Surveillance and student dissent: The case of the Franco dictatorship

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Abstract

The rise of a powerful democratic student movement in Spain in the 1960s represented a substantial stimulus to the repressive modernization of the Franco dictatorship. New containment strategies were adopted in the context of the counter-subversion and intelligence policies that the US administration and their allies were also implementing. From this assumption, this paper analyzes the specific dynamics of surveillance on student protest, exploring the previous situation at universities, the challenges introduced by the youth upheaval, the diverse responses of the establishment, the role of American aid, and finally the consequences both for the dissidents and for the dictatorship itself.

Introduction

The diverse ways in which political regimes confront dissidence are a rich area of study for the human sciences. They can provide first-hand information about government dynamics, both internal—for instance, the skill to confront new circumstances and unexpected challenges—and external ones, such as the collaboration in security affairs with foreign administrations. They offer signals about what groups, and to what degree, are identified as true opponents by both the power holders and their agents. They also indicate to what extent these hostile elements are perceived as a real menace at a given time. If consequences on dissidents are also considered, the opposition’s strength and the influence exerted in its evolution by the state can be estimated. Finally, the real damage caused to the establishment indirectly emerges from the contrast between official statements and punishment overreaction, restricted in turn by international factors and legal guarantees (Brodeur 1983; Marx 1988; Fijnaut and Marx 1995; Berlière and Peschanski 1997; Mazower 1997; Huggins 1998; Loubet del Bayle 2006; Gill, Marrin and Phythian 2009; Davis and Pereira 2003; Earl and Soule 2006; Galeano and Kaminsky 2011).

Those considerations are actually more relevant when referring to dictatorships, for the very reason that such political regimes have more resources and opportunities at their disposal to control and harass dissenters, while they are more capable of covering it up from public knowledge, both at home and abroad (Kohn-Bramstedt 1945; Gellately 1990, 1996, 2001; Johnson 1999; Gieseke 2014(2001); Dennis 2003; Boudreau 2004; Samatas 2004; Dunnage 2006; Fonio 2011; Ebner 2011; Weiner and Rahi-Tamm 2012). At the same time, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the much-trumpeted efficacy of dictatorships in maintaining order can be seriously hindered by their inflexibility and intolerance, that typically make them extremely sensitive to any public challenge, easily alienate important sections of the population, and induce its own supporters to conceal information to better match the expectations of their leaders (Sharp 2002(1993); Wintrobe 1998; Pfaff 2001).
Among the social groups that often represent a focus of dissent under autocratic regimes, the role played by university students is particularly puzzling (Kassow 1989; Caiado 1990; Garrido 1996; Boren 2001; Zhao 2001; McDougall 2004; Accornero 2013; Kornetis 2013). Neither the socioeconomic privileges nor the youth commonly associated with higher education allow us to take their political leaning for granted (Kotek 1996; Connelly and Grüttner 2005). At the same time, the actual impact of their mobilizations on both public opinion and the government do not tally with the paternalistic and disdainful remarks which they are dealt. Moreover, the recourse of dictatorships—and parliamentary democracies—to violence and surveillance to confront student movements turns the latter into a good touchstone of the efficacy of such strategies (Marx 1974; Glick 1989; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990).

However, when it comes to the particular interest of studying the policing mechanisms of dictatorships, serious barriers to research can be found in this domain, even long after constitutional rights have been (re)established, and especially when there is some degree of administrative and staff continuity between the old regime and the new one. Opacities, and more or less deliberate boycotts, are very common: sudden amnestias, missing or destroyed papers, archives that supposedly never existed, banned documents for long periods on diverse pretexts—like protecting the right to privacy of former prosecuted individuals—and so forth. The more political implications for the present and the more informal and illegal procedures used in the past, the more obstacles put up to current inquiries. There are also preconceptions that operate against scientific interest: such obstructionist strategies can be taken for granted, while a reliable account of them is excluded. Interest on these issues is sometimes stigmatized as a product of a conspiracy theory or, worse still, disqualified as mere revengeful will against civil servants or politicians from the previous regime who may still be in office—prominently in the intelligence and security apparatus—or in the political arena (Cohen 1995; Samatas 2005; Fonio and Agnoletto 2013).

The long dictatorship of general Francisco Franco in Spain (1939-1975) is a good example of how the way in which democracy is restored can influence further research on the recent past. The political change that took place in Spain during the late 1970s was not accomplished by the overthrow of the dictatorial government from below, but by means of an arrangement between a section of Franco’s supporters and the main leaders of the political opposition, which was made only once the dictator had passed away. Such a “political transition” was, in some aspects, advantageous for everyone, since it allayed the fear of a new civil war, similar to the one that had allowed Franco to come to power four decades earlier (1936-1939). However, it also required that the democratic forces recognize the king who had been appointed by the dictator to be his heir, to renounce that political crimes committed by pro-Franco stalwarts be judged and punished, and to tolerate thousands of the dictator’s loyalists to stay on as active politicians and as officers in the civil administration, the law courts, the police, the secret services and so on (Colomer 1995; Woodworth 2001; San Martín 2005; Díaz Fernández 2005; Balfour 2005; Encarnación 2007, 2008, 2014; Alonso and Muro 2011).

At the same time, as mentioned above, official information related to political abuses was classified for a long while or was simply missing, as many historians have repeatedly claimed (Corominas Noguera 2008). Even today, both efforts made by victims’ and relatives’ associations, and the subsequent (and unambitious) legislation passed in 2007 at the initiative of the late socialist government—the so-called Historical Memory Law—have been discredited as black-and-white, retaliatory and self-interested by

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conservative voices. United Nations demands to lift the amnesty on Franco crimes have been systematically ignored. An attempt to reopen a trial on dictatorship crimes has ended abruptly after the removal of the investigating judge for abuse of office. As a result, victims and relatives have chosen to make use of the principle of universal justice, reporting Franco crimes to Argentinian courts, just as foreign citizens had been doing to Spanish ones until recently.

