Abstract

This paper argues that “doing Surveillance Studies” in a way that builds on and extends past research requires embracing the increasing call in the field to attend to gender, and embracing insights pertaining to feminist methodology and relatedly epistemology. By reviewing the extant record and possibilities of attending to gender, the article shows how both the empirical and normative repertoires of Surveillance Studies may be emboldened and more nuanced discussions and understandings advanced. Special attention is paid to how a project aimed at gendering Surveillance Studies may create new possibilities for enhanced attention to difference and identity, as well as surveillance in relation to both control and care.

Introduction

In the wake of the deadly bombings at the 2013 Boston Marathon, an unusual photo went viral. While Boston and surrounding towns were in lockdown with residents confined to their homes, and local and federal armed agents in an intense and bloody search for suspects, Officer John Bradley did something unexpected. Armed and in a black bulletproof vest, the Brookline, Massachusetts cop delivered two large containers of milk to a housebound family with young children. The UK’s Daily Mail dubbed Bradley “America’s toughest milkman” (Stebner 2013), while closer to the actual scene, a Boston.com correspondent used the image to underscore that “there was a lot of compassion during those tense hours” (Elbakyan 2013).

As the massive hunt for the Boston bombers represented a moment in which post 9/11 surveillance technologies and practices were uniquely on televised display for a domestic and international public, this image of aggressive law enforcement with a gentler side had American and global media appeal. But the image also raises analytic questions. Are we fully recognizing emotive complexities around issues of surveillance? Given the visible centrality of technology to the evolution of the multidisciplinary field of Surveillance Studies since the 1980s, might we be bypassing ways in which examining more expressive components may enrich our understanding and analysis of Surveillance Studies? Do certain approaches better capture emotive and expressive contexts than others?

While leading practitioners in Surveillance Studies have acknowledged the “two faces” of surveillance which involves control and care (Lyon 2001: 3), in point of fact, to date surprisingly few analyses in the
field of Surveillance Studies have dealt systematically with ideas like compassion or care.\(^1\) In contrast, a central concern of contemporary gender studies, and more specifically feminist care ethics, is the profound human need to give and receive care. As a consequence, taken to its logical conclusion feminist care ethics provides an important avenue into thinking broadly about human needs and the institutions and practices that may, or may not, fulfill them (Adkin and Abu-Laban 2008: 56). The emphasis on care that has been so central to feminist care ethics, yet so tangential to the driving emphasis of Surveillance Studies on social power and control, raises the question of how a conversation might be facilitated and advanced. In what follows, consideration is given to some key extant and potential insights of feminist research and methodology to advancing discussion of both control and care in the field of Surveillance Studies.

It is the contention of this article that “doing Surveillance Studies” in a way that builds on past research requires embracing the increasing call in the multidisciplinary and rapidly growing field of Surveillance Studies to attend to gender (Ball, Green, Koskela and Phillips 2009; Corones and Hardy 2009: 389; Koskela 2012) and also embracing insights pertaining to feminist methodology and by extension epistemology. Although there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes a specifically feminist methodology (or method or epistemology), as Doucet and Mauthner (2006) usefully summarize, the work of feminist scholars has typically exhibited five tendencies. These are that the research: 1) deals with women and is often for women; 2) reflects methodological pluralism and often innovation in data collection and interpretation, making it appropriate to speak of feminist methodologies in the plural; 3) is concerned with social change and social justice; 4) is attentive to the power relations in which the researcher is situated; and 5) is reflexive and thus gives ongoing consideration to methodology (as well as method and epistemology). Some of these features—like methodological pluralism and attention to power—may be seen in Surveillance Studies research already. However, by gendering Surveillance Studies research through explicitly attending to gender, as well as being consciously aware of the tendencies of feminist research, the possibilities of new or more nuanced empirical and normative understandings for the field increase. These possibilities are especially relevant in light of the rapidly transforming information and communication technologies that make for a surveillance society/state and demand new considerations of ethics (see also Abu-Laban 2012a).

In order to substantiate this argument, this paper takes a two-fold approach. First it reviews key extant literature to underscore why a “gender blind” approach is insufficient to fully understanding social power and control, and how attention to gender has enriched the field. By identifying new questions and insights into “watcher” and “watched,” the emerging work done on gender and surveillance attunes us to a fuller array of dimensions to the “surveillant gaze” in both the “public” and “private” spheres. It also opens the door to a wider awareness of epistemological and methodological choices.

