Abstract

This paper presents a case-study of spatial brand protection and media management and security strategies at the 2010 Football World Cup (FWC) in South Africa (RSA). This focus stems from the realisation that commercially designated event spaces are very important environments for the interests of FWC sponsors, and that the media has a pivotal role in conveying messages about desirable conduct in such environments. In these respects, stakeholder organisations are concerned about safeguarding core event spaces, and with promoting positive messages about the FWC via the media. The paper therefore investigates the interests of key stakeholders at the 2010 FWC: the event owner Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the FWC sponsors and the host city (Cape Town). It is concerned with identifying various surveillance strategies to manage public spaces at the FWC, albeit with a particular emphasis on protecting the interests of sponsors and their brand integrity. It is also concerned with strategies to manage the media at the FWC, with a particular emphasis on how FIFA stymies dissent and forces compliance among reporters and news outlets that undermine critical surveillance into these practices of spatial management. Taken together, these hyper-protectionist approaches demonstrate what we have described as the FIFA-isation of the FWC, where commercial risk is outsourced to the event host, while the commercial benefits flow back to the event owner. Concomitantly, FIFA makes enormous surveillance demands on the event hosts and those residing in the country and city where it is to be held, and upon the media that broadcast and report on the world’s biggest sports mega events.

Introduction

The securitisation of public spaces at sports mega events is generally presumed to focus on operational risk management objectives, such as pedestrian decongestion, curtailing disorder and preventing terrorism. However, this instrumental approach fails to appreciate that the management of public environments at a sports mega event requires more than accommodating patrons and securing venues. It also involves the protection of stakeholder interests within the spatial confines of a public spectacle. This paper argues that researchers have yet to adequately conceptualise a very important aspect of the staging of sports mega events—the surveillance of public spaces that reflect the aspirations of event owners, event organisers and event sponsors (Klauser 2008a, 2011). As will be explained, mega events have profoundly important planning and operational protocols that seek to manage reputational and commercial risk. In this paper, the focus is on surveillance associated with two types of publicly accessible spatial environments, Public Viewing Areas (PVAs) and Commercial Restricted Zones (CRZs). This paper is part of a broader study evaluating the securitisation of these spaces at the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in South Africa (RSA) and in the specific context of the City of Cape Town (CoCT). Before pursuing that focus, however, a discussion of relevant literature examining event security, sponsor protection, media management, and reputation management is necessary.
Securing Event Spaces

The planning, management and operation of mega events is extremely complex and multifaceted (Emery 2002). Characteristically, these public spectacles generate claims of social virtue and benefit by event organisers, the host government, and commercial supporters. The size of sports mega events, as well as the public enthusiasm to host and participate in them, has grown substantially over the past 20 or so years (Horne 2007). However, while sports mega events offer a public relations spotlight in which to shine, especially given their extensive international media coverage, they also generate considerable economic, logistic, political and reputational risks (Appenzeller 2005; Getz 1997; Toohey, Taylor and Lee 2003). Therefore, the aspirations of event organisers and hosts may be compromised by a range of confounding factors, such as crowd management problems, fan misbehaviour, and strident expressions of nationalism (Frosdick and Walley 1997). A mega event can also play host to common, everyday forms of crime, such as theft and drug dealing (Jennings and Lodge 2009). Sports mega events may even involve oppositional forces and become sites for political activism (e.g., ‘anti-event’ protests, strikes) in which dissent against an organisation, such as the International Olympic Committee or another event-related entity, is expressed. Event security policies and practises are thus not simply politically neutral. They involve exercises of power.

Sports mega events require significant strategic planning in terms of spatial security measures, both within stadia and surrounding event precincts (Yu, Klauser and Chan 2009). Boyle (2012) and Lyon and Murakami Wood (2012) have indicated several aspects and events in which security and surveillance have become more closely connected, both in practice and theory. There is now a considerable body of research addressing risk management in respect of public order and safety, including crowding, fan behaviour, emergency responses, policing, and surveillance of event spaces by security agencies (e.g., Baasch 2009, 2010, 2011; Boyle and Haggerty 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Eick 2011; Floridis 2004; Haferburg 2011; Haferburg, Golk, and Selter 2009; Haferburg and Steinbrink 2010; Hagemann 2006, 2008, 2010; Hiller 2000, 2006; Klauser 2008b; Molnar and Snider 2010; Samatas 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Toohey 2008, Toohey and Taylor 2008; Toohey, Taylor and Lee 2003; Yu et al. 2009). Within this body of research there has been a particular emphasis on anti-terrorism measures and, in the context of the FIFA World Cup, initiatives to monitor and counter so-called hooligan behaviour (Armstrong 1998; Berthoud, Pattaroni, Viot and Kaufmann 2009; Giulianotti 1999; Giulianotti and Armstrong 1998; Jennings and Lodge 2009, 2011).