On the other hand, Spain is also a good case for studying how surveillance strategies can significantly contribute to holding up an autocratic regime. Francisco Franco took power after destroying the short democratic experience of the Second Republic (1931-1936) in an unequal civil war, in which a far-right coalition led by a faction of the military, the Catholic Church and the upper classes obtained vast support from Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Foreign intervention was essential to defeating the divided republican side, which was abandoned by the western democracies and only conditionally helped by the Soviet Union. During his first years of his government, which coincided with World War II, Franco contributed to the Axis war effort through a false “non-belligerency,” while a systematic political cleansing was put in practice. In addition to the more than 100,000 people killed by the rebels during the civil war (the republican side suffered twice as many victims from the mostly irregular and grass-roots violence), another 50,000 were executed after Franco’s victory, while thousands more were deliberately left to die in concentration camps (Preston 1996; Richards 1998; Casanova et al. 2002; Ros Aguado 2002; Beevor 2006).

Nonetheless, once the was Axis destroyed, the initially fascist-like Franco dictatorship—just like its Portuguese neighbor, the Salazar regime—was able to survive for three decades more. That fact was possible, on the one hand, because it was able to match the strategic interests of the United States during the cold war, since the new superpower was reluctant to any political change in Spain while the Communist Party (PCE) was the main political alternative to the so-called “Sentinel of the West” (Garcés 1996; Viñas 2003; Powell 2009). On the other hand, the dictator undeniably obtained important support among the Spanish people, albeit it more resigned and pragmatic than enthusiastic (Cazorla 2010; Del Arco et al. 2013). But the decisive role played by a great variety of repressive methods against disaffected population cannot be neglected, from the planning of physical elimination of adversaries in the first years, to the subtle recourse to intelligence services in the last period, both compatible with the constant use of police brutality and torture (Batista 1995; Delgado 2005; Diaz Fernández 2005). The appearance of innovative containment strategies from the mid-1960s did not happen single-handedly, but in the context of the new counter-subversion policies that the United States administration and their allies implemented in the central years of the past century, more restricted—but not necessarily less effective—than the methods used by their Soviet enemies in their own sphere of influence (Schmitz 1999, 2006; Ganser 2005).

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The mobilizations that began in Spanish universities in the 1950s and transformed into a powerful student movement in the next decade embodied perfectly the pro-Franco supporters’ phobia against “subversion” (Ysás 2004; Valdelvira 2006; Hernández Scià no et al. 2007; González Calleja 2009), especially because such a challenge had a disturbing precedent: a similar protest had helped to put an end to the dictatorship of general Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-1930). Therefore, student activism was a substantial stimulus to the dictatorship’s repressive modernization, that partially updated sources already engaged in the past and partially absorbed innovations from abroad. From these assumptions, this paper focuses on the Spanish case to analyze the dynamics of surveillance on student protest, exploring the previous situation at universities, the challenges introduced by the youth upheaval, the diverse responses of the establishment, and finally the consequences that those new methods had in the student movement and in other dissidence sectors.

1. The management of university dissidence before the student movement

The harsh political purge that Spanish universities suffered just after the civil war of 1936-1939 guaranteed the eradication of all disaffection there. It enabled the Franco dictatorship to entrust the colleges with the mission of educating intellectually and politically the regime’s heirs. In both tasks, government authorities counted on the assent of right-wing professors and the cooperation of an organization, the Spanish Student Union (SEU), that belonged to the official single party, the Falange or National Movement (Claret 2004; Vega 2011; Ruiz Carnicer 1996). Apart from the underground and ephemeral reconstruction of some republican student unions and the silent presence of isolated dissidents, during the fifteen years after the civil war the Spanish campuses were characterized by their exhibitions of fidelity to the dictator, a similar situation to those which prevailed in the earlier years of other autocratic regimes (Connelly and Grüttner 2005). During this period, there were some conflictive events, but most of them involved internal rivalries in the pro-Franco coalition, mainly between National-Catholics (reactionaries) and Falangists (fascists), that competed to gain more power and influence after the leftist common enemies had been crushed (Saz Campos 2003).

As a result of Franco’s adaptation to the outcome of the World War II, Falangists lost a good deal of their power, but the SEU kept some concessions that enabled it to exert an important degree of control over all students. As the single official union since 1937, SEU activists were in charge of political surveillance on campuses from the beginning. However, as a paramilitary militia, they were also given an exclusive domain on public order inside university buildings in October 1942. After that, regular police forces were not allowed to operate there, a fact sometimes misinterpreted by dissidents as the supposed continuation of a medieval privilege, the so-called fuero universitario. In addition, the Spanish University Organization Act of July 1943 made SEU affiliation compulsory, and the Union was commissioned to provide social and cultural services to undergraduates (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: I, ch. 1).

SEU’s monopoly of violence enabled its militants to use physical force to terrify dissidents. Nevertheless, compulsory affiliation supplied an instrument to control undergraduates that was both more discreet and effective: if the membership card was officially withdrawn, the victim was condemned to drop out of university. Moreover, the few scholarships given by the SEU could be vital for badly off students, but they were subject to the political references given by the union leaders. All these means were used to try to impose a military-like discipline on the young, including the exhibition of the union insignia on their clothes. Traditional student demands, such as petitions to bring forward the school holidays, and deep-rooted customs among the student body, as well as frequent absenteeism, were fought by constant threat of sanction.

Despite that, the necessity of repeating ad nauseam this sort of ban—phrased in more and more aggressive terms—could be an evidence of its limited efficacy. In fact, during the first year of compulsory affiliation, SEU leaders had to ask the academic authorities for help in order to force students to join the union, and...
they even agreed to grant an amnesty to latecomers. Many undergraduates refused this control, although not necessarily as a result of a dissident commitment, but because of their disgust against the power that the Falangists had on their everyday life. In addition, the failures of the official information network allowed some members of politically marked, but well-to-do, families to slip away by the simple, although very expensive, procedure of continuing their studies in another university, either in Spain or even abroad. At the end of the 1940s, SEU demands and control on dissidents had reduced enough to let them falsify their records and even get official union scholarships (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: I, 109-110).