Second, the article turns to examining how this record of gender research may be further expanded in the field both empirically and normatively. At an empirical level, more contemporary gender analysis insists that attention be paid to “difference” and identity, with the understanding that any one individual may belong to multiple identity categories. Such a perspective may serve to encourage a methodology of research procedure and analysis that explicitly considers the interactions of various categories of difference. Specifically, incorporation of intersectional analysis can better attune analysts to address the sometimes variable experiences of women and men as they relate to class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age/stage of life cycle, time and space. At a normative level, because feminist theory, and more particularly feminist care ethics, raises profound questions about the limits of liberalism and liberal ethics, gendering Surveillance Studies may temper the hegemonic focus on “privacy” in the field of Surveillance Studies by challenging the emphasis on individual autonomy through acknowledging a relational stress on interdependence. Placed in relation to Surveillance Studies, an emphasis on “care” may also temper the dominance of themes of “control” that characterize the field, and better enable practitioners to differentiate

\(^1\) For important exceptions see Nelson (2009) and McIntosh, Punch, Dorrer and Emond (2010).
the motivations of surveillance, as well as why they may be challenged—or perhaps tolerated or even embraced—by both “watcher” and “watched.” Attention to the insights of feminist research can further push the boundaries of normative understanding, and in the process reveal some of the paradoxical and ambiguous rationales and outcomes of surveillance.

**Key Pioneering Contributions and Challenging “Gender-Blind” Assumptions**

While space limitations prevent covering all feminist contributions with relevance to Surveillance Studies, attending to some key pioneering contributions and understandings is illustrative of where we have come, and allows for more consideration of where we may go. To begin with Surveillance Studies, at a basic level surveillance is understood to be a social process that has deep historical roots in human communities, but since the 1970s and 1980s it has come to assume a position as a key organizational practice of late modernity (Lyon, Haggerty and Ball 2012: 1). Additionally, while surveillance practices clearly predate the response to the events of September 11, 2001, there is widespread agreement amongst Surveillance Studies specialists that these practices, and certain features embedded in the international political economy, were more deeply entrenched and amplified in the aftermath of 9/11 (Lyon 2003; Monahan 2010). Hence, speaking of the American context, Torin Monahan notes:

> Whereas television series such as 24 normalize torture in the public imaginary and shape political discourse, U.S. government agencies actively partner with the security industry to propagate fear of terrorist attacks and cultivate a desire for prevention through technological means. This partnership is a component of larger trends in the privatization of national security, which spreads across many theaters of operation….

> The privatization of security entails much more than the awarding of government contract to private companies, however. It is fundamentally about the realigning of national security interests with the profit motives of private companies.

> (Monahan 2010: 37)

Given the American context described above—which in light of the global “war on terrorism” may also be viewed as an international context—it is really not surprising that technological developments, or possibilities, have assumed a pride of place in much Surveillance Studies research (Kroener and Neyland 2012). Yet, as Hille Koskela (2012: 49) notes, “Long before the development of contemporary surveillance technologies, gender and surveillance were intensely controlled by social and moral norms, which entailed their own forms of interpersonal monitoring, and in many places of the world this is still the case.” One might even go as far as to say that forms of interpersonal (as well as self) monitoring take place—albeit in distinct ways—in all human societies/polities past and present. This is a point developed in work from the 1970s taking up the centrality of looking and “looked-at-ness.”

While discussions of looking have a lineage in 20th century philosophical thought, by the 1970s the idea that “the way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe” (Berger 1972: 8) was taken up more emphatically in artistic criticism (see also Berger 1980). In other words, a host of assumptions relating to beauty, truth, gender, class and other social relations of power may be at play when humans look. In this same period, an emerging body of feminist theory also came to address “the gaze,” as well as “the body” very directly. A central early contribution was that of Laura Mulvey in her well-known 1975 essay dealing with cinema/media studies. Here she observed:

> In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female figure which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are
simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote “to-be-looked-at-ness.”

(Mulvey 1975: 11)

Such insight was also to be amplified in the work of feminist theorists addressing the changing social context of gender domination. For example, in her 1990 contribution, Sandra Lee Bartky highlighted a shift in modern industrial societies in the regulation of femininity away from previous emphases on chastity, modesty and homemaking toward new ones in which the female body was central (Bartky 1990: 80). Capturing this shift which also involved self-regulation she averred:

The woman who checks her make-up half a dozen times a day to see if her foundation has caked or her mascara run, who worries that the wind or rain may spoil her hairdo, who looks frequently to see if her stockings have bagged at the ankle, or who feeling fat, monitors everything she eats, has become, just as surely as the inmate of the Panopticon, a self-policing subject, a self committed to relentless self-surveillance.

