Abstract

A growing discourse in surveillance studies is leading the field away from socially neutral theories and introducing methodologies that account for factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. However, scholarship on surveillance in the arts, among which voyeurism and panopticism remain dominant, has been slower to adopt models that address these sociological dimensions of surveillance. This interdisciplinary article argues for expanding the theoretical and sociological scope of scholarship on surveillance in the arts, using Stieg Larsson’s Millennium novels and the Swedish films adapted from them as a case study. This series of narratives features three scopic regimes: the state’s surveillance apparatus, the protagonist’s own surveillant gaze, and the male gaze, each of which operates on and through the body of the central character, Lisbeth Salander. These representations, as so many others, demand that we break away from the panoptic model and employ a theoretically intersectional approach. The author integrates theories from surveillance studies, feminist film theory, and the social sciences to develop such an approach.

Constant developments in surveillance technology, practice, and policy have driven surveillance studies to evolve rapidly in recent decades. That evolution has also been driven by the need to reconsider the theoretical foundations and sociological scope on which the discipline is built, a necessity cited by numerous scholars, including Kevin Haggerty, Mark Andrejevic, and Catherine Zimmer. As Zimmer puts it, surveillance studies “has contended with the need to move beyond the conceptual framework of panopticism that has defined the field,” and she is far from alone in voicing this criticism (Zimmer 2015: 15). One of the core issues with panopticism and other theories that have dominated the discipline is the tendency to ignore factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation, even though the disparate effects of surveillance across these categories is readily apparent. This has led many scholars to argue for an increased historicity that accounts for these and other sociological factors. One of the first such appeals came from this publication’s 2009 “Gender, Sexuality and Surveillance” issue, in which Kirstie Ball, Nicola Green, Hille Koskela, and David J. Phillips argue that “the political economies, methods, outcomes, and profound normalizing tendencies associated with surveillance are deeply amenable to critiques informed by theories of gender and sexuality” (Ball et al. 2009: 352). More recently, Yasmeen Abu Laban writes, “doing Surveillance Studies’ in a way that builds on past research requires embracing the increasing call...to attend to gender” (Abu-Laban 2015: 45). Abu-Laban argues that taking a gender-blind approach is “insufficient to fully understanding social power and control, and how attention to gender has enriched the field. By identifying new questions and insights into ‘watcher’ and ‘watched,’ the emerging work done on gender and surveillance attunes us to a fuller array of dimensions to the
‘surveillant gaze’ in both the ‘public and ‘private’ spheres.” Mark Andrejevic, meanwhile, warns that adopting a “disinterested, neutral, or ‘administrative’ stance” to surveillance studies risks being disingenuous or complicit. He continues, “techniques conventionally relegated to the realm of monitoring and documentation—but not surveillance proper—mask and reinforce the gendered, sexed, raced, and classed exercise of power” (Andrejevic 2015: xi). These works are part of a growing discourse within surveillance studies, and there is now widespread acknowledgment that any treatment of surveillance must consider the implications for the individual human subject in her social, cultural, and historical context.

Scholarship on surveillance in the arts, however, has been slower to adopt new approaches that address the sociological dimensions of surveillance. In addition to being stuck in panopticism, Zimmer (2015) and others argue that work on surveillance in the arts also needs to move beyond voyeurism as an analytical model:

> Psychoanalytic conceptions of voyeurism and Foucault’s account of panopticicism have dominated explanations of a variety of disparate surveillance-themed narratives, even as discussions of surveillance in other arenas have developed profound engagements between these and other theoretical models. In discussions of cinema in particular, the voyeuristic model has been trenchant. (3)

Zimmer argues, furthermore, that “the forms and functions of [surveillance cinema] narratives exceed the bounds of any single explanatory structure” (4). Indeed, some of the most vital work in surveillance studies in recent years, for instance the many outstanding contributions to Rachel E. Dubrofsky and Shoshana Amielle Magnet’s anthology Feminist Surveillance Studies, are effective specifically because they identify the commonalities and intersections among theories across disciplines.

