Racialization as a Way of Seeing: The Limits of Counter-Surveillance and Police Reform

Lyndsey P. Beutin
Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania, US.
Lbeutin@asc.upenn.edu

Abstract
This paper considers the role of video footage in recent high-profile cases of anti-black police brutality in the United States. I illuminate the limits of the counter-surveillance impetus to film the police by contextualizing this strain of social media utopianism within the larger history of what I call “racialization as a way of seeing.” Racialization as a way of seeing is a historical formation that brings together the history of policing, the development of visual epistemologies, and the history of the naturalization of the criminality of blackness. I then track how the optimism of the counter-surveillance discourse has been recuperated by the state into consent for police worn cameras—reforms which threaten to strengthen a system built on structural racism, rather than ameliorate its injustices. I conclude by suggesting an emergent model for how video evidence may be paradoxically working to re-legitimize the police and the state in the newest era of “21st century policing.”

“Like the state, the camera is never neutral.”
(Tagg 1988: 63)

On Tuesday, April 7, 2015, white police officer Michael Slager was charged with murdering an African American man after a bystander video was released that captured the shooting. Prior to the video evidence, Slager had not been charged in the death of victim Walter Scott, and the police version of events—that Scott posed a threat to the officer—was already gaining traction in the news cycle (ABCNews4 2015). But by Wednesday, the liberal press was heralding the power of video evidence to advance criminal justice in racially motivated police brutality. The New York Times headline read, “Bystander’s Video of Shooting Offers a Path to Justice” (Robles and Blinder 2015). Democracy Now’s coverage led with, “What If There Was No Video? White SC Officer Charged with Murder of Fleeing African-American Man” (April 8, 2015). Even anti-racist cultural critic Jay Smooth promoted the use of video counter-surveillance on his vlog: “Would there even be a conversation if we didn’t have the video?” (April 8, 2015). The journalistic construction and promotion of the discourse of video proof was manifested in Time magazine’s cover of Walter Scott’s death: “This time the charge is murder” (April 2015). These headlines speak to the desire for documentation that can challenge dominant police narratives within racially biased systems. It is tempting to read the events in the Slager/Scott case as indicative of video’s promise to finally ensure equal protection under the law for African American citizens. Yet, American history has repeatedly proved otherwise—could public memory be this short? Or, is the naturalization of the objectivity of visual evidence obscuring the ways that racialization affects how various publics see, and see differently?
The United States has witnessed the cycle of hopefulness pierced by disappointment when video documentation stands to bring police officers to justice in cases of racial terror. Rodney King’s brutalizers were arrested but acquitted of their charges in 1992. Eric Garner’s murderer was not indicted in 2014. The state was only forced to grapple with the implications of the video evidence of Oscar Grant’s 2009 murder after mass street mobilizations demanded charges against the officer (Williams 2011b). Three black men’s murders and brutalization at the hands of police caught on tape and highly profiled in the news, and not a single police officer convicted and prosecuted to the extent of the law.

What, then, accounts for the persistent optimism around video evidence of police brutality and what are its practical and discursive limits? In the following article, I disentangle the increasingly complex discursive field of “filming the cops” by explicating the different political orientations toward surveilling the police. I then develop my argument in two parts. First, I illuminate the limits of the counter-surveillance impetus to film the police by contextualizing this strain of social media egalitarianism within the larger history of what I call “racialization as a way of seeing.” Racialization as a way of seeing is a historical formation that brings together three things: slave patrols as an important origin of American policing, 19th century criminology as an important origin and authenticator of the discourse that visual representations are evidentiary and indexical representations of truth, and the cultural and institutional processes of the naturalization of the criminality of blackness. I develop “racialization as a way of seeing” in order to draw attention to the limits of the practice of video counter-surveillance in meeting its goal to indict and convict the police of wrongdoing. In so doing, I aim to theorize an emerging and haunting suspicion: “but does the spectacle show the pain?” (White 2015; see also Cooper 2015; J. Smith 2015).

After demonstrating how racialization undermines the potential of the practices of counter-surveillance, I identify additional stakes to the discourse of filming the police. I track how the filmic emphasis within the counter-surveillance discourse has been recuperated by the state into consent for police control of video footage through body worn cameras. I argue that body cameras constitute reforms that threaten to strengthen liberalism’s co-constitution with structural racism, rather than ameliorate its injustices, similar to how other legal and prison reforms have historically re-entrenched racial disparity (Murakawa 2014; Gilmore 1998/99). To this end, I conclude by suggesting an emergent model for how video evidence may be paradoxically working to re-legitimize the police and the state in the newest era of “21st century policing.”

This study contributes to Surveillance Studies by conceptualizing the limits of counter-surveillance within racial regimes. I contextualize contemporary practices geared toward reducing anti-black police brutality within the history of racialization in the United States in order to demonstrate that, far from being peripheral to Surveillance Studies, the historical and constitutive relationship between race and visuality circumscribes its epistemology.