The securitisation of mega events has also escalated since the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’, together with further terrorist attacks in other parts of the world. These events have led to unprecedented types and levels of surveillance and security, as well as the accelerated development of ‘counter-terrorism’ technologies. In many countries, a range of government-sanctioned anti-terrorism measures has been introduced, including electronic communications to systematically monitor individuals or groups of people deemed ‘suspect’ at large public gatherings (Amoore 2007; Kreimer 2004; Warren 2002). The post-9/11 geopolitical environment has accentuated fear of security risks at public events, prompting sports organisations, governments and security firms to draw upon increasingly complex and costly mega event security and social control measures (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009).

Concurrently, though, sceptics have questioned whether new levels of public ‘protection’ represent a proportionate response to these identified risks. Boyle and Haggerty (2009b) claim that Western societies are moving from a ‘risk society’ to a ‘precautionary society’, with mega events providing particularly fertile ground for the articulation of highly conservative securitisation approaches that are increasingly reliant on new forms of surveillance. Discourses of fear have almost compelled mega event planners to conceive the future through dystopian nightmares of worst-case scenarios, which produce costly and intrusive security measures (Clarke 2006). Critics (e.g., Bernhard and Martin 2011; Samatas 2005, 2007) have also pointed to unnecessarily invasive security protocols and excessive surveillance measures at
mega events. This is not only a complaint about the power of authority, but also a commentary on its impact on the experience of patrons. Whereas security can reassure the public, excessive surveillance and control measures may compromise enjoyment and prove a disincentive for attendees to return (Taylor and Toohey 2006, 2007). Siebel and Wehrheim (2003) describe ‘fears resulting from insecurity are projected into public space, which can lead to excessive controls … can indeed impair the publicness of urban spaces’. While mega event surveillance and security measures are vehicles for the control of behaviour in public spaces, they are also mechanisms by which event spaces are themselves monitored and protected in order to safeguard the reputation and brand image of key stakeholders.

**Sponsor protection, media management and global reputation**

Sports mega events such as the Olympic Games, the Super Bowl, and the FWC, have a vast global media profile. These events display athletic talent while showcasing the event owner’s brand, presenting a platform for the exposure of event sponsors, and providing valuable tourism publicity for host cities. The sports mega event therefore provides numerous opportunities for stakeholders that also require the identification and management of risk. How benefits are optimised and unwanted outcomes minimised are therefore key considerations in the conduct of sports mega events. Venue security, stakeholder reputation, and the safeguarding of sponsors’ interests are among the most crucial managerial considerations at a mega event, as professional sport is so dominated by global media and commercial sponsorship interests (Slack 2005).

Event sponsors use mega events to optimise their brand image, product exposure (Brown 2000) and consumer loyalty (Alexandris, Tsaousi and James 2007). To achieve these brand-related goals, value is drawn from the image of the sport in an effort to positively influence brand perceptions and consumers’ purchasing intentions (Farrelly, Quester and Burton 2006). Effective security planning may also involve groups with a financial and reputational stake in the delivery of a sport product. Therefore, brand protection strategies are not inherently different from traditional forms of security that focus on the management of space and behaviour. The surveillance of these elements of securing brand protection rights has both material and symbolic dimensions that are seldom examined in previous research.

Mega event host cities are promoted as safe and welcoming places in order to attract international investment and global status. The concept of the ‘world-city’ (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991, 1994, 2001) involves megalopolises competing against each other on a global scale to attract investment from multinational corporations, public agencies, the media, sport and leisure corporations, and tourists (Harvey 1989). Bernhard and Martin (2011) have argued that ‘world-class’ cities strive to portray an image of safety and security, along with exciting and dynamic tourist attractions. Sports mega events also typically offer sophisticated security and surveillance measures to demonstrate the ‘advanced’ developmental status of major cities. Although the image of security and surveillance is not the same as preparing for and responding to *actual* security risk assessments, the securitisation of a mega event is part of a geopolitical reputational caché, showcasing the power, resources and skills of the host megalopolis.