It is characteristic of the Franco dictatorship that SEU leaders were both participants of the surveillance and support apparatus and targets of other intelligence services. These included the Social Investigation Brigade, the Military Intelligence Services (Army’s, Navy’s and Air Force’s), the paramilitary Civil Guard Intelligence and the Information Services of the dictatorship’s own National Movement (Ynfante 1976; Díaz Fernández 2005; Zorzo Ferrer 2005). Such counter-surveillance is not surprising if we consider the fragile balances that permitted the opposed forces and interests to collaborate mutually inside Franco’s regime to preserve what was the very fundamental priority for them all: the exercise of power. Information was obtained from a wide network of informers. Many of them were people bribed and/or blackmailed using any weakness that they or their relatives could have, such as compromising political records or economic hardships. However, many others were sincere sympathizers from both sexes, who were grateful to Franco for both having put an end to the “social disorder” favored by the democratic republic—which turned into disorganized “red terror” in the republican zone during the civil war—and having kept Spain out of the World War II, two trite slogans of official propaganda. Among them, pro-Franco ex-servicemen from the civil war played a leading role: quite a few were joined together in paramilitary organizations, like Franco’s Guard and the rural Somatén, but most of those loyal grassroots were just people who had obtained their jobs thanks to their former military and political services to Franco: night watchmen, licensed tobaccoists, taxi drivers, janitors of public or private buildings, barmen, storekeepers and so on (San Martín 1983; Payne 1987; Richards 1998; Cenarro 2004; Cazorla 2010; Gil Andrés 2013). Since their situation had improved under the dictatorship, they were usually interested in preserving the existing state of things. So, as can be observed in analogous regimes of disparate ideology—and therefore different targeted groups—but with a similar will of social control (Shelley 1995; Fitzpatrick and Gellately 1997; Gieseke 2014(2001); Dennis 2003; Dunnage 2008; Nielsen 2009; Weiner and Rahi-Tamm 2012), they were the eyes and the ears of the government during decades, and they kept under surveillance various places, like colleges, where legal formalities obstructed conventional police supervision (Rodríguez Tejada 2009).

SEU activists had been under surveillance already during the civil war, since the Falangist union was one of the few organizations where the fascist revolutionary agenda had kept more validity and, therefore, its activists harbored a higher level of critique against what they considered reactionary policies of Franco’s government. In actual fact, such “internal dissidence” seldom went from words to deeds (Ruiz Carnicer 1996). In order to regain some support among undergraduates, a new generation of young Falangists updated that rhetorical criticism in the early 1950s, and made some exhibitions of symbolic protest, such as driving student petitions to academic authorities about exams or holidays, or even joining popular protests against the rise of streetcar fares (Richards 1999), all of them actions that the SEU had persecuted in the past. On the other hand, they also collaborated with the official repression whenever a more coherent anti-Franco “external dissidence,” the always hated “Red,” seemed to threaten the established order. This contradictory policy frustrated any remote chance to lead a genuine student movement (Rodríguez Tejada 2010). Nonetheless, the discontent among undergraduates in the 1950s was a rising reality still barely masked by a look of indifference and demobilization, in a country where both the progressive reactivation of the economy and the incipient opening of borders started to offer new expectations to the Spanish youth, a process that simply climbed during the next decade (Marwick 1998; Pack 2009; Crumbaugh 2009).
2. Discontent takes shape

The contradiction in the SEU broke out in the mid-1950s, when some signs of unrest in the Central University of Madrid alarmed loyalists. SEU activists were ordered to give a harsh response to any expression of dissent. As a result, violence was indiscriminately used against students during two Falangist assaults of the university in which adult members of Falange also participated. That procedure was obviously illegal even under the fragile legal guarantees that were in effect, as was proved by the fact that some SEU activists opposed them physically. Confusion increased still further after a young Falangist was shot by friendly fire and the political police informed that some activists of the Communist Party (PCE) were secretly involved in the protests (Lizcano 1981; Mesa 1982). The menace perceived by the authorities can be gaged if one considers that there was a cabinet reshuffle and that this was declared the first State of Emergency (Estado de excepción) since the civil war. This overreaction revealed some important things about the Franco dictatorship: first, the general success of the power holders in maintaining order until then; second, their will to present it as a normalized regime without recourse to violence as their ultimate argument; and, last but not least, their impressive apprehension and their sensibility to the university political role.

Franco himself could not obviate the precedent of Miguel Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, which suffered a serious attrition in the 1920s as a result of the student mobilizations headed by the School University Federation (FUE) (Ben Ami 1991; Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 150). During the years following 1956, diverse preventive procedures were promulgated against the gradual increase of university dissent. SEU political activism was dismantled from above, and the union was turned into a supposed depoliticized and strictly supervised organization that was expected to canalize and appease the critics by means of a quite unfair representation system. The law of Public Order of 1959 withdrew the monopoly on security inside colleges from the SEU by authorizing both the Social Brigade and the Armed Police, known as “the Grey,” to operate there (Delgado 2005). Academic authorities had to give their approbation to police actions inside campuses, unless police officers could adduce urgency. Rectors and deans were conferred the everyday control on students, which forced them to behave as an extension of the dictatorship apparatus, a role that would cause increasing confrontation with dissident students. All these measures were promoted by Franco’s right-hand man and head of the National-Catholic interests, Luis Carrero Blanco, who both wanted to neutralize the Falangists definitely as a serious rival group, and exhibited a characteristic anti-intellectualism that made him accuse professors of indifference in front of disorder (Tusell 1993). However, it was necessary to maintain both SEU bureaucracy and some loyal taskforce among students, the so-called University Falanges (FU).

In the following years, the former diffuse student discontent led to the constitution of little dissident groups, whose young members—most of them male—were too young to have had a personal experience either from the civil war or from the post-war repression, and for whom the 1956 events had signified an important stimulus. Some of them had grown inside the only resistance subculture that had better survived under repression, the communist one, and logically joined the PCE (Molinero and Ysás 2004). Others came from political subcultures which had become less active since the civil war, like socialist or anarchist ones, or even from families indifferent or loyal to the dictatorship. In any case, they all had in common a rejection of the social and cultural environment in which they lived. After a time of common readings and discussions, some of these groups finally gave themselves a political formality, by founding little anti-Franco secret organizations like the University Socialist Group (ASU) and the Popular Liberation Front (FLP) (Maravall 1978; Mateos 1991; García Alcalá 2001). In this process of constitution, the use of acronyms was an important symbolic resource in order to enhance the seriousness of such amateur projects and this continued to be the case over the following years (Rodríguez Tejada 2009).