Using Zimmer’s final sentence above as a point of departure, I plan to demonstrate the efficacy of expanding the theoretical frameworks with which we approach surveillance in the arts by analyzing representations of surveillance, the body, and the male gaze in Stieg Larsson’s Millennium trilogy and the films adapted from them. Larsson’s novels and their filmic adaptations feature three scopic regimes: the state’s surveillance apparatus, the protagonist’s own surveillant gaze, and the male gaze, each of which operates on and through the body of the central character, Lisbeth Salander. The Millennium trilogy conflates these regimes in ways that mirror real-world surveillance practices and uses Salander to dramatize the complex connections between the act of surveillance, gender, and the body. Analyzing them accurately and comprehensively thus requires us not only to break away from the panoptic model but also to bring multiple, interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks to bear on the material. In doing so, the following analysis will demonstrate several specific points. First, we who study surveillance in the arts are not stuck with panopticism and voyeurism. There are other theoretical frameworks that more accurately capture the means and nature of surveillance representations. Second, the conceptions with which we analyze any representation of surveillance should recognize and account for the inherently gendered nature of the gaze rather than perpetuate socially neutral notions of surveillance. My analysis will also demonstrate, however, the fallibility of theorizing femininity in surveillance solely in terms of voyeurism and sexuality. As we shall see, Lisbeth Salander wields her own surveillant gaze in order to subvert the power imposed on her by both state surveillance and the male gaze to achieve political independence, and to construct her own subjectivity. The surveillance representations in the Millennium trilogy, as in so many other texts, demand a theoretically intersectional approach, which is what we will develop over the pages that follow.

Before beginning our analysis, a note on methodology. I began this project concerned only with the representations of Lisbeth Salander’s usage of surveillance in the Swedish film adaptations and by conceptualizing that usage as a form of social and political resistance. A number of things, however, soon caused me to change direction. It quickly became clear that Salander’s use of surveillance is more
complex and more empowering than mere resistance. Her surveillant gaze is both active and reactive, and the intentions that direct it are variant and complicated. Thus, because more than one notion of how surveillant gazes are structured became necessary, I drew from appropriate work in the social sciences as the nature of the gazes at play in these works became clear. One of the things that drew me to these texts initially was the rarity of seeing a feminine character use surveillance as a means of empowerment, which led me to recent work on the intersections between gender and surveillance, in turn radically changing my interpretations of all surveillance representations. I also recognized that any analysis of scopic regimes in the Millennium trilogy that does not include the male gaze would be incomplete. It would be impossible, then, to avoid voyeurism as a theoretical model altogether, particularly in those passages and scenes which are voyeuristic by design. Yet Salander’s unique gender construction, her ability to neutralize or subvert the male gaze, and her conscious manipulation of her gender all necessitated augmenting the usual usages of voyeurism and limiting the scope of its application. Finally, the novels are rich with representations of surveillance and are more responsible for constructing Lisbeth Salander as an international popular figure, so I chose to broaden the texts under analysis to include the novels, treating Salander as a cultural phenomenon rather than just a cinematic representation. My evolving approach became, in a sense, the point itself: rather than trying to fit my analysis into the theories commonly used in the fields in which I work, film and literary studies, I allowed the analysis to direct me toward more appropriate, productive theoretical models.

Perhaps the most distinctive scopic regime represented in the Millennium trilogy is Lisbeth Salander’s surveillant gaze. The introductory images of Salander in the Swedish film adaptation of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (Niels Arden Oplev 2009) are emblematic of how the character is presented in both the novel and film. A brief montage shows Salander (Noomi Rapace) surveilling Mikael Blomkvist (Michael Nyqvist), the investigative journalist around whom the narrative is initially built. She quietly observes him in the courtroom during his trial, follows and photographs him on the street during an intimate moment with Erica Berger (Lena Endre), and hacks into his computer to access all of Blomkvist’s private data, everything from receipts, bank statements, phone records, articles he is writing, research he is conducting, etc. She does all of this because her employer at Milton Security, Dragan Armansky (Michalis Koutsogiannakis), tasked her with generating a report on Blomkvist for Dirch Frode (Ingvar Hirdwall), attorney for the wealthy industrialist Henrik Vanger (Sven-Bertil Taube). The primacy effect of this introduction is to establish Salander as a mysterious figure who is always watching, hidden, tracking Blomkvist’s every activity.

This first impression is confirmed as accurate later in the cinematic narrative and is consistent with her characterization in Larsson’s novel, which establishes more explicitly that surveilling people is one of Salander’s defining traits. She surveils as a hobby, not just as a means of income. She enjoys “digging into the lives of other people and exposing the secrets they were trying to hide. She had been doing it, in one form or another, for as long as she could remember” (Larsson 2008: 264). Many of Salander’s activities fall on the blurry lines between surveillance, hacking, and investigation, and the term surveillance itself is frequently being redefined in response to developments in technology, usage, and law. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly define what we will classify as surveillance for the purposes of this essay.