Sports mega events are also typically owned and branded by a transnational sport organisation. The event host produces the sport product at the behest of the brand owner, which in turn arranges broadcast of the spectacle to a global audience via media contracts. The brand owner also garners income from official sponsorship of the product and event. The event host, meanwhile, is responsible for resourcing and producing event infrastructure, such as stadia and associated precincts, providing access for broadcast media to cover the spectacle, and overseeing security for patrons in event spaces. Therefore, the host city and/or country is responsible for managing security in stadia and associated precincts in the interests of the event owner, while the event owner seeks to maintain or enhance the reputation of its brand and the popularity of the sport product it promotes. This stakeholder may also look to safeguard the profile and position of its financial supporters—official sponsors—who use a mega event to showcase and promote
their products or services. To that extent, therefore, security planning and delivery are not simply about managing crowds, dissuading hooliganism and so on. It is also very much an exercise in brand protection—both for the event owner and its sponsors. The media is, of course, a key to this process since broadcasters provide a mega event lens to the world. A challenge for event hosts, therefore, is to facilitate the provision of exclusive broadcasting spaces. This often involves the sanitisation of event precincts and, in keeping with contractual arrangements with the event owner and sponsors, the imposition of commercial restricted zones wherein only official brand logos and products are allowed. The inference is that security and surveillance at a sports mega event need to be seen as more than simply managing conventional public order risks. It is also fundamentally about safeguarding the commercial interests of key event stakeholders. Both physical safety and brand management are equally important in terms of managing risks to the global reputation of a mega event (Klauser 2010).

Advertising and promotion of sports mega events extend beyond the site itself. Commercial affiliates reach two different types of audiences: those at the mega event (locals and tourists), and the much larger number of people consuming the event via television broadcasts, the internet, or reading about it in the press. Nicholls, Roslow and Laskey (2011) have asserted that the vast and dispersed masses in the external audience are more commercially important than the participants at the event. However, the manner in which the event is presented to that audience is crucial, and part of that is not simply football matches or other forms of entertainment, but coverage of how fans at the spectacle enjoy themselves, buy merchandise, and so on.

The global media footprint is steadily increasing, not only in respect of the increased size of sports media audiences, channels and social media tools, but also with regard to the expanding capacity of the media to broadcast and present experiences from a range of spaces before, during, and after a mega event takes place. Thus, the securitisation of public urban spaces at international sports mega events has become highly strategic. It is also very politicised. For example, Klauser (2008b: 62) has argued that security politics during the 2006 FWC in Germany served to ‘select, classify, separate, differentiate, mark, arrange and control specific categories of space’. He concluded that the purposes, scope and impact of security and surveillance procedures, and the risk management objectives for the event owner, the national government, the host city and security personnel cannot be comprehended without ‘referring to the territories concerned and created by their spatial deployment and performance’ (Klauser 2008b: 62). Therefore, while it is commonly assumed that the securitisation of public space at a sports mega event is fundamentally about operational risk management objectives (e.g., pedestrian decongestion, curtailing disorder, preventing terrorism), this instrumental approach fails to appreciate that public environments at a sports mega event requires more than the management of patrons. It also involves the protection of stakeholder interests within the spatial confines of a public spectacle. Researchers have yet to adequately conceptualise a very important aspect of the staging of sports mega events—namely, the security management procedures and surveillance arrangements public event spaces that preserve the interests of the event organiser for the brand protection of event owners and event sponsors (Klauser 2008a, 2011).

**Research context and data**

The present study reveals overlapping contexts, involving several stakeholders in the securitisation arrangements of mega events. At a global level, the FWC is an event owned by FIFA but run by a host country and particular cities therein. In our case, the focus is with the 2010 FWC in South Africa, and within that frame the security and surveillance measures in the city of Cape Town, which has the ambition of being considered a ‘world-class’ city. Place branding through the staging of mega events is a key strategy among Cape Town’s political elite after the city submitted bids for the summer Olympic Games in 2004 and the FWC in 2006. The eventual success of RSA winning the bid to host the 2010 FWC was greeted with particular enthusiasm in Cape Town, as the city was strongly committed to claiming ‘world-city’ status by virtue of staging a global mega event (McDonald 2008). Planning for and staging the FWC
in Cape Town required extensive input from local stakeholders, though the city also needed to conform to wider dictates on the part of the RSA government and, more importantly, FIFA.

The FWC is a critical element of the FIFA brand in the global marketplace. Through the staging of this international event, FIFA seeks to optimise financial returns via media rights and commercial backers (Eick 2011). FWC sponsors and broadcasting agreements are FIFA’s most important revenue stream. It is therefore logical for FIFA to protect the promotional interests of its commercial supporters and, in the context of the FWC, the display of logos and associated advertising in FIFA-approved public spaces within host cities. In this regard, Eick (2010) has argued that the FWC is itself a global ‘brand’ that serves as a major revenue earner and secures significant profits for FIFA.