These groups reproduced the old underground, resistance strategies inherited from the post-war period, but that could not avoid being systematically busted up as soon as they tried to do anything for real. In
arriving at the police station, the political policemen, nicknamed “the Socials,” usually intimidated them, striking and warning them not to be heroes because it would be useless: everything had been discovered (or they said so). Activists were generally shut in cells for days with other detainees that they did not know, and who could be in fact informers or agents provocateurs. They were forced to hunger, and the lighting, the discomfort and the harassment were continuous, so that they could not sleep. Sometimes the personal attitude of guardians could reduce vexations, but manifestations of class hatred and unnecessary humiliations were common in those situations, since policemen—most of them less-educated individuals from low socioeconomic background—found themselves in a position of power in front of supposedly “good family” youth. During interrogations, it was habitual to be hit and threatened by “the Socials.” The handcuffs were extremely tightened and sometimes heated to burn the skin. However, not all dissidents were treated in the same way. In general, they were tortured in accordance with, at least, four variables: their sex (there was an ambiguous paternalist protection towards the still few female activists), their political group (communists got the worst of it), their family (its political and social position) and their supposed political post (the more expected information, the more hits). Male lower-class communist leaders were tortured harshly more frequently, including simulated executions and electrical shocks. Generally, student activists avoided the worst of these “techniques” during some years, because the higher status associated with higher education acted as a symbolic protection for them (Batista 1995; Rodríguez Tejada 2009).

The systematic persecution of these underground anti-Franco groups acted like a sort of political selection in that it indirectly improved different kinds of strategies in some colleges, with some of this happening in the late 1950s, but mainly in the early 1960s. Like the incipient Workers Commissions, which was emerging as the cutting edge of a new labor movement in mining, factories and building industry, the innovative style developed by student activists was initiated spontaneously from everyday life conditions and were oriented to take advantage of the new election system in the official union. Most of these first activities—journals, conferences, music auditions, poetry lectures, day-trips, independent campaigns—had the appearance of pure “student affairs,” which helped both to win supporters and to hide their potential political danger from police surveillance (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: I, ch. 3). The efficacy of those new procedures among workers and undergraduates helped the Communist Party to develop a new political line, known as “the National Reconciliation Policy.” The implications of this were a moderation of the political discourse and the forgetting of the former civil war divisions in order to gain the common people’s support (Morán 1986; Álvarez 2004). Instead of creating separate, pro-communist labor and student unions, the goal was to promote independent, unitary organizations which could integrate all democratic activists in order to cooperate together against the dictatorship, as it happened in 1964 when activists from diverse campuses founded the Spanish Democratic University Confederation (CUDE) (Colomer 1978: I, 184). Together with the personal commitment and perseverance of the communist rank and file, that pragmatist turn strongly contributed to reinforce the hegemony of the PCE as the main anti-Franco organization. Therefore, the establishment was forced to use new resources to hold back the flood of unrest that was arising on campuses.

3. The challenge of the student movement

As the dictatorship’s authorities had feared in 1956, the development of a mass mobilization in colleges about petitions of student self-organization and democratic participation would become a problem of a very different nature than they had been used to managing in the past. Both the Spanish internal and external conditions in the 1960s were very different from the 1930s. As such, systematic violence and terror were not a viable option to fight a young male—and increasingly female too—middle-class dissidence that expressed itself in a formal and moderate language, that only harnessed non-violent means,

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7 Like the uniform of “the Grey” (Delgado 2005), this kind of torture was taken from the German Gestapo. See Morán (1986: 47) and Ros Aguado (2002: 181 ff).
that had the sympathy of the most brilliant professors and that was increasing known among the western public opinion. Although Spanish authorities always tried to present young dissidents as instruments of the international communist conspiracy, the fact was that they hesitated for a long time about what kind of response must be given to the challenge posed by the student movement. The cabinet worriedly discussed this issue again in February 1965, when a large peaceful student demonstration headed by four professors was brutally charged by the anti-riot police in the campus of the University of Madrid. Considerations of image—the dictatorship was trying unsuccessfully to be accepted as a new member by the European Common Market— influenced them to hold back, at least in comparison with the murdering methods used to establish Franco’s rule (Álvarez Cobelas 2004: 143 ff; Ysás 2004: 9).

There was a basic contradiction in the dictatorship’s policy on student dissidents. On the one hand, the most intelligent dictator’s advisers recommended trying to persuade them, searching for an alternative to the already quite discredited SEU. On the other hand, the authorities could not resist the impulse of blaming and persecuting young activists. In March 1965, there was a secret meeting in Villacastín, near Madrid, in order to negotiate with moderate student leaders. But promises made there were only a trick to save time. Months after, the SEU was partially abolished: only a bureaucratic office named Commissary for the SEU was preserved. The official union was replaced by a supposedly apolitical and independent, but strongly controlled, organization: the Student Professional Associations (APE). However, the APE won little support and was boycotted by most students on major campuses. Renamed as Student Associations (AE), that new official student body was reformed twice—in 1966 and in 1968—before being definitively abandoned. Therefore, the student movement could claim that they had been able to destroy a dictatorship’s official organization, an inconceivable deed so far. There were, though, other internal factors that contributed to that end, such as the internal conflict between National-Catholics and Falangists. In the next years, both public order laws and academic disciplinary measures were tightened in order to better fight protesters (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II).

So the inconsistency of the authorities—which, enabled to choose between two contradictory strategies, applied both wrongly—deprived them of any legitimation among the vast majority of students. During the previous twenty years, consecutive generations of undergraduates, like many other Spaniards, had come to assume the normal everyday existence of a “regime” that many did not even see as a dictatorship yet. It had been very common to think that, if anyone was arrested by the police, surely he had made a crime. But in the second half of the 1960s the violence against peaceful student demonstrations, the use of new anti-riot equipment supplied by the US as police aid (Delgado 2005: 212-213), the charges inside colleges, the States of Emergency specifically brought against student movement, like in 1969 and again in 1970-1971, the use of torture in interrogations by the police and the connivance of press and courts: all these facts gave reasons to student leaders, who denounced the political situation and called on the youth to do something.

Since indiscriminate and brutal repression created a cognitive conflict among even the most depoliticized undergraduates, it helped to unite them in an opposition movement. Anti-Franco activists took into account the general desire of democracy and campaigned for a national and truly independent Student Democratic Union (SDE), that had to be built up from below, as an open alternative to the official APE. The two main hits of the Spanish student movement in the 1960s, the constitution of the first SDE section in Barcelona (SDEUB) in March 1966, and the assembly of all elected student representatives—including the increasingly disappointed APE-AE members—in Valencia in January 1967, produced strongly critical statements against government, generated wide solidarity at home and abroad, and both concluded with charges and arrests (Crexell 1987; Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 83-102).
4. Promotional travels

An external observer realized even before own Franco’s assistants that it was necessary to find creative solutions for Spanish student dissidence. That new agent was the US government, and its proposals only meant to expand into Spain a policy which had already been developing in other countries under its influence (Stonor Saunders 1991; Jeffreys-Jones 2002). Despite some minor precedents, it was the US-Spain agreements of 1953 that enabled the intervention of the American secret services in Spain to be carried out in a more systematic way. In the context of the cold war, the 1956 events were analyzed by the US Department of State, with the reassuring conclusion for its anti-communist policy that they did not represent any menace to Franco’s regime stability because they did not imply the defection of key groups (Garcés 1996: 157).