Surveillance Studies has theorized the resistive possibilities of using visual recording regimes against the state (Fiske 1996; Lyon 2007; Antony and Thomas 2010; Yesil 2011; Koskela 2011). Despite widespread public and press discourse of the reform and punitive justice potential of video evidence of state violence, scholars have complicated the democratic and counter-hegemonic claims of counter-surveillance practices (Monahan 2006) by identifying the ambiguities of the outcomes of visual data (Wilson and Serisier 2010), the re-creation of power asymmetries between anti-police brutality activists and the communities they intend to help (Huey, Walby and Doyle 2006) as well as between researchers of marginalized communities and their subjects (Kemple and Huey 2005). Brucato (2015) deepens these critiques by

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1 I am not suggesting that there is universal agreement on the positive potential of video; rather I am drawing attention to how video evidence is regularly framed—in the press, among some community advocates, and in the Obama administration—as an avenue for holding the police accountable to the law despite the fact that historically it has rarely led to police convictions.
illuminating the ways in which the discourse of visual objectivity undergirds both repressive and resistive regimes of surveillance. These scholars discuss the impacts and potentials of counter-surveillance on racialized subjects, and yet, none engage a thorough analysis of the ways that race mediates public and official seeing, and the way that racism mediates public and official interpretations of violence and victimhood.

New scholarship has pushed the field of Surveillance Studies to center race and gender by recognizing the foundational role of slavery and settler colonialism in the establishment of a surveillance state (Browne 2015; Dubrofsky and Magnet 2015; A. Smith 2015; Mirzoeff 2011). Mirzoeff (2011) specifically connects visuality and slavery by compellingly arguing that the slave plantation is the original domain wherein visuality was co-constituted with surveillance and power through the authority invested in overseers and the force of law. Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) consider how the discourse of surveillance itself has subordinated race in the discussion by challenging the field to acknowledge the stakes of over-emphasizing privacy as the central concern of surveillance, when privacy concerns are fundamentally rendered as white and other privacies—say, of the black victims depicted in police brutality videos—are not prioritized. These interventions build an important conceptual foundation; I bring them together to explicitly link the historical formations of racialized surveillance to the ways that racism is always already mediating contemporary visual-based remedies. I build specifically on Browne’s (2015) argument that surveillance has been, and continues to be, constructed and materialized through anti-blackness by demonstrating how this logic extends to counter-surveillance and the state’s recuperation of resistive discourse.

**Recording the Police: Three Political Orientations**

Recording-based police monitoring initiatives have risen, somewhat paradoxically, since the acquittal of Rodney King’s abusers prompted the 1992 LA riots (Cannon 1999). LAPD officers were outfitted with additional antennas to record conversations with community members during traffic stops as part of the Department of Justice’s increased oversight of the department (Rubin 2014). Local community organizations have formed across the country to intervene on racial profiling, and a series of smartphone applications have been developed specifically to record police behavior.

Over the last year, the discourse of “filming the cops” has become even more complex. The lack of video footage in the 2014 police murder of Michael Brown, and the contested versions of the events leading to his death, rallied the victim’s family and other supporters to call for more police cameras (O’Neill 2014). The rapid state response after discovering the presence of bystander video led Walter Scott’s family to declare that no criminal charges would have been brought without the footage (Hing 2015). The non-indictment of the officer who killed Eric Garner, even with bystander video, made others more skeptical of the potential of video evidence in court. At the same time, the calls for increased cameras have been readily assimilated by the state as a significant part of police reform. In order to make sense of this discursive milieu and its implications, I distill the various motives for filming the police into three camps with different underlying political orientations: cop watching, punitive evidence, and police self-monitoring.

Cop watching is a broad term that refers to independent and loosely-networked groups of community members and organizations who self-organize to hold the police accountable by bearing witness to police interactions with civilians (Huey, Walby and Doyle 2006; Koskela 2011). The strategy has been amplified by video recording capabilities but pre-existing mobile recording’s widespread availability. A national depository by the same name, CopWatch.com began in 1990 with the slogan “policing the police” and was primarily a way to aggregate complaints against police conduct by documenting badge numbers and civilian narratives in an online database.
Cop watching is underpinned by the logic that surveilling the police will make them change their behavior in the immediate moment, preventing or limiting individual abuse and/or arrest at the hands of police, before the use of the witness testimony or recordings would be necessary in court. While groups who organize cop watching do so in many different ways, the “cop watching orientation” is based in community organizing strategies that seek to build cultures of resistance within communities that are heavily profiled by the police (Rakia 2014) and that seek to promote alternative approaches to community safety that do not rely on policing in the first place. For instance, the Network for the Elimination of Police Violence’s materials connect filming the police through their app “CopWatch” to the organization’s larger mission of systemic change, writing: “We strive to build the capacity of communities to resist police violence…We view police violence as a basic part of society because it is used to serve and protect the interests [of] the dominant, privileged groups in society…We believe that the elimination of police violence will come about with the end of all systems of oppression in society” (Network for the Elimination of Police Violence n.d.: 3). Similarly, We Charge Genocide, a cop watching group led by young people of color in Chicago, advocates for the use of civilian monitoring of police through video, but specifically sees it as a tactic within a larger organizing strategy, one that ultimately aims to “mak[e] the police obsolete” in part by changing public consciousness through making visible rampant police brutality (We Charge Genocide 2015). Thus, this framework uses video evidence as a deterrent and a tool; but ultimately, the cop watching theory of change mobilizes communities to change structures of oppression, including the embedded racial violence within the system of policing.