The FWC ‘field of play’ extends beyond the football matches staged in major event venues. Hagemann (2008, 2010) has pointed out that fan experiences increasingly encompass a range of sites and events within the host city. Inner-city areas and event precincts have been developed and themed as important components of the FWC. Since 2002, FIFA has extended its event footprint from the stadia in the host cities to the CRZs1 that surround them, and, from 2006 onwards, to PVAs.2 The underlying purpose of the PVA concept was initially a spatial strategy to manage public order, since too many fans would have been left without tickets at the 2006 FWC in Germany (there were only three million tickets and 50 million requests). Beyond these logistics, though, German cities realised they could gain positive image effects beyond just the broadcasting of matches in the stadia, which tend to be constrained by rather sterile designs and the standardisation of advertising spaces (Schulke 2007). Off-site concepts have given FIFA, FWC sponsors and the host country/city a broader platform to display their brands and enhance their commercial footprint. Since 2010, seven international ‘world cities’ (Berlin, London, Mexico City, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney) staged official mega event activities in PVAs and CRZs with a global imprint beyond the sports venues in host nations.

In order to examine PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC, this study considered an array of publicly available documents. FIFA, the Local (FWC) Organising Committee, the City of Cape Town, the Provincial Government of Western Cape and the Cape Town Partnership, a public-private venture created to assist with hosting the FWC, all produced a vast cache of data examined in this study. There were also numerous parliamentary proceedings and reports related to the FWC in Cape Town, including speeches by relevant ministers involved in sport, policing and securitisation issues. The study also drew on media reports that reflected on security operations in the public spaces within PVAs and CRZs. A process of manual coding was deployed (Basit 2003), with each major stakeholder—the event owner, the event host, the event sponsors—assigned their own principal category, after which subsidiary stakeholders, such as the police and private security agencies, were assigned a secondary category. A key part of this process involved the coding of the FWC precinct, PVA and CRZ mega event spaces in Cape Town. Responsibility for the management of these spaces rested with particular stakeholders, though the operation of security and surveillance measures in these environments was of considerable interest to all of the stakeholders. A final, but fundamental thematic category was the media and the capacity of news outlets and journalists to function within the constraints established by FIFA. Hence, although the media did not operate in a spatial boundary in the way that the PVAs and CRZs were managed by security, news outlets were nonetheless bound by FIFA requirements that limited their capacity to report without fear or favour. The remainder of this paper outlines the security and surveillance measures at the PVAs and CRZs and the various efforts to safeguard FIFA and its partners’ commercial interests in those spaces. This is followed by a discussion of

1 CRZs are subject to a variety of special regulation and policing methods, e.g. competition is restricted to those businesses legally authorised to sell and advertise. They are both hybrid mega-event spaces in the public urban environment through which spectators and fans arrive and depart, and places where local residents live and work.
2 Spectator spaces with huge TV screens and free admission targeted towards fans who wish to view an event but who do not have a ticket for stadium entry.
how FIFA and the LOC sought to manage media messages about the FWC, by stymying dissent while presenting aesthetically pleasing images of Cape Town to both tourists and audiences around the world. Taken together, this FIFA-isation of event places and media spaces was a very powerful strategy to commandeer the management of this mega event, even if responsibility of the implementation and staging of that spectacle was largely out-sourced to the local host.

The 2010 FIFA World Cup: policing, surveillance and security legacies

Expenditure related to mega events is often justified in terms of legacies beyond the event itself (Cashman 2005). When governments allocate funds to improve infrastructure and build stadiums for a mega event, the argument is typically put that they will have lasting benefits, even though how and why this occurs often becomes a moot question. In the context of the 2010 FWC, both the RSA and CoCT governments argued that their accelerated expenditure on security and surveillance resources would leave an important legacy in terms of South Africa’s efforts to tackle high rates of serious violent crime (McMichael 2012). The national police spokesperson, Senior Superintendent Naidoo, asserted that in the context of the FWC:

> We are preparing ourselves for a worst-case scenario or any eventuality ... although we have the framework in place, we must deal with issues as they present themselves.  
> (Flak 2009)

Skill development and training opportunities, improved communication and cooperative governance, public and private sector partnerships, as well as local community involvement, were identified as urgent and necessary securitisation requirements that enhanced surveillance for the FWC and a ‘true legacy’ thereafter (Provincial Government of Western Cape (PGWC) 2011). According to Police Minister Mthethwa (2010):

> Our security plans consist of achieving better policing, efficient criminal justice system and involvement of various local and international partners. This must leave a lasting security legacy that must guarantee further attraction of visitors post the tournament.