In his foreword to Feminist Surveillance Studies, Mark Andrejevic (2015) writes, “perhaps the most simple and generic [definition] is that [surveillance] is the coupling of information collection and use with power” (x). Salander’s use of her hacking skills fits this description perfectly, since she is an extraordinarily thorough researcher and deliberately uses information as power. David Lyon (2007) defines surveillance with a bit more precision as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction. Surveillance directs its attention in the end to individuals...this attention to personal details is not random, occasional or spontaneous; it is deliberate” (14). As the Millennium trilogy progresses, Salander’s monitoring of specific individuals and companies goes well beyond investigation, with its limited temporality, to indeed become systematic and
routine. She also wields surveillance in ways that transcend the traditional, vision-based definitions of the term but certainly qualify as systematic monitoring and are just as assuredly expressions of power.

Over the course of the first and second novels, Salander installs surveillance software called Asphyxia on computers owned by Blomkvist, Armansky, Nils Bjurman, and Hans-Erik Wennerström, giving her ongoing access to all of their files and digital accounts. She uses her access to these individual computers as a gateway to monitoring the networks at Millennium magazine, Milton Security, and Wennerström’s company and for particular kinds of information. She and her hacker friend Plague install a “cuff” on the broadband cable into Wennerström’s house, which intercepts all of his communications. She hacks into a police network so she can monitor the course of a murder investigation in which she is the prime suspect. She sometimes even uses her surveillance skills capriciously, such as in The Girl Who Played with Fire, when she responds to a real estate agent’s rudeness by hacking into his firm’s computer network, gathering evidence of 750,000 kronor in income he had not reported, then sending the information to the tax authorities (Larsson 2009: 77). Surveillance informs the narrator’s figurative descriptions of Salander, too. In Dragon Tattoo, Armansky recalls seeing Salander with a group of friends in a café. When he attempts to sneak away unnoticed by her, “she suddenly turned and stared straight at him, as though she had been aware all the time that he was sitting there and had him on her radar. Her gaze had come so surprisingly that it felt like a heart attack” (Larsson 2008: 44). In Played with Fire, the narrator states, “She felt like a radar installation on high alert” (Larsson 2009: 34). Salander is thus the subject of a surveillant gaze of her own making that she uses to monitor everyone with whom she comes into contact or who catches her attention. Surveillance is her primary means of interacting with the world and her source of social power, and she uses the information she collects any time someone violates her moral code or injures the few people to whom she is loyal.

All surveillance regimes, indeed all looking relationships, are inherently gendered, and Salander’s surveillant gaze is no exception. It is gendered by virtue of how rare it is for a popular culture text to represent a woman as the subject in a surveillance regime. Her gaze is not feminine in any of the stereotypical ways in which one might use that adjective, though. It is not passive, defined by her bodily capacities, or transvestic, meaning she does not adopt stereotypically masculine traits while occupying a subjective position that is typically the domain of male characters. Nor is Salander’s gaze voyeuristic, sexually motivated, or panoptic, making it difficult to fit into the dominant theoretical models. We will elaborate on all of these points in the passages that follow.

The other surveillance regime at work in the Millennium trilogy is the state’s surveillance of Salander. Years prior to the beginning of the literary and cinematic narratives, Salander and her mother were abused by her father, and after a particularly vicious attack she attempted to kill him. She was then placed under state care after her mother was deemed unable to care for her. Several other violent incidents followed, and Salander was declared legally incompetent and placed under state guardianship, a legal status “in which the client is relieved of the authority to handle his or her own money or to make decisions regarding various matters” (Larsson 2008: 180). She remains under this form of state surveillance even into adulthood because she “persisted in her refusal to submit to psychiatric examination” (180). Her former guardian, Holger Palmgren, was one of the few people to understand Salander and treat her compassionately. He bent the rules, allowing Salander to “take charge of her own money and her own life…he had treated Salander like any other normal being, and he had not interfered with her choice of lifestyle or friends. He did not think it was either his business or that of society to decide whether the young lady should have a ring in her nose or a tattoo on her neck” (Larsson 2008: 181). However, after Palmgren suffers a heart attack, Salander is assigned to a new guardian, Nils Bjurman, who immediately assumes control over her finances and begins monitoring every aspect of her life. The narrator of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo novel enunciates explicitly the severe political and social implications of legal guardianship: “Taking away a person’s control of her own life—meaning her bank account—is one of the greatest infringements a democracy can impose, especially when it applies to young people. It is an
infringement even if the intent may be perceived as benign and socially valid” (Larsson 2008: 180). In other words, legal guardianship as represented in the *Millennium* trilogy is an extreme, disempowering form of state surveillance. The state’s surveillance apparatus is also distinctly masculine because its initial personification, Bjurman, is a sexual predator. The gender of state surveillance becomes increasingly more pronounced as the trilogy develops.