The “punitive evidence” orientation is invested in ending police brutality by recording police interactions in order to indict and convict the police of wrongdoing. It shares a similar impetus to cop watching in that it desires to bring more community accountability to policing through civilian oversight; however, it is more narrowly focused on video evidence as an indexical representation of truth that can counter police narratives within the criminal justice system. The “punitive evidence” orientation’s theory of change is liberal reform. This framework is also advanced by, and often traffics within, technological discourses that suggest mobile technology, in and of itself, will lead to a more egalitarian public sphere (Jenkins 2006; Shirky 2008).

The popularized discourse of counter-surveillance largely relies on the logic of punitive evidence. I use counter-surveillance here specifically to refer to digital video recording by residents, although police monitoring as resistance and self-defense in the U.S. has taken many forms historically, including civilian watch groups (Kelley 2000), low-fi radio transmissions (Fiske 1996), the armed patrols of the Black Panthers (Austin 2000), or community review boards. The term counter-surveillance locates the strategy of using surveillance technologies against power within a social environment of ubiquitous video recording of public behavior by municipalities and corporations. Counter-surveillance today builds on Fiske’s early claim that “videotechnology extends the panoptic eye of power...but it also enables those who are normally the object of surveillance to turn the lens and reverse its power” (1996: 127).

Counter-surveillance strategies have been amplified as handheld digital recording devices have become cheaper and easier to use and sharing personal videos has become more accessible through free platforms like YouTube and Facebook. There are now several specific police monitoring systems, including the ACLU-NJ’s Police Tape (ACLU 2012), NYCLU’s Stop and Frisk App (PCMag n.d.), and OpenWatch’s CopWatch and Cop Recorder. While these apps enthusiastically encourage counter-surveillance, they often assume an unproblematic link between visual evidence and reform. OpenWatch’s website specifically propagates the claims of “objective record” and “preserving the truth,” and in so doing oversimplifies how visuals are made meaningful within social contexts, while overstating their potential effectiveness. This framing ignores how racism and racialized ways of seeing mediate the effectiveness of visual evidence in cases of police brutality. It also limits the potential usefulness of anti-police brutality tactics by individualizing the problem to specific police officers rather than “indicting” an entire system.
built on racism. The limits of the punitive evidence orientation to counter-surveillance are perhaps best glimpsed in how this discourse has amplified calls for police-worn cameras.

The third orientation toward filming the police is “police self-monitoring,” wherein police-worn cameras are advocated by the public and the state in the name of both police accountability and community safety. This orientation has been derived from a combination of sources. Police began to circulate a narrative of “officer safety” in order to justify the confiscation of civilian recording despite its protection by the First Amendment (Kopan 2013). Simultaneously, the company TASER International, Inc. has been promoting police worn cameras for several years in the name of protecting the police and providing a competing record to civilian evidence. Most recently, though, police worn cameras have been requested by families of the victims of police brutality as well as by President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing in the name of police accountability. The “police self-monitoring” framework instantiates how the counter-hegemonic demand for increased state accountability to community safety aligns discursively (but not politically) with a pre-existing need by the police to maintain legitimacy and reassert control over civilian visual recording.

By recognizing the differing political orientations and theories of change that underlie the growing popularity of video surveillance of law enforcement, we can better understand the stakes of eliding vastly different motivations with strikingly similar rhetoric. Conceptually clarifying this discursive milieu makes it possible to identify important limitations to the “punitive evidence” counter-surveillance orientation as well as reveal “police self-monitoring” as state recuperation of resistance rather than state cooperation with civilian-requested reforms.

Evidence of Racialization as a Way of Seeing: The Rodney King Video

The counter-surveillance desire to use video evidence to convict individual police of wrongdoing is undermined by the ways that racism and racialization shape what different publics see when watching the brutalization of the black body. While the “punitive evidence” orientation has gained popularity in the press and with activists, perhaps no case illuminates how racialization operates as a way of seeing more effectively than the events in the aftermath of Rodney King’s abuse at the hands of LAPD officers. Returning to this historical moment is important because it demonstrates the role that interpretation plays in the juridical efficacy of visual evidence—the lynchpin of punitive-based counter-surveillance today—and, specifically, the role that racialized ways of seeing plays in interpretation. What is “self-evident” in visuals is subjective. And subjectivity is fundamentally shaped by racism and racialization.

When the bystander video of Rodney King’s brutal arrest was broadcast repeatedly on nightly news outlets in 1991, the scene was so gratuitously violent and appeared so aesthetically authentic that many felt the visual evidence was “uncontestable” (Fiske 1996: 128). The video evidence prompted two key responses: a mass outcry for justice and reform by publics across racial identities that was heavily informed by the press interpretation of the event (Lawrence 2000), and a particular discourse of hopefulness among segments of the black community who suggested that “now there’s undeniable proof” of police racism (Crenshaw and Peller 1992).