(1990: 80)

Likewise, cultural critic and humanities professor Susan Bordo (2003[1993]) memorably drew attention to a diverse range of issues relating to power and the body in Western culture that carry gendered implications (e.g., concerning reproductive rights, weight, and eating disorders).

Irrespective of the position one may hold about the ubiquitous or universal nature of interpersonal and self monitoring, these foundational insights underscore how attention to gender necessitates consideration of not only how surveillance and control is mediated by technology, but also how it might not be, and the implications of both for girls/boys and women/men. With respect to technology, consider the work of leisure studies specialists who show that tourist spaces are prone to producing different forms of gendered and even sexualized gaze, and the finding that solo female tourists stress that their greatest fear whilst travelling abroad is sexual assault (Jordan and Aitchison 2008: 342). In this way, there is evidence to suggest that for many women who travel alone, the unwanted gaze of certain men they may encounter in ordinary circumstances while away from home is perceived as more threatening than the types of surveillance associated with the electronic eye (Jordan and Aitchison 2008: 343). Notably, human encounters, or the fear of such encounters, work to also restrict the free movement of female tourists (Jordan and Aitchison 2008). This suggests that even without the use of technology women’s mobility may be circumscribed in ways that, arguably, have some parallels with how technologically sophisticated electronic walls and border zones operate to control human movement by the threat of violence.

Contemporary Surveillance Studies, following often in the tradition of work established by Michel Foucault, puts a decided emphasis on the role of surveillance in relation to social control (Koskela 2012: 51). An additional insight coming from the fledgling work on gender and surveillance draws attention to the gendered assumptions underpinning forms of external control. For example, Corones and Hardy suggest that in being indifferent to gender, Foucault essentially neglected gender (2009: 393). Their work on cervical cancer screening as a form of medical/health surveillance suggests that this form of surveillance operates to discipline women, and assumes that rational women will also be docile recipients of such screening (2009: 393-396, my emphasis). Working with this stereotyped assumption of quiescence, they show that non-compliance is interpreted as resulting from ignorance, prudishness, or fear (2009: 395). The point being made here is that there are gender-specific norms which may be at play in the way in which a particular form of medical screening operates, which might be different if, for example, the imagined patient were male and neglecting to be screened for prostate or lung cancer.

Additionally, feminist analyses highlight how not only externalized control, but also how internalized forms of self-regulation may be gendered and historically specific. This is evident, for example, in a recent
study of two generations of women in England reflecting on pregnancy. The findings suggest that the more recent cohort of women experience a much more intense form of public surveillance of pregnancy than their own mothers when it comes to their choices of food, drink, and fashion, as well as their body shape and judging their care given to the unborn (Fox, Heffernan and Nicolson 2009: 553-568). Research findings also suggest more widespread and older technologies—like television—may work in distinct ways with new reality show formats to feed into both public and internalized forms of surveillance and control. Thus Magubane (2008) traces the way the show *Starting Over* uses African-American female characters to function as “modern mammies” by guiding and monitoring white women to utilize self-discipline and seek self-improvement in such areas as weight control, self-esteem, relationships and reducing personal financial debt. Sears and Godderis suggest that the TV reality show *A Baby Story* engages a form of “lifestyle surveillance” that allows viewers to surveil reality TV participants, and at the same time for the formulaic televised representations to ultimately promote self-surveillance for the (mostly female) audience members. As they put it: “bringing together Foucauldian and feminist theory we argue that the idea of an electronic panopticon is useful in theorizing the potential impact of reality TV shows like *A Baby Story*” (Sears and Godderis 2011: 183).

Taking the panopticon further, studies of the print media, which have systematically shown that female leaders are treated differently than males (Trimble 2007), also suggest that the print media watches with gendered effects. Thus in her analysis of the damaging treatment of former Hewlett-Packard President and CEO Carly Fiorina in *The Wall Street Journal*, Norander suggests, “For Foucault, the panopticon was the ultimate tool of surveillance—subjects could be watched, but did not know from which angle they were being observed. Women in high profile positions are often subject to such surveillance through the watchful eyes of the press—as well as through the transparency of the ‘glass ceiling’” (Noranger 2008: 103).

