turn in their neighbors.

Although many of these developments are quite alarming, I do not mean to argue that the governmentalization of the police and the growth of lateral surveillance practices do not allow for productive avenues of resistance and counter-surveillance. There are ways in which the ambiguation and technologization of the citizenry can be used to actively counter the abuses of the state and individuals in
positions of power. New trends in “sousveillance”—the methods by which individuals carry out bottom-up surveillance, typically through new mobile technologies—have freed citizens to turn their gaze against the state, allowing them to capture and publicize police brutality and other offenses (Mann, Nolan and Wellman 2003). In fact, the widespread popularity of mobile surveillance devices has empowered citizens while it has simultaneously disciplined their conduct: nowadays everyone, including police officers, are under threat of constant surveillance by mobile phones and other devices equipped with video recording software (see Wilson and Serisier 2010). In this sense, the ambiguation of the citizen-officer-suspect has a dialogical impact on the police officer as well as the lay civilian, although it must be admitted that legal biases render citizens far more vulnerable under police surveillance than the converse. For this and other reasons, discussions of the liberatory potential of digital/mobile surveillance devices should take a cautious route.  

As sovereign institutions continue their recession from public life, we will be increasingly expected to police one another using the communication/surveillance technologies that we have on hand. To be sure, there is liberatory potential inherent in this crisis of sovereignty. But we should avoid buying into the climate of pervasive suspicion to which the “See Something, Say Something” campaign contributes. This campaign, having shed the brute coercion of Anglo-Norman surveillance initiatives, relies on one’s consensual agreement to govern oneself and others (see Hall et al. 1978: 202). While we might not be able to shed the splintered subjectivity forced upon us by the current control society, we can resist those hypersuspicious activities that identify us with the mentalities and techniques of an antagonistic sovereign. Better yet: we can remember that, as citizen-officer-suspects, our “officer” capacity has a positive valence: we can use our technologized bodies to bring accountability to the public agents of a faltering and all too often aggressive sovereign power.

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References


4 In fact, the historical record shows that medieval technical advances merely enhanced the gaze of the state. The innovation of the horn, for example, allowed for the immediate expansion of the frankpledge to surrounding villages (For an historical description, see Pollock and Maitland 1895: 577). The advent of print, of course, was similarly problematic. The first “Wanted” posters, in fact, were hue and cry declarations that were used to immediately deputize scattered villages (see Becker 2009: 20; also Rachel Hall 2009).