The power of the role of interpreting images ultimately undermined the potential effectiveness of a visual record that could be used against the state. The police defense lawyers successfully manipulated the video, and the jury’s opinion, by isolating the visuals into still frames that decontextualized King’s body movements and dehistoricized the racism of the incident (Williams 1993). By slowing down, rewinding, and freezing the video, the defense turned what seemed to be “undeniable proof” of police brutality into visual evidence that King was resisting arrest and that his flailing body was a weapon and a threat to police (Fiske 1996: 130, 134). These technical manipulations were effective because the visuals were also being interpreted through a particular way of seeing: racism.
The stark juxtaposition of the video footage and the jury acquittal tangibly troubles optical claims to indexicality while illuminating how broader social issues frame seeing. Judith Butler has posed:

> The video shows a man being brutally beaten, repeatedly, and without visible resistance; and so the question is, How could this video be used as evidence that the body being beaten was itself the source of danger, the threat of violence, and further, that the beaten body of Rodney King bore an intention to injure [the police]. (1993: 15, emphasis original)

The ability to see the tortured black body as a threatening weapon—simultaneously hyper-human and dehumanized—is the product of centuries of American history and policy that have understood black bodies as inherently threatening to the social order and have treated, controlled, and surveilled them accordingly. What the Rodney King court case makes clear is that viewers see with and through their respective positionalities in historical context. Visual evidence is always narrated and interpreted (Hesford 2011), and as Kimberlé Crenshaw and Gary Peller point out, “at stake at each axis of conflict is a contest over which, and whose, narrative structure will prevail in the interpretation of events in the social world” (1993: 57). Narrative structures are not just personal; they are created through public understandings of American history, what role groups attribute to racialization in American history, and how racialization continues to affect groups unevenly in their daily lives.

The video of Rodney King’s arrest is an important precursor to the practice of digital counter-surveillance and its limitations. If the jury acquittal of the abusive officers moderated some public belief in, or hope for, the ability of images to prove wrongdoing within racialized contexts, it does not seem to have diminished the ways that visual objectivity continues to underpin press framing of police brutality video. That is, the media upholds the notion that video evidence of anti-black police brutality will result in state accountability, against historical precedent, even if some publics post-Rodney King are more skeptical of this claim. More broadly, the outcomes of the case help illuminate how a counter-surveillance orientation that depends on a court system’s ability to interpret evidence without bias ends up reinforcing structures of state violence because it relies on, and amplifies, the truth claims of liberalism’s discursive alibi of equality—a racial equality under law that is formally guaranteed and yet seldom attained.

Rodney King’s brutalization empirically demonstrates the veracity and material effects of racialization as a way of seeing; a closer look at history makes it apparent that a police system built on black social control will not be meaningfully reformed by visual documentation alone. In a context where black criminality has been historically naturalized, visual evidence that requires society to be able to see black humanity will be persistently limited by the structures that have created racialized ways of seeing.

**Histories that Produce Racialization as a Way of Seeing**

Three important histories have converged, perhaps conspired, to simultaneously create and conceal the formation “racialization as a way of seeing.” In this section, I bring together historical origins of American policing, historical discourses of visual objectivity, and histories of black social control and criminalization in the United States to demonstrate how race, visuality, and criminality are co-constituted. I derive the term “racialization as a way of seeing” from one of the canonic critics of the objectivity of the visual. In *Ways of Seeing* (1977), John Berger argued that the way that we see is affected by what we believe (1977: 8). I riff on Berger’s formation to hail its critique of images as both open to interpretation
and shaped by the viewer’s and creator’s ideological perspectives, as well as its attention to the relationship between power and perspective.

The history of policing in the United States is intimately tied with slavery and racism. In his chapter on the history of police brutality, Robin D. G. Kelley (2000) describes the lineage of legal violence against communities of color as originating in the colonial encounter between Europeans and Native Americans (through genocide and displacement) and gaining institutional traction in the slave patrols that were designed to protect the economic system of slavery. In a visual episteme, the visuality of phenotypical difference, codified into law, made racialization a visual, publicly accessible technology that aided the deputation of social control practices. When the Charleston Town Watch was created in 1671 to prevent enslaved people from running away and revolting, it simultaneously institutionalized the optical surveillance of black bodies by white civilians and initiated the system that would later become the formal American police force (Williams 2007). The Fugitive Slave Acts (1793, 1850) further enlisted (and required) white citizens to monitor the movement of black bodies and legalized the suspicion of criminal behavior of black people (Higginbotham 1978; Peabody and Grinberg 2007). As white fears shifted from slave revolt to controlling growing urban populations in the South, slave patrols became more regulated and began to resemble the modern organization of the police (Williams 2007). Since slavery’s abolition, the law and the police have been effective avenues for surveilling and repressing black subjects, from the Black Codes initiated to discipline black behavior post-Emancipation (Hartman 1997) to police complicity in the lynching of African Americans by white civilians (Wood 2009). This history demonstrates the co-constitution of policing and racial terror, as well as how the police and their practices have been built to serve power and are able to reconfigure their modes of operating as power needs.