The work on gender and surveillance also reflects on how state surveillance may take gendered forms. One sphere in which women are especially prone to encountering state surveillance is in the area of social welfare. As a contemporary example, Monahan notes how electronic benefit transfer systems for American welfare and food stamp recipients serve to surveil poor and often racialized women. Introduced in the U.S. as part of the 1996 reform of welfare, ostensibly to prevent fraud, these systems track purchases made with electronic cards, with consequences for individual budgeting strategies and choices (Monahan 2010: 119; see also Eubanks 2012: 82). What is equally noteworthy is that as early as World War One, Britain’s embryonic welfare state pension programme designed for war widows involved gendered bureaucratic surveillance (Smith 2010). In this way, the state effectively replaced the deceased husband as both the financial and moral guardian of war widows (Smith 2010: 524). These findings suggest the deeply embedded forms of gendered bureaucratic surveillance contained in the welfare state, a finding echoed about the judicial branch of the state by criminologists addressing gender and crime. Such work has much to say about how surveillance practices relate to gender and other social divisions (Barak, Leighton and Flavin 2010), how new forms of surveillance and surveillance technologies may reinforce existing social divides along new lines (Coleman and McCahill 2011: 286), and also how a variety of state institutions may be mobilized. On the latter, for instance Flavin draws attention to how the courts, laws and law enforcement agencies, and social welfare/child welfare agencies, work in tandem to effectively “police” women’s reproduction in the United States in relation to conception, abortion, pregnancy and child-rearing (Flavin 2009).

The importance of powerful institutions of state and society is further amplified in the work of Virginia Eubanks which provides a feminist take on science, technology and society studies. Specifically, focusing on American programs developed under the Bush and Obama administrations which target the “digital divide,” Eubanks finds these have both underestimated the resources of “poor” communities and neighbourhoods, as well as the ways in which institutions relating to criminal justice, welfare and employment work to shape the relationship between “poor” people and information technology. Notably,
in contrast to a dichotomous “digital divide,” the marginalized women interviewed by Eubanks highlighted variable interaction with new technologies based on social location and complex relations of power (2012: 37-39). As such, the interviews with specific women allowed for the emergence of situated knowledge, so central to much feminist epistemology, and highly relevant for thinking about policies advancing “digital equity.”

Moreover, interviews with the subjects of surveillance provide one major way in which the technologically driven emphasis of much Surveillance Studies work is not only challenged, but a wider array of experiences and knowledge(s) of surveillance may arise. This is captured in the work of McCahill and Finn (2010) who utilize interviews with UK school-age children (ages 13-16) to illustrate how the actual experience of surveillance varies in relation to class and gender. As such they argue that “it may be useful for future research, including our own, to situate the ‘subjective experiences,’ and ‘behavioural responses’ of the ‘surveilled’ in a wider context by drawing upon sociological theories on ‘identity formation’ in ‘late modernity’” (McCahill and Finn 2010: 286).

The gender-specific implications of certain technologies are also a consideration in work done more explicitly on surveillance, gender and other forms of identity. As one chilling example, the potential ways in which new technologies may be used for harmful ends is given in the recent work of Mason and Magnet (2012) on violence against women, and specifically domestic violence. They suggest violence against women is being increasingly facilitated by new technological strategies like tracking of Facebook and Twitter, installing hidden GPS monitors in cars, and use of computer SpyWare to monitor online activities. They show therefore how the strategies abusive partners may utilize to stalk have been amplified (Mason and Magnet 2012: 107-109). In the process, these popular technologies also transform into technologies of violence (Mason and Magnet 2012: 107).

One of the more wide-ranging theoretical considerations of gender and surveillance has been helpfully advanced by Torin Monahan who starts with the observation that control is not the only feature of surveillance directed at women. As Monahan (2010: 113) notes, “Studies find that at least one in ten women are watched by control room operators for voyeuristic reasons alone.” Monahan also suggests that the gendered implications of surveillance go beyond voyeurism because modern surveillance involves not only what he calls “context or use discrimination” (e.g. males are often in control rooms and may use video surveillance in voyeuristic ways with particular impact on some women) but also “body discrimination” (privileging male young white and able bodies), as well as “discrimination by abstraction” (evident in the ways that technological systems work on abstraction and often bypass context, and thus may be read as relying on “masculine” control at a distance) (Monahan 2010: 114-117). The idea of masculine control at a distance is one that Monahan posits as the most controversial, and it is a point I will return to from a different angle in considering care.