During the lead up to the 2010 FWC, international media coverage focused strongly on RSA’s crime rate and fears that tourists might be at risk from either petty thieves or violent gangs. For example, the Guardian reported:

> The [UK] government today warned travelling England fans that any misbehaviour at the World Cup could impact on the country’s bid to host the 2018 tournament, and advised potential troublemakers that they would face the ‘full force of local policing laws’.
> (Gibson 2010a)

Meanwhile, the RSA Home Affairs Minister announced that hooligans would not be able to come to South Africa during the tournament (The Hindu 2009). The Department of Home Affairs implemented a Movement Control System, involving a computerised system for monitoring movements of goods under suspension of excise duty, in 34 air and land ports of entry. In addition, the Advance Passenger Processing (APP) system, and the deployment of 160 Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) was introduced at eight strategic international hubs abroad (Maseko 2010). Moreover, INTERPOL, in conjunction with the South African Police Service (SAPS), established a Dangerous and Disruptive Persons (DDP) database identifying those previously involved in organised crime and hooliganism (FourFourTwo 2010; Omar 2007).

For the ‘law abiding’ resident or visitor, the South African media reassured FWC patrons that there would be ample security, and they should expect a safe and pleasurable experience as tourists. For example, the
picture titled ‘Sun, surf and safety’ by the Sunday Times implied that pleasurable experiences could be combined with unobtrusive surveillance in public spaces. Security guards were represented not only as a source of protection but also as helping to enhance visitor pleasure, reassurance and comfort.

Both the RSA and CoCT police agencies focused on security and crime prevention policies to defray anxieties among ‘law abiding’ tourists, who were very much needed to make the FWC a commercial success. This meant significant deployment of public policing resources together with private security partners at key CoCP FWC sites, such as the FIFA PVAs and the specially developed Fan Mile, in which World Cup fans walked from the central railway station to the event precinct. The South African Police Service (SAPS) claimed that ‘South Africa will host the safest and most secure FIFA World Cup’ (Mthethwa 2010). According to Mthethwa (2010): ‘Police will be everywhere, ready for any eventuality. This is the epitome of our security plan; we will cover every corner because we do not have any no-go areas’. However, while these strategies were logical for the FWC, they were scarcely relevant to the long-term policing and security needs of the broader community (Bob and Swart 2011; Swart, Bob and Turco 2010). Before the event, Andrew Boraine, Chief Executive of the Cape Town Partnership (CTP), had argued that it was crucial to continue the visible policing measures employed during the FWC, and to ‘turn the exception of one month into the norm’ (CTP 2011). Subsequently, however, he was disappointed, because:

… people came into our towns and they saw the SAPS patrolling everywhere. But the day after the World Cup they went back to their bases. The Central City Improvement District security is still in place, but it is not the same security we had during the World Cup. Then Metrorail went back to how they had always been. It’s not good enough.

(CTP 2011)

Johan Burger, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria argued that it was impossible to sustain the same high levels of police visibility after the FWC. This is because during the tournament all police leave was cancelled. This meant that during the FWC all resources were made available and there was an event-specific budget to pay the police overtime (Burger 2010).

During the FWC there were also important contrasts in the management of public spaces in inner-city Cape Town and its outer fringes. This involved the unequal and spatially fragmented provision of security services, with a strong emphasis on support for the inner-city areas where the FWC was staged. The security and surveillance strategy focused on particular ‘hot spots’, which included strategically important spaces in the city centre. These included: the stadia, practice venues, FIFA headquarters, PVAs, media centres, hotels, public transport, air- and seaports, main routes, popular tourist attractions, official and public accommodation, restaurants, bars, event centres, shopping complexes, pedestrian routes and red
light areas (Directorate: Communication and Information Services 2008). This focus on policing the inner-city areas of South African FWC cities was confirmed by Mr Watson, a delegate in Parliament, who stated that whilst cities and urban areas were flooded with police and SAPS vehicles, smaller towns and rural areas suffered from a shortage of [security] infrastructure (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010).

In other words, the enormous public expenditure on security and surveillance at the FWC was, for the most part, a snapshot strategy for a limited purpose and particular context. FIFA as the event owner, and its commercial event sponsors, were the indirect beneficiaries of an enormous security/surveillance operation that, at its core, was intended to ensure that the FWC was a great success in terms of public order and safety, as well as safeguarding officially sanctioned commercial interests within inner-city event spaces.

**The 2010 FIFA World Cup: public relations and media accreditation**

In Cape Town, the international media was courted well before the FWC. ‘Welcome Services’ focused largely on ensuring that media representatives enjoyed a ‘safe and informative time’, visiting diverse parts of Cape Town and the Western Cape beyond the conventional tourism locations (PGWC 2011). To do this, the LOC employed three international PR consultants to ‘manage’ Cape Town’s image in three key source markets where negative reporting and ‘Afro-pessimism’ were most prevalent (PGWC 2011). The effort to woo international reporters seemed to have paid off, because as the FWC unfolded much of the anxiety and fear about RSA as a tourist destination disappeared from global media reports. This was a significant media carrot.