Police power to surveil communities has been aided by two key visual technologies: race and cameras. The introduction of photography in the 19th century bolstered the emerging science of criminology as well as the then-dominant science of phrenology, which linked brain size to intelligence to striae and biologize social groupings such as race, class, and religion. All three sciences were undergirded by the visual and taxonomic episteme of the 18th century (Foucault 1966) that, by the 19th century, had extended beyond the scientific community and into social, institutional, and administrative logics (Conn 1998). Together, they constructed criminal deviance as biological and visible. John Tagg (1988) has influentially demonstrated how photography’s status as a “regime of truth” was discursively constructed. The discourse of photography’s indexicality was not natural or automatic, it gained power because the mechanical means of the camera were understood as more objective than portraiture and because state bureaucratic apparatuses endowed it with the authority to stand as evidence in court. Allan Sekula (1986) uses the history of scientific thinking to show how the dominance of “optical empiricism” was applied to practices of policing, where photography documented the attributes of criminals and was used as a predictive technology for who, based on physical characteristics, might become a criminal. These histories of science and technology illuminate the coeval of racial thinking, visuality, and criminality: in Britain, photography was central to attempting to identify a criminal type that could be reformed or disciplined; in the United States, slave patrols used visual indicators of race as a technology of social control. Understanding how photography has been used to legitimize power/knowledge evinces how state violence is abetted by visual representation, specifically through the discourse of indexicality.

2 Berger’s work is useful for thinking through the implications of relying on video footage that is captured from the perspective of the police officer because he argues that the makers of images encode those images with their positionality in ways that reproduce asymmetrical power relations. Transferring the image-making back to the police (and away from the civilian) further entrenches, while invisibilizing, the perspective of power in the image.

3 I do not mean to imply here that race is only or simply visual. Racialization and racial identity formation is a complex social process that, while not based in biology, has been consistently pinned on physical characteristics that stand in for group differentiation. My point in calling race a visual technology is to emphasize that racialization was invented as a socially useful process that serves power; and the visibility of racial difference has been key to how marginalization processes are operationalized.
Returning to these early scholarly excavations of the history of the discourse of visual objectivity is important for contextualizing how long this critique has existed among the lingering public recourse to photo-indexicality, and demonstrates just how deeply entrenched these beliefs are. As the contemporary discourse of colorblindness has taken hold, scholars have continued to theorize the ways in which seeing—and not seeing—race remain constitutive of power. Nikhil Singh (2012) explicates the paradox wherein the discursive deracialization of oppression actually remains specifically enforced along racial lines, particularly in the case of the criminalization of blackness. Like Singh, Mitchell (2012) grapples with the illusion/reality duality of race by arguing that race has become a frame that we see through, even if race is no longer “seen.” Omi and Winant (2014) recently revised their canonic Racial Formation in the United States to specifically address the fact that though race is socially constructed, racialization remains a technology and structure that constitutes social control and power amid the political and legal terrain of colorblindness. Thus, racialization remains a way of seeing—power’s embedded gaze—even if, and perhaps especially when, liberal institutions no longer “see” race.

If colorblindness and social construction invisibilized race amid persistent racism, Wendy Hesford (2011) demonstrates how human rights discourse continues to rely on the “truth-telling genre” of visual documentation. She identifies how the paradigmatic visual culture of human rights represents a “deserving victim in need of rescue” that allows structural and state violence to be recast “as scenes of individual trauma and victimization” (2011: 29). The counter-surveillance discourse traffics in similar problematic logics—that showing will translate into change (2011: 202)—but what happens if the depicted victim is read as not deserving? What happens if the victim is understood as inherently criminal?

Blackness has been constructed and naturalized as criminal through the history of American social science and reform policies (Muhammad 2011). By tracking how philosophies of science continued to shape racialization post-Emancipation, Khalil Muhammad extends our understanding of the visual logics of race-as-objective to the numerical logics of racial statistics-as-objective. Early actuary science was designed to prove that blacks were unfit for freedom and would perish without the plantation system. When this thesis was no longer tenable, statistics were used to “objectively prove” black inferiority in another way: crime. By collecting statistics on African American arrests, social science turned cultural practices of racist laws and disproportionate arrest into objective numbers that underpinned the “racial crime discourse” that blacks were, in fact, more likely to be criminals than whites (2011: 5). These biased statistics, cloaked in the scientific discourse of objectivity, then became naturalized through early 20th century reform policies that were themselves applied in racially biased ways. As immigrants benefitted from social services and programs formally denied to blacks, the increased wealth and social status of second and third generation European immigrants was interpreted to prove white superior competence at overcoming hardship, which, by comparison, pathologized black disenfranchisement and naturalized the connection between blackness and inherent criminality. Muhammad’s work, thus, gives a broader understanding of how blackness has been consistently criminalized in law and, even more punitively, through social policy, cultural representation, and cultural norms.

These histories and processes suggest that the visual evidence produced by counter-surveillance will not be able to self-evidently “expose” abuses of power within the police force alone. Most significantly, the systems of power we inherit (gaining supremacy and resource through racial division; maintaining advantage through racialized repression; defining civility against assignments of criminality) and our extant ways of knowing (statistics, taxonomies, looking, evidence) have been produced within, and shaped by, the context of racial capitalism. Demonstrating how they interlock emphasizes the significance and endurance of the process of racialization, including how it becomes its own embedded gaze, or way of seeing.
With racialization as a way of seeing firmly entrenched, and often concealed, within American society, the notion that visual documentation of a violated black body could objectively prove wrongdoing, or even would regularly evoke broad public empathy, is highly attenuated. Spectacles of public abuse of African Americans have long been condoned, and even enjoyed, by dominant white society (Wood 2009). Systems of policing were created with the purpose of controlling and terrorizing black lives (Russell 2000; Williams 2007; Herzing and Ontiveros 2010). These are histories of surveillance and limitations of counter-surveillance that must be centered in order to make sense of how, and to what extent, the recourse to visual evidence could effectively reduce police brutality.