To sum up then, by moving beyond the indifferent (and gender blind) tradition of Michel Foucault, and by bringing gender into the heart of discussions, the empirical findings of the fledgling literature explicitly linking gender and surveillance draws attention to how surveillance may work in ways that are technologically mediated as well as in ways that are not. As such, the surveillant gaze may still equally be the human eye, not just the electronic eye, and it may be differentially experienced as recent work on surveillant subjects makes clear. Work explicitly considering gender in Surveillance Studies suggests that forms of external as well as internal control are socially constructed and historically specific, and take gendered forms. The budding work that takes gender explicitly into account draws attention to state surveillance, and also suggests that technologically mediated surveillance may facilitate voyeurism,

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2 Notably, it is also males that are more frequently reported on and charged for voyeurism, as in the widely covered case of a New York University Art History instructor who was arrested for unlawful surveillance, allegedly using his iPhone to record women in change rooms adjacent to his in a Manhattan clothing store (Huffington Post 2013).
stalking and violence with specific implications for women. These important findings provide a base from which to envision further gendering Surveillance Studies research by building on methodological and epistemological pluralism.

**Building on the Record of Gender and Surveillance Studies: Pushing Empirical and Normative Boundaries**

As a relatively new multi/interdisciplinary and bourgeoning field, Surveillance Studies has, since the 1980s, produced a plethora of conceptual insights stemming from research. As a result, the field has a clearly identifiable and developing lexicon to better facilitate naming and identifying the consequences of surveillance. For example, some relevant terms emerging from “doing Surveillance Studies” include “social sorting,” “surveillant assemblage,” “visibility,” and “exposure” (Lyon, Haggerty and Ball 2012: 5) as well as “surveillance society,” “surveillance state,” (Abu-Laban 2012a: 425-426) and “surveillant gaze”—a concept that has been particularly pertinent for emerging studies on surveillance in relation to art and performance (McGrath and Sweeny 2010). The field then has a clear status and language, is evolving, and is multi/interdisciplinary and therefore not tethered to any longstanding disciplinary bias which might make it less open to gender analysis (see Abu-Laban 2008 for the contrast with the discipline of political science).

Given this point of development in the field of Surveillance Studies, this is a particularly propitious juncture to imagine what might be gained by gendering Surveillance Studies research by explicitly attending to gender, as well as feminist methodology and epistemology. Recalling that feminist research has tended to be about and often for women, exhibit methodological innovation, and be attuned to social justice, power and reflexivity as concerns methodology (Doucet and Mauthner 2006), it is clear that if widely embraced, a gendering Surveillance Studies agenda would have several avenues of potential exploration. This might include attending to marginal groups not only in relation to being the objects of surveillance, but ascertaining the conditions under which surveillance may be harmful or beneficial in relation to social justice through more research focused on the subjects of surveillance. It might also include more explicit consideration of researcher subjectivity and social power and the difficulties (or ease) with which certain forms of data are obtained. Moreover, it might also include a more conscious awareness and ongoing discussion of methodology and epistemology in Surveillance Studies research. However, for the purposes of this discussion this section will look only at how Surveillance Studies may be invigorated by deeper engagement with two dimensions: attention to difference and attention to care ethics. Each will be discussed in turn.

**Attending to Difference and the Gaze**

Contemporary feminist analyses have, since the late 1980s, paid increasing attention to difference, and in particular to the way in which the experiences of women and men may vary by class, religion, race, ethnicity, disability and geographic location amongst other forms of difference (Abu-Laban 2008). This kind of work has been further facilitated by intersectional theory and analysis, which informs methodological considerations in much contemporary gender studies and social science research, and also increasingly informs national and international policy-making circles (Stasiulis 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006). In marked contrast however, and as apparent in the literature overview, it has been observed that while Surveillance Studies specialists have been attuned to power/inequality, “less attention has been concentrated on intersectional feminist approaches to surveillance that examine its relationship to racisms, sexisms, ableisms, and homo and trans-phobias” (Mason and Magnet 2012: 107).

There are some notable exceptions to this tendency, and this work shows the incredible promise of taking up the challenge of utilizing intersectional analysis to investigate how gender operates in complex ways with other forms of social differentiation and oppression. For example Simone Browne uses the idea of “racializing surveillance” (2012: 72), to signal a technology aimed at social control wherein “enactments
of surveillance reify boundaries and borders along racial lines, and where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment.” Critical race theorists, like many contemporary feminist theorists, often aspire to a view which sees gender, race, class, sexuality, disability and other points of difference as intersecting (and in Browne’s words, interlocking) and historically connected to expressions of colonialism and imperialism (Browne 2012: 73). From the accounting practices of the transatlantic slave trade, to modern day biometrics, it is clear that “racializing surveillance” has been in operation (Browne 2012: 72-78). In one contemporary application, Browne further demonstrates the relevance of intersecting and interlocking categories in her discussion of the Automated Targeting System used by the Department of Homeland Security in the United States. As she notes of this system, it has:

assigned risk profiles, so called “terror scores,” to millions of unwitting travellers since 2002 based on methods of payment, frequent flyer records, gender, seating and meal preferences, such as choice of a halal meal.