However, a commensurate stick emerged in the form of the South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF). This prominent media organisation reported that FIFA was anxious to prevent ambushing of sponsor logos and symbols, and as such expected strict compliance under threat of legal action. According to SANEF, FIFA’s media restrictions were meant to safeguard ‘its rights, brand name, profit-making and status of the games, and the rights of sponsoring companies, including broadcasters’ exclusive rights’ (Da Silva 2010). As one of FIFA’s lawyers pointed out: ‘(w)e don’t want to let branded stuff get into the stands and get TV exposure worldwide. That’s the most terrible kind of ambush’ (Portela 2010). The stakes were high: television coverage of the 2010 FWC reached over 3.2 billion people around the world, or 46.4 per cent of the global population, based on viewers watching a minimum of over one minute of coverage. This represented an 8 per cent rise in the number of viewers recorded during the 2006 FWC in Germany (FIFA 2011a). FIFA was keen to associate the FWC brand through media coverage emphasising Africa’s iconic personalities. For example, Nelson Mandela’s grandson stated that the former South African president was placed under ‘extreme pressure’ by FIFA to attend the final game of the FWC (Paul 2010). Ultimately, Mandela was too weak and fragile due to illness to attend.

One FIFA-ised space, the official Cape Town FIFA Fan Fest (FFF), was situated on the Grand Parade in front of the City Hall and the Castle, close to the main railway station with a view of Table Mountain. The Grand Parade was held approximately 12km from the stadium in Cape Town’s oldest public space and one of its most well-known heritage sites where Nelson Mandela made his famous first public address following his release from prison in February 1990. The fenced FFF was surrounded by these historic sites, while an enormous 74 square-metre screen, one of the biggest structures ever to be erected in the RSA (CTP 2010b), provided a viewing space to watch FWC matches. The entire area was re-surfaced with paving stones that matched the colour of City Hall, while a double row of stone pine trees was planted around the perimeter with lighting masts installed (CTP 2009). These structural elements veiled views of the gritty neighbourhood and any non-FIFA endorsed commercial advertisements surrounding the event precinct.
FFFs were themed with the FIFA brand and sponsors’ commercial messages. The logos of FIFA’s corporate partners adorned the advertising boards surrounding the FFF, which consisted of a reserved area and a general area. The reserved area was exclusively for sponsor advertising and sales of FIFA merchandise, including the Official FWC shop. It was the prime area around, in front, and behind any giant screen and main stage of the FFF, including the main screen, and within line of sight of all screens and stages as determined by FIFA. The general area was defined as the remaining area of the FFF. In this space, it was possible for other third party Capetonian exhibitors to establish a modest on-site presence, so long as their products and services did not compromise those of FWC sponsors (FIFA 2009). Cape Town also had the opportunity to develop additional on-site tourism advertising under FIFA’s supervision (FIFA 2009).

The FFF could safely host up to 25,000 people (PGWC 2011). The goal was to enhance fans’ experiences through the consumption of entertainment, food, beverages, and merchandise. This was pursued by offering a range of hybrid consumption activities, such as watching live match broadcasts, laser light displays, an interactive activity zone, viewing areas for popular local music bands, entertainers and DJs, food and refreshment stalls, art and crafts, and purchasing branded merchandise at the official FIFA Fan Store. The partnership of FFF security and commercialisation was apparent in the Prohibited and Restricted List. Intriguingly, weapons were listed in the same category as non-sponsors’ illegal beverages. There was a zero-tolerance approach to any non-sponsoring brands, but also to people who carried such brands into event spaces.

Cape Town’s FFF in Cape Town was extensively covered by the media over and above any other PVA according to the PGWC (2011). Overall, more than 5,200 accredited media members reported from the FFFs in the RSA (Namibia Sport 2010). By concentrating on the highly securitised FFF coverage, FIFA optimised the prospect that beautified and sanitised images of South Africa were shown. The highly controlled environment and the selected target market of middle-class patrons and international visitors were less likely to attract disorder or display a negative appearance. The CTP stated that ‘much of the electronic media coverage was broadcast live during peak consumer times’ (CTP 2010a: 7), such as drive times and news programming. All stakeholders—FIFA, its sponsors, and the government of Cape Town—benefited from these globally broadcast images of cheering masses at the FFF, complete with FIFA branding and sponsor logos, and the aesthetically glorious Table Mountain in the background. FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, stated:

The public viewing events became a symbol of the power and charisma of football, the picture of the millions of fans from all over the world celebrating at public places across the entire country (RSA) was the image that went around the globe.

(FIFA 2007)

In order to maintain a sanitised environment, any political or religious demonstrations were prohibited within 10km of FWC stadia to prevent social tensions shaping media coverage of the event and preserve the branding messages of FIFA and its sponsors. According to the relevant by-law:

(2) No person may undertake any event or a special event which will or may be used for the purposes of the Competition unless specifically authorised by the City Manager’.