State Recuperation of Resistance to Police Brutality

If racialization as a way of seeing is the limiting factor for the effectiveness of the visual practice of civilian counter-surveillance, there are additional implications of the discourse that demands filmic evidence of police behavior. The impetus to counter-surveillance emerged from the Left and developed from a larger goal to keep people safe in their communities. As this practice has circulated as a discourse, though, it has largely been reduced to a technologically determinist notion that cameras themselves are the agents that hold the police accountable. The mechanism of change has been converted: cameras provide an objective record that allows for colorblind justice to prevail. Reduced to the mere implementation of more technological devices, the call for police accountability has been quickly co-opted by the state as a demand for increasing body-worn cameras on police.

Prior to the Brown family’s call for increased police cameras in 2014, police officials were galvanizing a different narrative to attempt to gain control over the presence of video footage. “Officer safety” has been used repeatedly by police officers to deter or arrest counter-surveillers as well as by police administrators who are advocating for police control of surveillance technologies.4 There are many incidents of people being arrested for recording another arrest in progress. In 2013, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the Philadelphia Police Department for “wrongfully intimidating and arresting citizens who try to videotape them” (Martin 2013). The right to record police is protected by the First Amendment, has been upheld in court, and supported by the Department of Justice (Kopan 2013), but that has not deterred officers from intimidating residents.

To justify these illegal arrests, police officers often state that the constituent is endangering the police officers’ safety. In a telling 2011 video highlighted on USA Today’s blog, a white Rochester woman is arrested on her own lawn for videotaping a police officer conducting a traffic stop against a black man near her house. Once the officer notices her filming, he states, “I don’t feel safe with you standing behind me so I am asking you to go in your house.” He then repeats that he does not feel safe five additional times, including “I don’t feel safe, you seem very anti-police.” The woman reiterates that she is exercising her right. The officer gets agitated and with a disgusted and mundane tone says, “You know what, you are going to go to jail. That’s just not right,” referring to her insistence at filming him, despite her actions being perfectly legal (Stanglin 2011).

In addition to individual intimidation and repression, “officer safety” has been used by police officials to co-opt public support for cameras. In Dallas, the Police Association President declared that civilian cameras are “creating a major officer safety issue” (Pinkerton quoted in CBS Dallas / Fort Worth 2014). At the same time, officials from the Dallas Police Department said “they support squad car dashboard cameras and the department’s plans to buy body cams. They believe those are enough eyes watching their 4 This rhetoric is historically consistent. Police often justify excessive force through recourse to their own safety, whether by proliferating the idea that policing is a dangerous job or by prematurely firing bullets based on the perception of their own endangerment.
every move and are asking citizens to put their cameras away” (*CBS Dallas / Fort Worth* 2014). This discursive pairing activates and upholds the dominant veneration for the police by prioritizing their safety, while transferring the counter-surveillance logic of filming for accountability into police control and self-monitoring.

TASER International, the corporation who leads the market in selling “on-officer” body cams and data management systems to law enforcement agencies, has advanced a strikingly similar narrative in its promotional materials. Their website proclaims, “People on both sides of the badge stay safe when accountability is expected,” and as Kelly Gates (forthcoming) argues, their tagline to “protect truth” aligns moral legitimacy with the police officer’s point of view. TASER originally developed mounted camera technology in order to counter excessive use of force complaints issued by victims who had been shocked with their non-lethal electric weapon namesake. Now TASER markets its officer-mounted product line as a way to ensure officer safety through “the protections of body worn cameras” which silence “erroneous allegations” (website). TASER supports its marketing claims with the frequently cited 2012 Rialto study, a randomized trial with TASER-provided equipment, which found that the presence of police worn cameras reduced complaints against police officers. This study is also oft-cited in the press when the issue of body cams are raised in cases of police brutality (e.g. Mims 2014; Keneally 2014; O’Neill 2014; Jorgensen 2015).

Officer safety remains a prevalent and effective rhetorical tool for justifying police behavior, whether in incident reports where police testify to feeling “threatened” by the presence of a black body or press and policy conversations suggesting that police self-monitoring of video footage is safest for all. Since Michael Brown’s murder, though, the narrative around filming the police has been more congruently and publicly knitted to the counter-surveillance discourse. That is, if before the police had to make a case for why they should be in control of filming, now body cams are articulated as the logical outcome of the demand for counter-surveillance. And, the state situates itself as benevolent for supporting this public demand and providing funding for law enforcement agencies to purchase the technology. TASER International and police administrators initially laid the rhetorical and infrastructural groundwork to redirect control of civilian surveillance; now, the discourse on filming, and its various political orientations, is elided into moderate liberal support of increased police control, rather than increased community oversight.