However, both the great age of Franco and the alarm that Algerian and Cuban revolutions generated in the strategic interests of the US moved their intelligence to make plans in order to supervise the force and the political orientation of the Spanish opposition. There were a lot of examples of cultural propaganda, but of particularly relevance was the policy of scholarships applied by the American Field Service (AFS) and by the exchange program People to People, both intended for Spanish high school and university students since the mid-1950s. The aim was that these young people, preferably men, could spend some time in America to appreciate firsthand the advantages of its political and economic system. In the 1960s, just when the student movement emerged as a force to consider, the AFS program focused fundamentally on colleges, recruiting student activists through diplomatic legacies, excluding (significantly) only communists.

It must be noted that underground political ascriptions were supposedly secret, except perhaps for the Spanish political police. In fact, there are some clues that members of the American staff in charge of these programs could have been involved with the intelligence services. For instance, the US vice-consul Timothy Lathrop Towell supervised the AFS program in Valencia between 1963 and 1965. After leaving Spain, he was consul between 1967 and 1968 in Cochabamba (Bolivia), when Ernesto Che Guevara was executed under CIA supervision (October 8, 1967) in the next province of Vallegrande. From 1968 he was in charge of the Agency for International Development (AID) in La Paz, an organization that was an instrument of undercover action everywhere. Ambassador in Paraguay from 1988, he was reported to be involved in the dirty war program, “Operation Condor,” providing instructions and a torture manual to the national police (Reagan 1988; Calloni 1994; Stein and Klare 1975; Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 25-26).

Since the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been indirectly financing diverse organizations of volunteers—such as the ones mentioned above—which operated in foreign countries as part of an ambitious double strategy of promotion of the US image and of gaining new collaborators. Students—likely future leaders in their respective countries—were undoubtedly among the groups which received more attention. The AFS and the US National Student Association (NSA) were used together. Every year the Foreign Student Leadership Project selected some undergraduates from each country in order to travel to the US, where they spent a year studying and traveling. Others received month-long scholarships during the summertime. The program developed in the AFS framework and officially was initiated and financed by the NSA, which took charge of them during the stay. However, the funds in fact came from the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs (FYSA), a supposed philanthropic and private covering, whereby the CIA paid 80 per cent of the NSA expenses and, by the way, also financed the

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8 As president John F. Kennedy explained to a group of AFS foreign visitors on 13 July 1961: “You will go back to your countries, and they have stereotypes and prejudices and ideas about the United States. It is going to be your destiny, I hope, to serve in the interests of peace as a bridge between the best parts of my country and your people” (Kennedy 1961). See also Ramson (1975: 106).
International Student Conference (ISC), the western alternative to the communist International Union of Students (IUS) (Ramparts 1967; Thomas 1995: 229-230).

In fact, the student leaders who participated in such travels did know that they could be promoted by the CIA in order to orient youth ideologically. Among other significant clues, there were the privileges that Spanish authorities gave them by the intercession of US embassy, like temporary authorizations to go abroad for students who had previously had their passports withdrawn due to their political activities. But that was not an obstacle to their participation as they thought of these travels as valuable chances to broadcast in America the real political situation in Spain and to obtain support for their cause. When in 1967 Ramparts—a left-wing review edited at Berkeley—reported the CIA control on the NSA and the ISC, there was little surprise among anti-Franco activists. Two years before, during an ISC meeting in Amsterdam promoted by the Union Nationale d’Etudiants de France (UNEF) to help economically the Spanish student movement, the NSA had used diverse subterfuges to deny any funds for the CUDE, probably because they knew for sure that there were communist activists inside. Some time after, this attitude changed partially, and during the foundation of the SDEUB in 1966 the chairman of the ISC Wilfred Rutz and the chairman of the NSA Frederic Berger assisted as guests and both took the floor. Berger was later identified as a CIA agent (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 28-29; Crexell 1987: 53). In any case, in the 1970s, both the NSA scandal and the radicalization of student activists (all leaders became communists of diverse kinds) eliminated any utility of these programs in appeasing Spanish university dissent.

5. New surveillance methods

The need to find new ways to confront a rising student mobilization was already perceived in the mid-1960s. The combination of indiscriminate punishment and selective conciliating did not work at all. Solidarity against police and academic authorities grew in campuses, while, at least in short term, Spanish realities influenced more political attitudes of activists than any internal or external propaganda. Realizing that, the government tried to improve informal strategies of action against dissidence, which led to an increased role for the intelligence services. But that decision was taken in an international frame determined by the challenge for the old bipolar order—and, in particular, to the American superpower prestige—that was generated by the convergence between both the powerful internal protest of student movements that came into their climax around 1968 and the Third World revolutionary agenda symbolized by icons like Che Guevara and the Vietnam war (Elbaum 2002; Suri 2003; Schiltz and Siegfried 2006; Klimke and Scharloth 2008; Bhambra and Demir 2009; Klimke 2010). The course of action in Spain cannot be analyzed, therefore, separately from the turn made in this issue by the US government, especially under the Nixon administration (Gitlin 1987: 378; Glick 1989; Churchill and Vander Wall 2002; The Rockefeller Commission 1975: 142-144; Marx 1988; Ganser 2005; Schmitz 2006).