Given textual elements similar to these, scholars have commonly drawn on panopticism and/or voyeurism as analytical frameworks. However, both theories prove ineffectual or incomplete when applied to the *Millennium* trilogy, as to many other texts. Zimmer accurately states that psychoanalytic voyeurism “makes certain structural assumptions about the existence of a clear subject/object relationship between watcher and watched” (2015: 17). The same is true of panopticism. In the case of Lisbeth Salander, such clarity does not exist. Salander is both watcher and watched because she uses her own surveillance to look back at the state surveillance apparatus. Her use of surveillance is motivated by multiple factors, none of which is voyeuristic desire. She desires, rather, to return the state’s gaze and protect herself. Furthermore, neither voyeurism’s nor panopticism’s visual schemas account for all of the means of surveillance dramatized in the Millennium trilogy. Much of the state’s and Salander’s information is gathered via digital tracking, not visual or auditory means. It is more appropriate to the texts and more productive to consider both surveillant gazes within a theoretical framework founded on the *informatization of the body*, something we will do below. Finally, Zimmer also writes, “voyeuristic desire often emerges in work on surveillance, especially as it appears in cinema, as a given element that underlies other more explicitly constructed political and social formations” (16). As we shall see, the saga of Lisbeth Salander reverses this structure. In her case, complex political and social formations underlie the state’s apparent voyeurism. Viewing surveillance in the *Millennium* trilogy through the lenses of either voyeurism or panopticism does not capture the complexity of the surveillant gazes represented, neither of which can be accurately reduced to the product of voyeuristic desire or the state’s desire for discipline and control.

Any analysis of the Millennium trilogy is also incomplete if it does not integrate the texts’ other scopic regime, the male gaze, which overlaps increasingly with state surveillance and is directed almost constantly at Salander. The male gaze begins to manifest in the novel even before the narrative begins, because its theme of violence against women is foregrounded by the original Swedish title of the first novel and film, *Män som hatar kvinnor* (“Men Who Hate Women”). Larsson also prefaces each part of the novel with a statistic demonstrating the prevalence of men abusing women in Sweden. These elements create a thematic context for specific instances of looking at Salander’s body, which the male characters usually do with some mixture of desire and bemusement.

While Oplev’s filmic introduction of Salander focuses on her surveillance of Blomkvist, Larsson’s novel introduces her through Armansky’s desiring eyes. After briefly complimenting her investigative abilities, Armansky dwells on Salander’s physical appearance at length. Kristen Mollegaard points out that Armansky “describes Salander in a voyeuristic mixture of erotic fascination, gender bias, and middle-class prejudice” (2016: 357). He views her as a “pale, anorexic young woman” and notes the short hair, pierced nose and eyebrows, wasp tattoo on her neck, tattooed loops on her left bicep and left ankle, dragon tattoo on her shoulder blade, and her dyed black hair. He observes, “She looked as though she had just emerged from a week-long orgy with a gang of hard rockers,” then continues his description with, “She had a wide mouth, a small nose, and high cheekbones that gave her an almost Asian look. Her movements were quick and spidery” (Larsson 2008: 32). Salander’s appearance upsets him because she is so out of place within Milton Security and because he is sexually attracted to her in ways he cannot comprehend: “Sometimes she wore black lipstick, and in spite of the tattoos and the pierced nose and eyebrows she was…well…attractive. It was inexplicable” (Larsson 2008: 32).

Armansky’s descriptions initiate a preoccupation with Lisbeth Salander’s body that permeates the trilogy in print and on screen. He is merely the first of many male characters to direct his desiring, mystified gaze
toward Salander. Seemingly every character she encounters is struck by the paradoxical distancing and
attraction provoked by her body. She endures extreme bodily injury too, and she inflicts the same on
others. The early sections of the second novel spend an inordinate amount of time on Salander’s changing
physiognomy, and the narrator discusses her bisexuality and enjoyment of sex in multiple passages. Most
prominently, the history of sexual abuse Salander has endured in the past and the series of rapes that occur
within the narrative are defining events for her character. For English-language readers and viewers, all of
this is framed by the trilogy titles, two of which are not direct translations from the original Swedish and
all of which position her as “the girl,” encouraging the reader to regard her with the same fascination as
the male characters around her. Salander is represented as a character whose body speaks more about her
than she speaks for herself, as a girl rather than a woman, and as the constant object of the male gaze, all
of which contrast with and somewhat undermine Larsson’s broader, feminist agenda of drawing attention
to violence against women. Quoting Laura Mulvey, Mollegaard (2016) writes, “despite the noble intent
and political correctness of this agenda, Larsson ambiguously portrays Salander’s body and her body
modifications as mediated through a ‘determining male gaze,’ which, because it is grounded in
mainstream heteronormative values, blends visual pleasure with violence and unpleasure” (350). The
filmic narrators are likewise guilty of indulging in their own male gaze, but I am concerned here with how
the gaze manifests within the diegesis of the texts.