With President Obama’s inauguration of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing, the discourse that underpins police self-monitoring has shifted from “officer safety” to reasserting the universality of law enforcement’s role in keeping everybody safe. This move re legitimizes the institution of the police at the moment that the police are facing broader skepticism of their ability to credibly enforce and ensure race-neutral community safety. After investigating the mechanisms through which local police departments have been militarized through the Department of Defense’s provision of “equipment” to law enforcement agencies (Executive Office of the President 2014), the Obama administration introduced a “community policing initiative” to build trust between historically oppressed populations and the police (White House 2014). While the Executive Order created the Task Force on 21st Century Policing to make more thorough recommendations about how to strengthen community oriented policing, the flagship component of Obama’s Executive Order was the explicit endorsement of body worn cameras. The Order recommends the allocation of $75 million specifically for the purchase of cameras (Manjoo and Isaac 2015; Scott 2014; White House 2014), and police-worn cameras are the sole strategy mentioned for how to operationalize

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5 The findings of the study, however, raise some questions: (1) is Rialto a representative city, both in terms of size and demographics, and in terms of trust between communities of color and the police? (2) excessive force complaints reduced dramatically across both the experimental and the control group suggesting Rialto PD might have experienced a treatment effect where all officers responded to being *studied*, not just monitored by cameras. See Brucato (2015) for further discussion of the study’s limitations.
the Community Policing Initiative. The President’s Executive Order came a few days after a grand jury did not indict the police officer responsible for killing Michael Brown. As there was no video evidence in the case, the presumption is that if there had been footage, the officer would have been indicted, and liberalism’s race neutral application of justice would be restored.

The interim report findings of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing, released in March 2015, deal with the issue and recommendation of body cameras extensively. The report affirms the need for body worn cameras as evidentiary defense: “Now that agencies operate in a world in which anyone with a cell phone camera can record video footage of a police encounter, BWCs [body worn cameras] help police departments ensure that events are also captured from an officer’s perspective” (2015: 32). The report does grapple with potential unintended effects of body worn cameras, including privacy considerations of civilians; however, it emphasizes the perils to law enforcement agencies, namely cost, training, need for additional policies, and the rapid pace of technological change. While 21st century policing is implemented in the name of enhancing community relations, the report makes it clear that its main endorsements of and reservations with cameras lie in protecting the police.

In a year marked by persistent uprisings against police brutality across the country, cases where police kill civilians of color have garnered increased media attention. News articles often include quotes from officials pledging to outfit their officers and facilities with additional cameras, framed as a gesture toward accountability and impartiality in discerning the “facts” of the incident. In the immediate aftermath of the release of the bystander video of Walter Scott’s murder, North Charleston’s mayor “announced that all patrol officers would be outfitted with body cameras” (Lowery and Izadi 2015). Another journalist interpreted the mayor’s executive order as “a tacit acknowledgment of the importance video played in this case” (Blinder and Santora 2015). The questions surrounding African American Freddie Gray’s death while in police custody in Baltimore prompted officials to say “they are checking all of the vans to make sure they’re outfitted with proper restraints and are considering putting cameras inside” (George 2015). Police cameras, then, are discursively rendered as the automatic solution to end police brutality. Where bystander video exists officials expand (and take control of) video footage; where no video exists, police controlled monitoring is situated as the way to resolve contested incident reports. The recuperation of the discourse comes full circle as TASER International uses public outrage to persuade law enforcement agencies to buy their on-officer products: “Body-worn cameras continue to gain momentum as the public demands greater transparency from their law enforcement agencies” (Taser International, Inc. n.d.). The police, then, are rhetorically reinvested with the imperative and legitimacy to protect the people fairly.

The state recuperation of the discourse to film the police has major implications. It gives the police control over the angle and framing of the footage, as well as complete control of capturing it, editing and tampering with it, and disseminating it (or not). As scholars of visuality have shown, framing and perspective embed power and narrative into images. In their handbook on how to film the police effectively, the Network for the Elimination of Police Violence (Toronto) suggests, “Don’t film the person being stopped unless it is absolutely necessary” because suspect behavior can be used against victims in court even though such actions do not legally permit excessive force (p. 10). Putting cameras on the police does the exact opposite: there are limited views of the officers’ interactions and extensive documentation of the suspect’s. Power’s gaze is reinstated. There is also evidence that some police officers resist being self-monitored by turning off dash cams, breaking antennas, and otherwise tampering with equipment (ABC Local 2014; Rubin 2014), which gives officers control of which incidents they record. Further, police footage is generally reserved for evidence in the courtroom and is rarely circulated publicly, thus undermining video’s role in inspiring mass outrage and public mobilizations against police brutality.

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6 The Task Force’s emphasis on privacy indexes both a liberal universalist logic that is underpinned by white subjecthood, and Surveillance Studies’ complicity in advancing privacy as the chief concern of the implications of surveillance (see Dubrofsky and Magnet 2015).
(Ciccariello-Maher 2009). Giving the police control over the mechanisms of accountability represents the full recuperation of the original resistance politics of cop watching.

On a systemic level, police worn cameras are problematic because they constitute a liberal reform that funnels more federal money into local law enforcement agencies, giving police more power, not less. As I have been arguing, reform-based strategies are not capable of fundamentally redressing the structural exclusions and violence built into liberalism precisely because the goal of reform is to incrementally improve, but ultimately maintain, the existing system. The Task Force report ignores the history of racism as the primary cause of police brutality, focusing its precautions instead on implementation procedures and policies (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). But as Ruth Wilson Gilmore has demonstrated in her work on the state’s investment in prisons, “The limit to any reform...is the system itself: reform tends to strengthen institutions, especially those geared to social control” (1998/99: 183). Thus, if the system of policing is inherently racialized and racializing, strengthening those institutions, even in the name of reforming them, will not address the underlying structural issues.