This new kind of containment policy had four modalities of intervention: obtaining information, improving official student association, loyalist reassembly and training task forces. They were put in practice in two successive phases, whose inflection point was the formation in 1968, specifically for this purpose, of a new intelligence agency that directly depended on the Presidency of Government. During the period before 1968, the collecting of data was entrusted to the old secret services above mentioned, like the Social Brigade. In the 1965-1966 academic year, a confidential bulletin on student activities was founded. This sort of negative version of student journals rendered an account of political university events around twice a week. Inside it, there was a detailed register of activists provided in order to facilitate their control and arrests. The bulletin also offered means to analyze the student movement, including schedules about SDE organization and informed lists of critical and loyalist student groups (Rodríguez Tejada 2009; II, 58).
As was the case in 1940s and 1950s, dissidents had serious difficulties in preventing the police learning of their plans. In March 1965, the government obtained a copy of the agreements taken in the first National Coordinating Meeting of the student movement immediately after its closing. One year later, the strict security measures taken by activists to keep hidden the place of the founding meeting of SDEUB could not prevent the police already learning important details ten days beforehand, which helped the cops to lay siege to the building only two hours after the opening. Likewise, the Social Brigade procured the names of every assistant to a secret summit of student leaders which took place in Madrid to organize the all-representative meeting of Valencia in 1967. All these examples suggest that there were probably informants or infiltrators among activists or, at least, in their closest circle (Rodríguez Tejada 2009).

The authorities also used intelligence services to control and try to promote the APE-AE. It was necessary to search for potential loyalist candidates in student elections—a very hard task, considering the rejection that it aroused among undergraduates—and to find a trustee to act as the public image of the organization. He was given a chauffeur-driven car and money from the Ministry of Education to spend on propaganda, meetings and gifts. Since that department was controlled by National-Catholics, so was the APE-AE chairman. At the same time, the recruitment and reassembly of possible pro-Franco students was entrusted to the remaining bureaucracy of the old official union, the so-called Commissary for the SEU, which still maintained halls of residence, sport clubs and diverse social projects organized by its University Work Service (SUT). These activities, that allowed it to contact many undergraduates, were the preserve of the National Movement intelligence services. Not always successfully, academic authorities were asked to collaborate in an effort which, anyway, was also obstructed by the internal rivalry between National-Catholics and Falangists: these ones—who never forgave the fall of the SEU—orchestrated an interposed campaign to denounce the corruption of the APE leadership, which actually contributed to the dissident aims (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 60-65).

The swift arousal of university dissent was also fought by informal groups that collaborated with—and were coordinated by—the standard Franco security forces. In the 1962-1963 academic year, the so-called University Defense (DU) was founded, a far-right organization that operated as a police-guided violent task force against anti-Franco activists. The Social Brigade praised its “moderate tendencies, hostile to Marxist and left-wing groups,” and appreciated its activities, specifying that “it counts on few members, but it had been a remarkable labor of propaganda and action in the university environment (to break demonstrations, removing posters, counter-propaganda, etc.).” Unsigned leaflets denigrating democratic dissidents using the same words and tone of official statements were distributed in some colleges from at least 1965. SDE activists denounced in 1968 that a pacific demonstration in Madrid had been disrupted by an unknown agent provocateur, who threw a crucifix against “the Grey.” In addition, an apparently homemade bomb was exploded in the Medical faculty. It is remarkable that some tactics like those ones were indeed used by left-wing groups in the next years, but not yet. Moreover, small groups of young “authentic Falangists” persisted. They pretended to be completely independent, but in reality some porousness between them and DU actually existed (Rodríguez Tejada 2009).

6. A new intelligence agency against the student movement

The boosting of protests in 1968, symbolized by the “French May” and its counterparts in Spain and other countries, sparked alarm inside the Franco establishment. In September 1968 the Ministry of Education asked the Army’s High General Staff for technical support against university “subversion,” in order to avoid any chance that the awkward situation the French president, general De Gaulle, had suffered some months before—when students and workers converged in Paris and other places to rise up against the government—could happen in Spain. It is important to remember that the coordination of both collectives was, unlike its French counterpart, the main aim of the Communist Party of Spain. An officer loyal to Carrero Blanco and expert in French, West German and American counter-intelligence methods, José Ignacio San Martín, was designated technical advisor in charge of an alleged Education “Liaison
Committee.” In reality it was a new intelligence “Special Service” on student dissent, the so-named National Counter-Subversive Organization (OCN) (San Martín 1983: 17-42; Díaz Fernández 2005: 146-150).9

One month later, the OCN already had an action plan with the code name “Canada.” However, it was not made official until December 1968. Its basics objectives were to stop, as much as possible, the growing of the opposition—at first student mobilizations—and to control its potential consequences in the future, when Franco would finally die. In addition, that could give the government enough time to seize back political initiative by means of a technocratic university reform, which had been obstructed by the undergraduates’ general rejection against the establishment. In 1970, an ambitious Education General Law (LGE) was promulgated. In March 1972, the OCN was renamed Documentation Central Service (SECED), and Carrero Blanco, who had by then become vice-president of the Spanish government, took entire control. The economic and technical resources of the SECED multiplied, such as special training in counter-subversive techniques in Israel and the USA. Its aims enlarged too: on the one hand, nationalist and far-left terrorism; on the other hand, dictatorship internal conspiracies (San Martín 1983: 42-47; Díaz Fernández 2005: 160-165).

Originally the OCN methods were focused on two complementary tasks: information obtaining and anti-Franco activism boycotting. The first issue included the reinforcement of the former networks of informers, to collect and process all available documentation, to infiltrate student movement organizations and to recruit new informants and “pointers” from among the activists themselves. The second issue, not separable from the former, was to use all these resources to hinder and distort anti-Franco dissidence, by dividing it, interrupting assemblies, expediting arrests and promoting senseless violence—for instance, through far-right aggressions—to justify repression and the discrediting of all activism (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II). This last tactic was facilitated by the general drift of dissidents to substitute the strictly non-violent fighting with a more “determined”—increasingly violent—response against police brutality. But it also strongly favored it because such dirty play did not go unnoticed among students, and therefore it confirmed the most far-left views about the political situation. The obsession to stay underground, which consumed so much energy inside revolutionary, “new left” groups—Trotskyist, Maoists, Luxembourgists, Guevarists, anarchists and others—in Spain and abroad (Marx 1974; Cunningham and Noakes 2008), was obviously related to the fear that inconvenient observers—maybe infiltrators—could ruin their projects. Police reports contained plenty of references from non-identified “sources” and, although they were sometimes pure inventions, anti-Franco fighters could not know this for sure.

As has been shown above, these pro-Franco undercover war strategies were not new at all, but were renewed and improved because of the interest they had awaken in, among others, vice-president Carrero Blanco. In tandem with the OCN, in November 1968 a Government Delegated Commission on public order was engaged and during their early years it was centered on the universities. Headed by Carrero Blanco, it was constituted by the ministers of Government (Home Security), Treasury, Army, Justice and National Movement. The meeting took place every Wednesday for two hours: the same duration, for instance, that the Commission of Economic Affairs meeting took, which suggests to us how serious dictatorship leaders were about student challenge (Tusell 1993: 378).