(Brown 2010: 136)

In this system, many elements—not least gender and religion—are seen as relevant in assessing threat.

Likewise, Shoshana Magnet has ably demonstrated that while new biometric technologies which use biological information for purposes of identification/verification are typically presented as objective and neutral, in actuality there is a close association between science and socially constructed markers of difference because “assumptions about gender, race, sexuality and disability are encoded by scientists directly into the operational elements of the technologies” (Magnet 2011: 15). (This finding resonates with Monahan’s 2010 observation, noted earlier, that there is “body discrimination” in surveillance.) Moreover, as Magnet shows, the reification of such categories as gender and race tends to lead to “failures” in identifying those whose bodies, or body parts, do not easily fit, with the implications ranging from the “marginalization of transgendered bodies to facilitating forms of racial profiling” (Magnet 2011: 48). An intersectional approach is also seen in Magnet and Mason’s (2014) collaborative piece discussing “mom bombs,” “cross-dressing terrorists” and “queer orientalisms.” Their study is instructive to how “the war on terror,” and obsession with female suicide bombers, played into new orientalist discourses that worked their way into the 2008 directives of the U.S. Department of Homeland security. As a result of those directives, veiled, burka-wearing and/or seemingly pregnant women were constructed as threats, not least because they might potentially be men concealing both their gender and murderous intent (Magnet and Mason 2014).

The insights emerging from these recent works are suggestive of how complex forms of identity may be at work in the surveillant gaze, and this is connected to power. In fact, it has been noted that the surveillant gaze frequently fixates on specific collectivities lacking power and construed as flawed such as poor women of colour, welfare recipients, immigrants or those perceived as “illegal” immigrants, prisoners, homeless people or enemy combatants (Monahan 2010: 146-147). Gendering Surveillance Studies, and pushing the boundaries of empirical understanding, may be further enhanced by much more explicitly and systematically embracing intersectionality as part of the methodological understanding informing how research proceeds and is analyzed.3 This may also serve to illuminate extant concepts in the field in ways that are attuned to complexity and possible differentiation at local, national and global levels, as well as over time. In this sense “the surveillant gaze” may take multiple and intersecting forms as concerns for example masculinity, imperialism, whiteness, adulthood, and so on.

**Surveillance as Care versus Surveillance as Control**

As suggested above, the surveillant gaze, connected as it is to constructions of identity and difference, is not merely a single entity, and consequently almost all generalities stated about surveillance need caveats.

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3 For the import of intersectionality in relation to criminology, see Barak, Leighton and Flavin (2010: 22).
Thus, for example, while Koskela notes that women are more likely to encounter protective forms of surveillance and men are more likely to be treated as suspicious (Koskela 2012: 51) she quickly acknowledges that gender is constructed, and surveillance is relative to time and space as well as being ambivalent as concerns the individual subjective experience of it (Koskela 2012: 51-52). Hence some people have an exhibitionist desire to be seen and some do not, some experience surveillance with fear and some see it as offering security and safety (Koskela 2012: 51-56). The surveillant gaze(s) may be protective, mutual or discriminatory. Just as there is ambiguity with surveillance, there is also ambiguity with “sousveillance,” a term used to reference more popular/democratic technologies and forms of watching. As Brighenti (2012: 410) observes, “while certain uses of sousveillance may have democratic potential … for example denouncing police brutality,” it is also possible such popular technologies as the internet may inspire persecution through “do-it-yourself forms of popular ‘justice’ and vigilantism, if not witch hunts.”

As a consequence, one way of better differentiating how we should normatively judge surveillance (or its potential popularized diffusion in the form of sousveillance) is through consideration of whether it causes harm. And an obvious way to determine harm is by referencing principals established in human rights norms, especially since these principals have been widely accepted internationally (Abu-Laban 2012b). A human rights framework carries tremendous possibilities for more consistently determining when surveillance is negative, when surveillance is positive, and when surveillance is immaterial, as well as moving beyond a mere focus on privacy for judging surveillance. This being said, it also needs to be stressed that one important critique of human rights made by many feminist theorists is that abstract appeals to universal rights carry the problematic tendency of not being fully attuned to varied needs stemming from individual and collective contexts (Abu-Laban 2012b).