(CoCT 2010 FWC By-Law 2009: 22)

Danny Jordaan, CEO of the LOC, said that the official FWC sponsors had paid R2.8 billion to sponsor the FWC in 2006, and this increased to R3.2 billion for the 2010 FWC: ‘Rather than look for discounts due to lower expectations in the RSA, the companies had been prepared to pay more’ (LOC 2008). Ultimately, this income went to FIFA, not the South African government or local event organisers which paid to host the FWC.
FWC organisers managed global audience perceptions through local media coverage during match broadcasting breaks that excluded anything ‘unsightly’, such as Cape Town’s slums and townships. Images of people living without electricity or running water in the shadow of gleaming new stadia were not something the LOC, FIFA and its sponsors wanted to reveal to the international community. In particular, the CoCT was interested in conveying an impression of a modern, entrepreneurial, ‘world-class’ city. Such global media attention not only impacts upon the image of the hosting city/nation, but also on the ‘brandscapes’ (Klingmann 2010) of the event owner and its sponsors. In the context of event urbanism, the use of Cape Town’s ‘natural urban environment’ as advertising space was particularly attractive. The natural beauty of Table Mountain as the backdrop, combined with ‘happy faces’ alongside sponsors’ logos, was mediated to global television audiences. As Eick has observed, spaces in the public realm were visualised through spectacular media images of thousands of peaceful, fans viewing football in PVAs and the inner cities, which are considered increasingly valuable by event organisers as major sites for selling authorised sponsorship rights (Eick 2011).

While official broadcasters authorised by FIFA were compliant with the needs of the event owner and host cities, FIFA’s media restrictions on journalists and media outlets were at the centre of a major row with the SANEF. One point of contention was FIFA’s prohibition on newspapers preparing video packages for their websites. Newspapers were not allowed to publish pictures on their mobile platforms, and no newspaper agency was allowed to sell its papers within the security-rings around the FWC stadia (a radius of approximately 800m) (Moodie 2010). According to Da Silva (2010), local journalists accused FIFA of acting as a bunch of ‘bullies’ and ‘dictators’ with a neo-colonialist mentality, following what analysts saw as ‘unreasonable’ media restrictions on the 2010 FWC coverage.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was the official broadcast partner of FIFA for the 2010 FWC, and to a certain extent represented the ultimate booster for the event. Journalists earning FIFA accreditation had to pledge not to print anything that ‘negatively affects the public standing of the Local Organizing Committee or FIFA’, or they could be punished by summary withdrawal of their accreditation (Bond 2010). As a consequence, journalists spoke to Da Silva on condition of anonymity for fear of victimisation. Many journalists remained silent, fearing FIFA would deny them accreditation if they were to speak out against these restrictions (Da Silva 2010). SANEF attempted to negotiate with FIFA on this matter, with a long time proponent of media freedom through the Freedom of Expression Institute stating:

We are also proposing to members that they append to their applications a letter saying that reporters and photographers regard the assurances they have been given as indicating that they have full freedom to report in the traditional way on games and all associated events related to the games.

(Da Silva 2010)

However, these restrictions were not negotiable, and South African journalists who questioned the motivations or impacts of the 2010 FWC were dubbed unpatriotic, with the government ‘dismissing calls for reflection as examples of Afro-pessimism or worse’ (Alegi 2008: 328). SABC’s spokesperson Kganyago reported that the national broadcaster had refused to screen a critical documentary, ‘Fahrenheit 2010’, depicting the forced relocation of poor people from the event precinct prior to the FWC. ‘Our job is obviously to promote the World Cup and fighting anything that can be perceived as negative is not in our interest’ (Bond 2010).

FWC organisers also shaped audience perceptions, with local media footage during match broadcasting breaks excluding anything ‘unsightly’, such as Cape Town’s slums and townships. Images of people living without electricity or running water in the shadow of gleaming new stadia were not something that the LOC, FIFA and its sponsors wanted to reveal to the international community. The CoCT was
particularly interested in conveying an impression of a modern, entrepreneurial, ‘world-class’ city, with selective media attention favouring the ‘brandscape’ (Klingmann 2010) of the event owner and its sponsors. The use of Cape Town’s ‘natural urban environment’ as advertising space was a particularly attractive strategy. The natural beauty of Table Mountain as backdrop, combined with ‘happy faces’ alongside sponsors’ logos, was carefully mediated to global television audiences through spectacular media images of thousands of peaceful, football-watching fans in PVAs and the inner cities, providing an increasingly valuable backdrop to selling mega-event sponsorship (Eick 2011).