With racism intact, well-intentioned reforms retain the capacity to be used in unpredictable ways that could further entrench racial disparity. In her new book on the anti-racist liberal reforms to the legal system in the 1950s, Naomi Murakawa (2014) demonstrates this potential historically. She argues that post-WWII race liberals—those interested in ameliorating white-on-black violence—are responsible for creating law-and-order policy before it became co-opted into conservative tough-on-crime laws. White liberals were operating on the logic that if policy could be reformed so as to alleviate individual discrimination on the part of state actors, then liberalism could ensure equal treatment to all. Yet, supposedly race-blind policies like mandatory minimum sentencing laws have resulted in a disproportionate number of people of color in prison. Reforms that aimed to “control racial bias in criminal justice administration” (Murakawa 2014: 3) understood racism as an individual bias issue and not a structural problem. As such, they did little to ameliorate systemic violence and ultimately had the counter-productive impact of exacerbating racial inequality. The historical documentation raises the question: since wearing cameras does not change the practice of over-policing communities of color, to what use might the mass accumulation of police-perspective video recordings of people of color be put?

While other, more hopeful, scenarios of the unexpected possibilities of video counter-surveillance exist, their potential lies in what these video documents might be able to galvanize through changing public sentiment and community organizing strategies. For instance, Kristian Williams (2011a, 2011b) has suggested that the power of video documentation of police brutality does not inhere in punitive justice, but rather in the videos’ ability to generate mass public distrust of the police, which could de-emphasize the role of the police in social life and thereby reduce racial terror. Community organizations, particularly those invested in cop watching, readily point out that counter-surveillance video is one part of a strategy of building community power through visibility, education, and multi-racial solidarity. Thus, if video can call certain publics to action, the potential for state recuperation could be limited by public understanding of structural racism that requires larger scale protest and the creation of new community and societal structures that resist reproducing domination. What my discussion points to, then, is the importance of naming the ways that the state recuperates the counter-surveillance discourse, so that we might remain vigilant in tipping the scales toward liberation rather than being lulled into compliance by the state’s actions.

**Conclusion: Video for State Legitimacy**

From the 1992 Los Angeles uprising to the 2015 Baltimore uprising, the police and the state have recursively used the societal disruptions caused by protests against police brutality to re-legitimize the need for the police to restore and maintain social order. By using the press framing of protesters as violent, attention is directed away from structural violence against black citizens and toward reaffirming the
construction of blackness as inherently criminal. This cycle continues to persist in high-profile cases with or without video: when video helps prompt mass mobilizations in the streets (e.g. Oscar Grant, James Boyd), when video evidence does not lead to indictments and convictions (e.g. Rodney King, Eric Garner) and when the lack of video ignites longstanding distrust into outrage (e.g. Michael Brown, Freddie Gray).

I would like to conclude, though, by suggesting that under the discursive conditions of 21st century policing, a new model for reasserting state legitimacy in the face of bald state-sanctioned racial terror is emerging—one that fundamentally relies on video. Returning to the police shooting of Walter Scott, law enforcement officials acted with unprecedented speed and conviction upon the disclosure of bystander video. Officer Slager was arrested and fired; the police chief quickly denounced the actions of the officer. Mayor Summey commented, “This was a bad decision by one of those 343 [officers], and I think the lesson that we take out of this, and hopefully the general public takes out of it, is that when an incident occurs, give us the appropriate time to investigate, find out exactly what happened, and we will act accordingly” (quoted on Democracy Now 2015). In the same press conference, he declared that all officers would begin wearing police cameras.

While the sequence of events is notable for its rarity, I would like to direct our attention away from the tempting techno-egalitarianism it inspires and toward the less apparent model for upholding state legitimacy the response offers. Namely: When there is damning video evidence, law enforcement agencies respond quickly and punitively to individualize the wrongdoing and diffuse protest. The self-inflicted act of criminal justice repairs the police reputation as unbiased, accountable, and civilized. The request for additional body cameras suggests humility and openness to wider reforms from within the department. The entire cycle ultimately demonstrates, and thus legitimizes, the efficacy of Obama’s reform-based initiatives and helps secure public support for additional funding for them. The public, then, essentially consents to the inauguration of a massive archive of video evidence of public behaviors with unpredictable implications. Finally, the cycle subtly propagates a narrative of “civility” that delegitimizes and discourages radical protest by once again suggesting that if we could just perfect the procedures, liberalism’s promise of racial equality would be attained.

Zooming out from the narrow frame of counter-surveillance, then, allows us to see how its visual and punitive evidence logics are underwritten by dominant epistemologies that are unlikely to dismantle police violence. Multiple centuries of America’s investment in criminalizing blackness structures our seeing, as individual jury members, as a police force, and as a state. As long as visual evidence of police brutality is interpreted through racialized ways of seeing, the practices of counter-surveillance and the discourse of filming the cops remain circumscribed within a larger cycle of repression that continues to reconfigure itself in ways that uphold the legitimacy of the police, and by extension, the racist state.

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