Attention to context forms a starting point into feminist care ethics. It has been over thirty years since the publication of Carol Gilligan’s work In a Different Voice (1982) and since this time a new generation of care ethics research has emerged which seeks—in non-essentialist ways—to re-examine the nature of communal life, social justice and democracy (see Tronto 2013). Key points stemming from this perspective include that: 1) it views humans as embedded in interdependent relations as opposed to completely autonomous (privacy-seeking) individuals; 2) it emphasizes the moral value of care and caring relationships; and 3) it pays attention to issues of power and vulnerability seeking to address what we ought to do for particular others in light of context (Abu-Laban 2012b).

What would it mean to take up the normative challenge of feminist theorizing by being attuned to the ethical dimensions of surveillance and care? A few observations can be made. First, while it is true, in the abstract, that in many areas associated with care (health care, child care, or elder care) those who are defined as marginalized are treated differently than those who are defined as able-bodied adults (Koskela 2012: 52) it should not be automatically assumed that surveillance in the context of care is negative. As noted, with some limited exceptions, such as research done on children in residential care in Scotland by McIntosh, Punch, Dorrer and Emond (2010), there are not a lot of accounts of surveillance that deal with care. McIntosh, Punch, Dorrer and Emond attribute the dearth of Surveillance Studies research devoted to care to the penchant for research focusing on the more ominous “big brother” and “panopticon” imagery associated with surveillance and control (2010: 290). As they counter:

Surveillance can be a crucial component of care, particularly in relation to vulnerable groups and individuals such as children or older people. Awareness that you are being “watched over,” noticed and paid attention to can all be positive and affirming for children in care.

(McIntosh, Punch, Dorrer and Emond 2010: 290)
This finding can be better understood through a framework that considers both human interdependence and the moral value of care and caring relations, than a framework mainly emphasizing power and control, as in the dominant Foucauldian tradition of the field. Similarly, many new parents, particularly mothers in Western countries, will purchase or acquire digital video baby monitors as part of being responsible and caring (see Nelson 2009). If we consider the fact that it is still primarily women (mothers, grandmothers, nannies etc.) who are involved in early childhood care (Adkin and Abu-Laban 2008), the idea of surveillance technology for home use in the form of “baby CCTV” representing masculine control at a distance (Monahan 2010: 114-117) has much less resonance than when we consider CCTV at borders, prisons or airports.

Second, attention to power and vulnerability is also central to considerations from the perspective of care ethics. Thus, while there may be many contexts in which care is both indispensable as well as positive, a point made by many disability rights activists is that care and dependence can be oppressive. This is precisely why there are various campaigns to foster “independent living.” This kind of debate may assist a more contextually based moral judgement about particular instances of surveillance for the ostensible purposes of care, not least because surveillance technology may potentially support forms of independent living. For example, consider the growing use of sensor networks aimed at senior citizens—or at least more affluent senior citizens in the West who can purchase them. Sensor networks can monitor such things as motion in particular rooms (relevant if someone falls), medicine intake, and regular sleep patterns (Sutter 2010). For some seniors this offers a sense of comfort, being cared for, as well as independent living. In the words of one American senior who chose to have such a system installed in his home, “It’s a wonderful system for helping older people stay independent as long as possible. They know where I am all the time” (cited in Sutter 2010). This context may be contrasted with situations in which an adult child installs a system against the wishes of the parent, without their full understanding, and with the threat that the alternative is institutionalization (Sutter 2010). It is for this reason that AARP (American Association of Retired Persons) officials, while supporting the sensor systems in principle as a means to age in place, nonetheless stress the need for early and ongoing conversations between interested parties, not least because there may also be issues around personal data collection and insurance (Sutter 2010).

Third, sometimes “care” may blur into “control,” and as noted, control is the stress placed in much literature in the field of Surveillance Studies. As one example, the case of a University of Cincinnati student whose parents secretly installed keyloggers and trackware on her cellphone and computer to stalk her is illustrative (Hopper 2012). In this particular instance there was a court issued restraining order against the parents precisely because what they did was deemed to be abusive and controlling behaviour (Hopper 2012). This is a case however that raises questions about how parents entrusted with care—or at one point entrusted with care—may exhibit controlling behavior towards female children. However, just as “care” may blur into control, it may be equally relevant to consider the ways in which “control” may at times blur into care. And it is this consideration that may be pertinent for the field as a whole.