The characters’ objectification of Salander’s body culminates in a series of three rape scenes. In the first,
Bjurman begins to abuse the power granted him by the state and blackmails Salander into performing
fellatio. This is the moment at which the literary and cinematic texts’ three scopic regimes and their
representations of the body converge. This alone is instructive. We have thus far considered these
representations separately, but they are brought into commonality by their shared, inherent power.

All scopic regimes, including surveillant and male gazes, express power of one nature or another. The
subject of any gaze exerts power over the object of the gaze. This is an uncontested premise in many
disciplines and foundational in both surveillance theory and feminist theory. David Lyon (2007) writes,

> Whatever the purpose of surveillance, to influence, manage, protect or direct, some kind
of power relations are involved. Those who establish surveillance systems generally have
access to the means of including the surveilled in their line of vision, whether that vision
is literal or metaphorical. It is they who keep the records, hold the tapes, maintain the
databases, have the software to do the mining and the capacity to classify and categorize
subjects. Whether it is the massive Department of Homeland Security in the USA or some
rural school board with cameras in buses, power is generated and expressed by
surveillance. Surveillance power may also be wielded by the disempowered, of course.

Lyon’s final statement signifies much about Salander’s use of surveillance and is a point to which we will
return. Mark Andrejevic (2015) writes succinctly of the importance of power to surveillance studies as a
discipline: “The study of surveillance is, of necessity, a study of power relations” (xi). The power
expressed by surveillance regimes ultimately impacts the human body, both mentally and physically, just
as do manifestations of the male gaze.

Laura Mulvey and others have likewise identified the power relations and implications for the body
intrinsic to the male gaze, specifically as it manifests in the cinema. Mulvey writes,

> The man controls the film phantasy and also emerges as the representative of power in a
further sense: as the bearer of the look of the spectator, transferring it behind the screen to
neutralise the extradiegetic tendencies represented by woman as spectacle. This is made
possible through the processes set in motion by structuring the film around a main
controlling figure with whom the spectator can identify. As the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, he projects his look on to that of his like, his screen surrogate, so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic look, both giving a satisfying sense of omnipotence. (2000: 720)

Power is thus a binding principle among theories of the surveillance gaze and the male gaze. When the male gaze precedes an act of rape, as it does in *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*, the impact of that power on the body becomes brutally explicit.

Drawing on theories that account for the impact of surveillance on the body thus proves useful in analyzing the *Millennium* trilogy by providing a more accurate conception of the state’s surveillance gaze and clarifying the nature of the power brought to bear on the body. The state’s surveillance gaze is an instance of the *informatization of the body* as described by Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson. Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) describe surveillance as an assemblage that “operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention” (606). According to Sean Hier, Kirstie Ball, and others, modern surveillance performs this operation “to the end of feeding the information categories on which the surveillance process is based (Hier cited in Ball et al. 2011: 301). As such it is not the identity or subjectivity of the individual that is of interest, rather the data it can yield, the categories to which it can contribute, “which are reapplied to the body as part of [an] ‘influencing and managing’ process” (Ball 2011: 301). In other words, surveillance dehumanizes its objects by transforming them into sets of disembodied personal information, or *data doubles*, wherein the corporeality of the body is translated into information. This abstracted data double is then sorted into certain bureaucratic categories, which in turn determine how the real, embodied individual is treated. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between *forces* and *power*: “Forces consist of more primary and fluid phenomena, and it is from such phenomena that power derives as it captures and striates such flows. These processes coalesce into systems of domination when otherwise fluid and mobile states become fixed into more or less stable and asymmetrical arrangements which allow for some to direct or govern the actions of others” (Haggerty and Ericson 2011: 608-609). The state’s data double of Salander is captured in her official file, which is the basis of the asymmetrical power arrangement between Salander and Bjurman.

Maria Los (2011) argues persuasively that data doubles are the descendants of “the file which was at the centre of the last century’s totalitarian mechanisms of surveillance…Given that both databases and intelligence files contain personal information collected with the aim of serving certain purposes, they represent knowledge that translates into power” (74-75). Los goes on to clarify the nature of that power, writing,

The power of the image of the file goes far beyond the specific knowledge these files may contain. Under totalitarian conditions, the image of a comprehensive, secret, centralized, political surveillance seems to be of a greater importance than the actual information collected. For it to succeed, however, people have to believe that it is the information and not the psychological effect of the act of surveillance that is of crucial value to the authorities. (76)

Los is careful to point out that this interpretation of the data double’s effects on the objects of surveillance should not be read as supportive of the panopticon as a theory:

In general terms, the totalitarian power operates through the individual’s awareness of being known and an implicit assumption that this knowledge is inherently perilous. This may seem to resemble Bentham’s panoptical mechanism, where the subjects, aware that
they are watched, work on themselves to achieve the expected norm. For Bentham, however, the omnipresent watchful eye was to assist individuals to internalize the norm, while in the totalitarian scheme, the system’s eyes operate as an instrument of negating individual subjectivity and agency. The totalitarian gaze, which is arbitrary and predicated on fear, aims not at normalization but at infinite malleability and obedience. If there is a norm, it is not a stable, predictable, positive standard of achievement but, rather, a negative standard of eradication of the self. (76)

The complementary conceptions of the surveillant assemblage, data double, and the file take remarkably concrete shape in the Millennium trilogy. Information about Salander, much of it malicious, sexist diagnoses written by the state’s psychiatrist, Peter Teleborian, flows through the state bureaucracy and coalesces into the file Bjurman has on her. She has been categorized as a mentally incompetent ward of the state, information that manifests as power wielded by Bjurman as her guardian, who seeks the infinite malleability and obedience Los describes.

However, the Millennium trilogy dramatizes how inaccurate the state’s information can be. The discrepancies between the state’s data double of Salander and her true identity emerge during the police department’s investigation into the murders of Bjurman, Dag Svenson, and Mia Johannson, which consumes part three of the novel The Girl Who Played with Fire. The investigators find a connection to Salander at a crime scene, and as soon as they read her file, she logically becomes their prime suspect. Their reasoning is sound given the data they have at their disposal, but as Armansky puts it, “Files are one thing. People are something else” (Larsson 2009: 252). The central problem for the police investigators is the dissimilarity between the psychological subject constructed by state files and the descriptions given by Armansky, Blomkvist, and Miriam Wu. Inspector Bublanski spells out his dilemma to Blomkvist: “I had the impression that this Lisbeth Salander was a mentally ill girl who hadn’t even finished school and who was under guardianship. Now you tell me that you trusted her as an exceptional researcher, that she has her own business, and that she earned enough money to take a year off and travel around the world, all without her guardian sounding the alarm” (Larsson 2009: 254). Bublanski reiterates the problem later when speaking with his colleague Sonja Modig: “According to the paperwork she is a developmentally disabled near-psychopath. According to the two men who have worked with her, she’s a skilled researcher. That’s a huge discrepancy” (Larsson 2009: 290). Note Bublanski’s gendered disparagement when he refers to her as a “girl” even though he knows she is in her twenties. The state’s inaccuracies are exacerbated by an unmistakable sexism.

Bjurman also misconstrues the information in Salander’s file, with dire consequences to Salander and to himself. Like all of the men she encounters, Bjurman is inexplicably attracted to her. He recalls his initial interactions with her in The Girl Who Played with Fire: “Stockholm’s district court had declared Salander legally incompetent. He had been assigned to be her guardian, which made her inescapably dependent on him. From the first time he met her he fantasized about her. He could not explain it, but she seemed to invite that response” (Larsson 2009: 35). Bjurman thus misreads Salander’s body and her file, and believes he has “control over her life; she was his to command” (35). The narrator recounts Bjurman’s thought processes as he decided to rape her:

She had a record that robbed her of credibility if she ever had a mind to protest. Nor was [his raping her] a rape of some innocent—her file confirmed that she had had many sexual encounters, could even be regarded as promiscuous…In Bjurman’s eyes the conclusion was straightforward: Salander was a whore at the bottom of the social scale. It was risk free…She was the ideal plaything—grown-up, promiscuous, socially incompetent, and at his mercy. (Larsson 2009: 36)
Consider the two subjectivities formed over the course of this process. One is the state’s wildly inaccurate construction of Salander’s subjectivity. The other is the subjectivity of the state’s surveillance apparatus itself, which is represented as misogynistic and fallacious—and moreover, fallacious largely because of its misogyny.

The state’s profile of Salander also exemplifies a discrepancy in how male and female bodies tend to be conceptualized, a phenomenon Kirstie Ball and others have observed. Males tend to be abstracted into psychological subjects while women are defined largely in terms of their bodies, or how they are other or exceptional relative to men. Ball (2011) writes, “traditional sociology [tends to] over-corporealize women…to explain women in terms of bodily capacities of sex, sexuality and reproduction, affording them little sociality” (303). Bjurman’s selection of Salander as prey is a cruel example of this tendency. His actions, though, are merely a hyperbolic representation of how the surveillance gaze routinely becomes gendered. As Haggerty observes, “the fact that most operators are male often transforms ostensible security devices into a form of technological gendered objectification” (Haggerty 2011: 33). The Millennium trilogy lends credence to both observations by making the influence of gender on the intent of the gaze, on the processes of informatization and social sorting, and on the usage of power painfully explicit.