7. The Spanish connection

At the turn of the decade, the efforts of old and new Spanish secret services against student dissent were paying off. They counted on the close support of some state and official party departments, most of them in charge of former SEU militants. Some news agencies, such as Cifra and Pyresa, were used to

9 Many years later, San Martin was involved in the failed coup of February 1981 against the recently restored democracy (San Martin 2005).
broadcasting official stories on university events. According to the OCN director, in May 1970 three hundred and eighty collaborators (infiltrators or informers) from both sexes were working on diverse campuses. Since 1972 the new SECED boosted its staff until two hundred agents and about five thousand collaborators all over the country, of whom approximately two thousand were usual informers and five hundred eventual ones. In addition, close relationships were established with other intelligence agencies from neighboring countries with similar problems, such as France and Italy, in order to learn from their counter-subversive methods, to exchange information, to collaborate on surveillance of exiled activists and to use foreign agents as infiltrators—who pretended to be left-wing activists from abroad—inside Spanish opposition groups (San Martín 1983: 28-42, 49-50).

Once again, these undercover operations did not go undetected for anti-Franco activists. Among the information included in self-defense instruction manuals handed out by underground left-wing groups, there were serious warnings against infiltration. One of them claimed that “eight hundred men and women, between eighteen and twenty-four years old, were trained by CIA agents in Madrid during the summer of 1969. Today they were spread about all over the country, especially in campuses, intellectual circles and anti-Franco groups.” They conformed, continued this source, a “corps of spying agents, whose mission consisted of infiltrating political and union organizations.” The paper set as an example the fall “of a well-known political party,” which it did not name, but was in fact a far-left group named Communist Party of Spain (international) or PCE (i). A “student-policeman”—concluded the paper—had infiltrated himself in the Central Committee and had organized the arresting of the main leaders during a meeting in Madrid (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 266-267).

Regardless of whether every surveillance story was true or not, other sources confirmed both the involvement of foreign intelligence and the control that student dissent suffered. On the one hand, the OCN—and later the SECED—did actually had regular and close contacts with the CIA, whose reports named it “Quantum” and understood it as a mere subsidiary. On the other hand, the Spanish Military Information Services (SIM) had been reorganized under the supervision of US advisers as a copy of the Pentagon military intelligence. SIM agents also operated on universities, but during some years their main occupation was to keep watch on male anti-Franco protesters during their compulsory military service. Undergraduates could usually delay their military training while they were enrolled in colleges and, in addition, they could try to serve through the Upper Pre-military Instruction (ISP), the remains of the former SEU militia. But having a record of dissent activities resulted automatically in the loss of both options and to be called to the colors. During their service, student leaders were often harassed by SIM officers and were sometimes sent to punishment unities in the Spanish colony of West Sahara, where they suffered physical and psychological abuses for several months without any chance of obtaining help from their relatives or friends (Ynfante 1976: 26, 30; Díaz Fernández 2005: 500-502; Grimaldos 2006: 65 ff.).

On the other hand, there are documentary evidences—two OCN-SECED confidential files—that, in April 1972, at least three informers did help to bust the PCE university organization in Valencia, by giving details about what activists said and did, thanks to their closeness to them. Despite the fact that they were only identified by nicknames and we know nothing about their actual identity, these papers prove that one such collaborator attended an underground meeting and that another was given an important amount of propaganda to hand out, which suggests that both were actually members of the PCE student group. The information obtained from those secret sources were not reserved only for the OCN. It was transferred to the Social Brigade, which was preparing a systematic political record about the main student dissidents in the University of Valencia in order to sustain a wide academic punishment. In September 1973, more than three hundred male and female activists of both diverse political involvement and leaning were forbidden to matriculate, which meant that, as explained before, the men were drafted in the next months.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a more detailed analysis and a copy of the documents themselves, see Rodriguez Tejada (2009: II, 293-298).
8. Far-right violence arises

The OCN supervised the 1968 official Student Associations (AE) in a last attempt to provide them with some array. But the service’s first interest was, however, to promote informal organizations of loyal students, which could fight the left-wing ones on their own ground. During the 1968-1969 academic year, a National Association of Spanish University Students (ANUE) was founded as a pro-Franco alternative against democratic groups. Its organ, also named ANUE, was launched with a print run of ten thousand in February 1970, which rose to fifteen thousand in the next year. The organization had solid state financing but, in addition, it was given generous private donations which were tax-deductible because the Ministry of Education declared the ANUE of “educational-beneficent” interest in June 1970. Their members also managed a low-cost cooperative society of books, music and sport articles. Lots of money, appealing services and its own political propaganda were supposed to help them protect the “healthy student youth” from “Marxist pollution” (San Martín 1983: 28-42).

Nevertheless, it was too late for such an objective, since even the most moderate students had realized that they lived in a brutal dictatorship that did not deserve any sympathy. Therefore, the OCN found it substantially easier to work on small far-right groups than to change the majority opinion. These so-called “ultra” organizations could, in fact, contribute to the OCN’s purposes by assaulting democratic activists, terrifying undergraduates, sowing chaos and, in doing so, justifying police charges and academic sanctions on campuses. The recruitment of loyalist individuals attempted to adapt to the local conditions in every university. In Madrid, the OCN created the National University Association (AUN), direct heir of the old University Defense. In Barcelona, the AUN did not work and, instead, OCN agents decided to finance already operating groups, situated between neofascism and nostalgic Falangist politics, such as the Revolutionary Trade-Union Front (FSR), the Spanish National Socialist Party (PENS) and the younger remnants of Franco’s Guard. The PENS had a twin group in Madrid, named National Revolutionary Militants (MNR). This was born as a split from a wider organization, New Force (FN), founded in 1966 by one of the most known members of the so-called pro-Franco “bunker,” the lawyer and member of the corporate parliament Blas Piñar. Another paramilitary far-right group, Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey (GCR), was also linked to FN, Franco’s Guard, the Social Brigade and the secret services. Those “partisans of King Christ” become famous during the State of Emergency of 1969 by attacking working-class priests under the slogans “Long Live King Christ!” and “Long Live Franco!” (Casals 1994: 97-101; Rodríguez Jiménez 1994: 202-223).