Given that leading practitioners in the field of Surveillance Studies have recently observed that “one of the greatest surprises in the field of Surveillance Studies has been the comparatively muted public response to developments in Surveillance Studies that seem to be self-evident threats to personal liberties” (Lyon, Haggerty and Ball 2012: 4) it is well worth considering why. To date, the main reasons given have included the conglomeration of discourses playing on fear in conjunction with neoliberal policies and practices which encourage particular forms of individualization as well as consumption (Monahan 2010: 128), as well as the popularity and convenience of many new technologies, ignorance of trends and possible uses of technologies, and even prior public participation and acceptance of surveillance resulting from the advent of television (Meyrowitiz 2009: 47). To this might be added deflection—evident in much mainstream media coverage in 2013 which focused on the personality and whereabouts of whistleblower Edward Snowden, rather than what he revealed about the extensive surveillance practices of the American-based National Security Administration (NSA) in the US as well as globally (Naughton 2013).
However, returning to where we started, with the image of Officer Bradley, it is hard to imagine an act more symbolically evocative of the nurture and care associated with a mother toward a child than making sure that an infant has milk. That Officer Bradley even refused to take any payment for the milk (ABC7 News 2013) may even further extend the symbolism into a “labour of love” normally associated with the work of unpaid, or poorly remunerated, caregivers (e.g., mothers, grandmothers and nannies). Of course on the ground the actual extent to which the everyday care needs of the residents of Boston and surrounding areas were actually met by police and security personnel may be debatable. The delivery of milk to one family (when many might have been in need) may thus be a form of “care theatre” analogous to the “security theatre” that analysts have identified at borders and airports.4

However, even if “care theatre,” the interest in the milk-delivering image of Officer Bradley, and its possible symbolic resonances, should not be treated as analytically tangential. In fact, discourses associated with caring and protecting others were in frequent supply in descriptions of the responses of fans, volunteers, runners, health care workers and police in responding to the horrific carnage of the Boston Marathon explosives. Hence, at the interfaith service held to honour the victims of the Marathon bombings, attended by President Barack Obama, Cardinal Sean O’Malley noted that “the generous and courageous response of so many assures me that there resides in people’s hearts a goodness that is incredibly selfless. Summoned by great events, we can be remarkably committed to the well-being of others, even total strangers” (McClam 2013). President Obama, in response to the eventual capture of Boston bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarvaev similarly spoke of the kindness exhibited by many in helping victims, and specifically singled out the work of law enforcement services for “these men and women get up every day, they put on that uniform, they risk their lives to keep us safe, and as this week has showed, they don’t always know what to expect” (Agence France-Presse 2013). The spontaneous cheers and applause given by the residents of Watertown and other communities as law enforcement and security officials from a range of local and federal agencies left the town following the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarvaev is indicative that many Americans felt relief and gratitude. Moreover, it is suggestive that the events in Boston are easily mobilized in the American context to justify a range of surveillance practices including closed circuit television cameras and photo radar (see Griffiths 2013 for post-Marathon debates in Iowa City as one example) if not the fleet of post-September 11, 2001 equipment purchases and new fusion of security practices (Abu-Laban 2012a: 421). We may be remiss in understanding these developments without considering how the idea of care may be very easily mobilized and supported, precisely because care is a human need. Studying the idea of care would benefit from the range of insights pertaining to feminist methodology and epistemology which sensitize us to different voices, different experiences and different needs.

Conclusion

This article has examined the extant work in the field of Surveillance Studies which has taken gender into consideration. In the process it has drawn attention to the tremendous contributions and insights attention to gender can bring to our understanding of “watcher” and “watched,” as well as the many sites in which surveillance occurs with gendered effect. As argued here, gendering Surveillance Studies research further, by explicit recognition of feminist methodology, epistemology and research analysis, would build both the empirical and normative repertoire of the field of Surveillance Studies. As suggested in this paper, attention to difference and intersectional analysis carry potential to enliven and sharpen a focus on the socially constructed and historically specific belief systems that can influence surveillance practices in relation to people in all their diversity. At the level of ethics, attention to care and care ethics may further nuance the dominance of themes of control as well as privacy rights in the field. Both the empirical and normative promise of gendering Surveillance Studies are relevant given that the growing array of

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4 On borders see Andreas and Synder 2000.
surveillance technologies, as well as interest in studying surveillance, show no signs of dissipating. More to the point, gendering Surveillance Studies and attending to care may alert us to emotive and expressive components of surveillance in ways that can sharpen our collective understanding and serve as a base for judging the manifold ways surveillance is being exhibited as an organizing principle of our time.

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