Charlotte Epstein, meanwhile, offers a different means of conceptualizing subjectivity which is particularly useful for developing a more complete understanding of Salander’s subjectivity. Epstein argues for the centrality of the body in conceptions of privacy and political subjecthood. She writes, “The body serves to articulate two different perspectives on the subject, the political subject on the one hand, the member of the polity in classical political theoretical terms, and the psychoanalytic subject on the other, understood in the Lacanian sense as a speaking, desiring subject” (Epstein 2016: 29-30). We see Salander’s subjecthood violated on both levels by Bjurman and the entire state surveillance apparatus. Epstein observes that “the private body removed from the sovereign’s gaze is the grounding for our political agency in the very constitution of the modern polity” (37). Salander’s desire to exist unseen is both a psychological need and a means of political agency. The most valuable thing Palmgren provided Salander was invisibility from state surveillance, and even before Bjurman physically violates her, he robs her of this political agency by instituting the strictest possible guardianship rules. Mollegaard (2016) summarizes insightfully: “As a ward of the state, Salander’s body does not fully belong to herself, and consequently her body is not a private space, but subject to state control, medical and psychiatric (mis)diagnosis, and sensationalist media scrutiny as the trial makes evident” (355). When Bjurman then uses his state-sanctioned authority over Salander to rape her, it is simultaneously a violation of her physical, psychological, and political subjectivity.

The second time Bjurman rapes Salander, his actions take on more brutality, and the intersections among the surveillant and male gazes become even more complex. Salander initiates this meeting because she needs money and because she plans to videotape Bjurman’s next physical assault on her, which she expects to again be forced oral sex. Instead, Bjurman assaults her much more violently. It is difficult to conceive of a more vicious dramatization of the gendered nature of surveillance or of how the state’s surveillance gaze or the male gaze can impact the body.

However, this scene also demonstrates Lyon’s (2007) point that “[s]urveillance power may…be wielded by the disempowered,” because Salander’s surveillant gaze is at work, too (23). She captures the entire, terrifying incident via a digital video camera hidden in her bag. She had planned to use the video to blackmail Bjurman. After he assaults her as he does, though, she devises a more elaborate plan. During a third meeting, at Bjurman’s home, Salander tases, strips, binds, and rapes him with his own dildo. She forces him to watch the video of himself raping her, thus using surveillance footage of Bjurman’s attack as a means of punishing and establishing disciplinary power over him. She then tattoos, “I am a sadistic pig, pervert, and a rapist” on Bjurman’s chest. Salander essentially does a bit of her own social sorting based
on information she alone possesses, labeling Bjurman with tattoos that mirror hers. Inscribing this on his body effectively prevents Bjurman from having intimate contact with other women, itself a form of surveillant control, and she makes it clear that from now on, Bjurman will be under her constant surveillance.

We should be clear about the multiplicity of meanings communicated by this pivotal scene. Salander’s actions constitute a form of resistance to surveillance and a reversal of a defining power dynamic in the narrative up to that point. However, what Salander does goes beyond resistance or a reversal of either the state’s surveillance gaze or the male gaze. Mollegaard (2016) elucidates:

> When Salander rapes Bjurman, quite symbolically with his own dildo and thus usurping the phalus, it is tempting to assume that the sexual imbalance Mulvey analyzes has been balanced out, so it is now the active/female torturing the passive/male. However, this is not the case. Bjurman acted on his sexual desire for Salander’s body, on his reading of her punk attire and body art as signs of sexual perversions, and on his confidence in his own phallic power (as a man, a lawyer, and her legal guardian). Salander, on the other hand, is a rape avenger. Her attack on Bjurman is not motivated by sexual desire for him. (362)

I would argue that this scene is more complex, though. It is true Bjurman may have initially acted on sexual desire, but his rape of Salander is about power more than anything. Mollegaard herself writes, “as a social act, rape is about power, not sex” (363). Salander’s rape of Bjurman is undoubtedly an act of revenge; however, more than anything, she seeks a means of controlling her guardian and of regaining her political and psychological subjectivity, the agency Epstein describes above. She also seeks to exert self-negating power over Bjurman similar to what she has endured.