The FSR had also some support in Valencia. One of its militants there was a former director of the Falangist University Work Service (SUT). In addition to financing this group, the OCN local section gained new recruiters among far-right students in order to create a new organization, the Spanish Social Movement (MSE), whose name and symbols were inspired by the Italian neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). The acronyms AUN and PENS were also used, sometimes in the same actions and writings that MSE vindicated as its own, a fact that confirmed that there was a common sustaining structure for them all. The first contacts between these pro-Franco activists were established in a training course promoted by the OCN in Franco’s sanctuary Valle de los Caídos in October 1970. In April 1971, PENS, MSE and MNR signed a formal unity agreement in a meeting near Girona, attended by Italian and French neofascist observers (Rodríguez Tejada 2009: II, 268-269; Casals 1994: 101-102).

During the next years, these violent far-right groups displayed growing activity in several campuses, occupying posts in the failed official Student Associations, writing threatening slogans on walls, and intimidating everyone by exhibiting chains, brass knuckles, clubs, knives and fire weapons. Their militants—all men—showed a typical short-hairstyle, well-shaved, and very muscled look, which contrasted strongly the long-haired, bearded and casual hippie-like guise of the leftist male activists. It was not unusual to see them talking to the Socials, who often guided and supported their actions in an expanding campaign that passed very soon from individual attacks to well-planned brutal assaults of
faculty buildings in order to interrupt student meetings and kick dissenters out, declaring them exclusive “National Zones.” They also used explosives in several cities against cars, bookshops and homes. These terrorist tactics fed back to some far-left underground groups—most of them with an important student base, and several times infiltrated by the secret services—that wanted to overthrow both the dictatorship and the Spanish capitalism by “revolutionary” violence, such as the Basque nationalist Euzkadi and Freedom (ETA), the Revolutionary Anti-Fascist and Patriot Front (FRAP) and the First October Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Group (GRAPO). Both dynamics reinforced the strategies of tension that strongly influenced political life after Franco’s death (Woodworth 2001).

Conclusions

As shown above, after a period of relative lull in the universities until the mid-1950s, the Franco dictatorship was forced to update its policing resources to contain the growing student dissent, while dealing with its own internal conflicts. During most of the 1960s, the Spanish government made use of all kinds of resources, both legal and illegal, violent and pacifist ones, to weaken, divide or, at least, divert the youth mobilization. The clumsy stick-and-carrot policy used by the authorities produced an unfortunate result, since it confirmed the condemnation discourse that student activists addressed to their companions, showing them the real nature of Franco’s regime. The US strategy of persuasion, focusing on Spanish young non-communist university leaders, was more successful, but also contributed to making more visible the political seriousness of student politics to them.

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, that feedback process was reinforced by both the improvement and sophistication of repressive means, and the radicalization of activists’ positions. Once more, rivalries inside the establishment—the National-Catholic offensive against the Falangist influence—were involved in the diversification of resources against “subversion,” especially in the creation of a new intelligence agency, the OCN/SECEZ, as a spearhead against the new dictatorship’s enemies. Using the talent of the pro-Franco younger staff and enjoying the support of the American aid, this modernization strategy achieved remarkable triumphs. Dissident groups were successfully monitored, infiltrated and manipulated to a certain extent, and their efforts to prevent this consumed a lot of their energies, confusing and weakening them. So surveillance helped to prolong the dictatorship’s life by keeping the growing social dissent in colleges and workplaces at bay for some years more. When far-left activists spread out from universities to organize both new foci of popular protest in other social spheres in factories and popular neighborhoods and, in some cases, underground armed (terrorist) groups, the surveillance apparatus originally updated to fight the student movement was ready to track them down.

The official reaction revealed that the dictatorship felt threatened by the young opposition because its basic rhetorical justification as a peace-and-order guarantor was being questioned, not so much by the protests themselves as by the political alarm and the public repression they were able to draw on against them. The violence and the surveillance displayed by the power holders legitimated in turn far-left “revolutionary violence” and contributed to many anti-Franco activists justifying the latter during the last period of the dictatorship and thereafter. At the same time, the capacity to tap into and infiltrate the dissidence offered the Spanish secret services many means of action that were used for different purposes in the decisive next years of political transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy and thereafter (Woodworth 2001; Díaz Fernández 2005; San Martín 2005).

The Franco dictatorship was not the only example of a far-right European dictatorship put in a predicament by a willing student movement in the second half of the 20th century. Despite their differences, Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal (1933-1974) and the Regime of the Colonels in Greece (1967-1974) were similarly challenged and eroded by protests on campuses. In Portugal, both António Oliveira Salazar—o ditador catedrático in office until 1968—and his successor Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974) came from the faculty and, therefore, they had first-hand knowledge of the situation in colleges.
However, their attempts to appease youth dissent were as compromised by both their deceitfulness and the resort to policing as their Spanish counterparts were (Caiado 1990; Garrido 1996; Reis Torgal 1999; Accornero 2013). On the other hand, the Greek military dictatorship—which was itself a continuation of a long period of right-wing authoritarian politics—gave an unequivocally violent response from the beginning, but it couldn’t avoid a similar loss of prestige as a consequence (Samatas 2004; Kornetis 2013).

Of course, it is not a question of those three dictatorships being overthrown by the student protest. But, in the particular conditions of the European periphery in the 1970s—far different from both those ones existing in the past and those prevailing then in other areas, such as Latin America—university dissent created a problem that could not be solved by only using the expeditious methods inherited either from the fascism or from the cold war. Therefore, new strategies were explored to stop a kind of defiance so naive in appearance as hard to handle anyway.

So, the political role of student movements should not be underestimated. University youth, in general, have important advantages for revolting, such as living together as an age group in an influential sphere of society, their usual distance from scarcity due to family support, their command of the hegemonic culture’s dispositions and symbolic resources, much more spare time than the average of adults, some esprit de corps, good future expectations, and the protection of social status. A student movement can be a serious challenge to any government, if both internal and external circumstances force the establishment to restrain partially its repressive power and usual persuasion is not enough effective to neutralize it. Surveillance emerges, then, as an unavoidable and useful solution to fight dissent, but it also shows it to be a double-edged sword with several unplanned consequences. As has been shown above, those factors become even more significant under a dictatorship, just because any conflict—among loyalists or promoted from outside—is alarmingly perceived as a potential danger. Further research is needed to clarify both the potential influence of student movements in other political contexts and the efficiency of surveillance to deflate it.

References


**Websites**