Carlson (2009) has argued that in the 2010 FWC context, South African newspaper stories relied primarily on government and other official sources, such as FIFA and the LOC, and presented an overwhelmingly biased and positive coverage of the event. Although the RSA print media is vibrant and at times critical, there was little interest among media outlets for harsh criticism of FIFA and the RSA government’s media restrictions. South African journalists also had a significant stake in the country’s success in hosting the 2010 FWC. Thus their ‘boosterism’ was not surprising (Carlson 2010). Even though the media was expected to consult FIFA before launching stories (Sports and Recreation Portfolio Committee and Education and Recreation Select Committee 2006) many journalists were complicit and saw virtue in these unusual demands.

While extensive criticism has been levered towards FIFA’s ‘draconian’ demands, its non-negotiable deadlines were often the very catalyst required to transcend the usual lethargy.

(CTP 2010a: 3)

It’s been a spectacular success. Everything according to plan, smooth as silk; South Africa successfully rebranded; no unpleasant surprises, and plenty of pleasant ones….What we saw was just how united and racially healed South Africa really is.

(Carlin 2010: 15)

Prior to the 2010 FWC, FIFA President Sepp Blatter stated: ‘I am still the development officer of Africa’ (LOC 2008). On the other hand, South African authorities denied FIFA’s strong influence in the media. As Komphela, an African National Party (ANC) Member of Parliament and Chair of Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport commented in relation to the design and public display legislation:

We were not afraid of FIFA; FIFA has never dictated to us. What we had is a mutual agreement and we wanted our people on the ground to be able to say that we had a grand occasion where all of us benefitted. I think it is pleasing for our country to have taken that bold step and take care of our people.

(Proceedings at Joint Sitting of Parliament 2010)

This attitude may have had something to do with the national government’s political ambitions, since the FWC signalled an opportunity to lobby for funds and fast-track several urban development projects. Van der Merwe (2008) has pointed out that the FWC represented one of the most spectacular platforms for the affirmation of the ‘African Renaissance’. Further, he stated that the FWC would give ascendance to the recognition of the new President as a leader on the African continent. ‘The new president will have a role to play in managing these expectations, and will use the event to build trust and accrue political capital for the remainder of his or her tenure’ (Van der Merwe 2008: 34). Thus, any reporting on how FIFA was ‘taking over’ the country was dismissed.

However, it took considerable effort on the part of local groups to access important information about the staging of the 2010 FWC. For example, the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit in the Law Faculty at the University of Cape Town sought to access 2010 FWC documentation in terms of the *Promotion of
Access to Information Act (PAIA), No 2 of 2000 (Oxtoby 2010), while in Johannesburg the South Gauteng High Court deliberated about granting public access to the LOC’s tender awards. The court ruled that:

[r]efusing access to these records would enable the organiser of this event to keep from the public eye documents which may disclose evidence of corruption, graft and incompetence in the organisation of the World Cup, or which may disclose that there has been no such malfeasance.

(Pillay 2010)

By this time, though, the persons responsible for staging the event had typically moved on to other roles and responsibilities. Once the ‘show’ had left town, only a few diehards were interested in poring over what remained of its legacies on local governance arrangements in Cape Town.

Conclusion

By focusing on the 2010 FWC and the case of Cape Town, this paper reveals the interrelationship between security management and the selective surveillance of public spaces to promote the interests of the event owners, event organisers and event sponsors (Klauser 2008a, 2011). Sports mega events have profoundly important planning and operational protocols that seek to carefully manage reputational and commercial risk. This paper focused specifically on two types of event spaces: PVAs and CRZs. These are particularly important environments in the FWC context because they are domains within which FIFA and its corporate sponsors have exclusive rights to showcase their brands to extend their ‘market reach’ of the FWC. PVAs and CRZs provide FIFA, its sponsors, and the host country/city with a carefully stage-managed and heavily surveyed platform to communicate their marketing and promotional messages to the global community. The interface between physical security and the surveillance of commercial interests and media reporting is therefore a powerful tool for the hyper-branding of FIFA and its supporters. Those who host the event, and in the process accept the financial risks and responsibility, largely accept these FIFA-isation tactics without question. After all, they are paying for a moment in the world spotlight, and are indeed complicit in the aggrandisement of the FWC as a global sport spectacle. However, the difficulty for mega event managers is that public involvement and engagement in such a varied range of spatial fields bring increased challenges for those responsible for the surveillance of public order, commercial behaviour and the public relations narratives associated with the representation of these situational experiences. These developments highlight a crucial link between surveillance and security measures that extends well beyond the prevailing focus on mega event research that is largely confined to measures designed to control the disorderly behaviour of football fans.

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