She succeeds thoroughly on all counts. A passage in The Girl Who Played with Fire novel describes the effect of Salander’s actions on Bjurman:

> During the almost two years since then, Bjurman’s life had changed dramatically. After Salander’s nighttime visit to his apartment he had felt paralyzed—virtually incapable of clear thought or decisive action. He had locked himself in, did not answer the telephone, and was unable even to keep up contact with his regular clients. After two weeks he went on sick leave…Every day he was confronted by the tattoo on his body. Finally he took down the mirror from the bathroom door. He returned to his office at the beginning of summer. He had handed over most of his clients to his colleagues. The only ones he kept for himself were companies for whom he dealt with legal business correspondence without being involved in meetings. His only active client now was Salander—each month he wrote up a balance sheet and a report for the Guardianship Agency. He did very precisely what she had demanded: the reports had not a grain of truth in them and made plain that she no longer needed a guardian. Each report was an excruciating reminder of her existence, but he had no choice. (Larsson 2009: 37)

By establishing surveillance over Bjurman, she seizes control over him personally and regains her invisibility from state surveillance, and thus her political agency. Via Bjurman’s reports, she also begins to change the state’s files and resumes control over her own psychological subjectivity.

From that moment on, she becomes an increasingly empowered character, free to move and manage her finances as she chooses, and that power is signified consistently by acts of surveillance. She buys a new computer and returns to surveilling Blomkvist, hacking into his computer to monitor his activities and scan his files. She soon begins assisting him with the Harriet Vanger investigation and quickly makes connections that Blomkvist and Gustav Morell, the original detective, had overlooked. She and Blomkvist
establish that a serial killer murdered Harriet and five other women. After someone shoots at Blomkvist, Salander installs surveillance cameras around the inside and outside of their cabin. She ultimately solves the case by scanning the Vanger Corporation’s financial records and determining which of the Vangers were in each city at the time of each murder, pinpointing Martin Vanger as the killer. Meanwhile, Martin traps Blomkvist in his killing room. Salander races back to the cabin and scans surveillance footage to find Martin has taken Blomkvist, then she saves Blomkvist’s life. Salander then uses her skills to prove Wennerstrom’s guilt. Fittingly, one of the last images we see of Salander in Oplev’s film of Dragon Tattoo comes via surveillance footage.

Salander continues using surveillance throughout the remaining trilogy to defend herself and subvert the power structure imposed on her by the state. Her final use of surveillance as well as her ultimate subversion comes during the climactic trial in The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet’s Nest when she appears in court dressed in hyperbolic punk attire. She essentially wears the costume of the subject constructed by the state’s files. This act is a reminder that Salander is fully aware of how the state views her and is yet another intersection of surveillance and gender. Mollegaard (2016) claims,

Salander’s ability to treat gender identity as a mask is her most subversive social act, far more rebellious than computer hacking and seeking revenge over her individual tormenters, because her parody exposes gender identity as a signifying practice, not as a natural condition. In other words, as much as her encounters with misogynistic villains symbolize the backlash against women that feminism is believed to have produced in mainstream culture, her agency and her ability to self-fashion her body highlight the possibility of a reconfiguration of the female body despite the continuing oppression of masculine discourses. (356)

Salander’s masquerade transcends issues of gender identity, however. By physically hyperbolizing the data double the state has constructed of her, she undermines its validity. Her verbal statements in court then deconstruct it entirely. Mollegaard concludes that Salander “cannot control the dominant discourse that holds her as a ward of the state and hence as the object of its surveillance and gaze” (364). Yet that is precisely what she accomplishes via her blackmailing, tattooing, and monitoring of Bjurman, her use of surveillance, and finally her performance in the courtroom, which results in her emancipation from the state. Her actual bodily presence and demonstration of her true mental abilities in the center, as it were, of the state’s surveillance apparatus overturn the power the state wielded over her once and for all.

The preceding analysis hopefully demonstrates several points, chief among them the value of using theoretically intersectional methodologies. Considering the interactions among the male gaze and the surveillant gazes at work in the texts and acknowledging the gendered nature of surveillance are crucial to a full understanding of the representations in the Millennium trilogy. That understanding could only be reached, however, by integrating the informatization of the body model developed by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) with theories that account for the gendered aspects of the representations. Those theories do include voyeurism, but its usefulness proved limited since it is not the sole or true impetus of the state’s surveillance gaze. Nor does it explain Lisbeth Salander’s gaze, which is motivated by the need to combat the effects of the state’s data double of her and to reclaim her own political subjectivity. These desires should not be considered the exclusive domain of masculinity. Charlotte Epstein’s conception of subjecthood therefore proved more useful in explaining Salander’s gaze than thinking of it as resistance to state surveillance or basing our thinking on traditionally stereotypical notions of feminine subjecthood. Representations of surveillance, like surveillance itself, are multifaceted phenomena and cannot be fully explained by individual theoretical models. My approach is based on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of theory, which Haggerty and Ericson (2000) describe as approaching “theory not as something to genuflect before, but as a tool kit from which to draw selectively in light of the analytical task at hand”
We scholars of surveillance in the arts must broaden our tool kits and draw on theories that fit the task at hand rather than continuing to shape our analyses to fit the dominant theories of our disciplines.

**References**


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