Abstract
This paper sets up a framework to assess how purportedly passive state surveillance comprises an infrastructure of active racialization. Frantz Fanon’s concept of “racial phobogenics,” or the process of making a raced body into an object of anxiety, can be useful for scholarship at the intersection of communication, race, data, security, policing, affect, and biopolitics. To read how local state surveillance justifies the aggregation of data by means of phobogenics, I analyzed 120 hours of field observations and conducted fourteen interviews from June 2017 to March 2018 in one US Homeland Security Fusion Center, part of the integrated intelligence system and national security strategy after 9/11. I argue that Fusion Centers’ use of “situational awareness,” the trained ability to know what is deemed “suspicious” in everyday life, fuses race or taxonomizes what is out of place and what is inflammatory according to nonconscious racializing affects. I therefore urge for a critical scholarship that attends to “prelogical rationality and affectivity” (Fanon 1986: 133) as exercises of power.

Introduction
This paper offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the anxiety-based racialization of suspects as part of the routine operation of US Homeland Security Fusion Centers. Such a framework will detail that racism, the rendering of raced bodies as out of place, is an immanent part of the melding of police, military, and national security intelligence. Toward cultivating a horizontal consciousness of information that augments war operations and domestic policing, the seventy-nine current Fusion Centers in the United States combine older technologies like on-the-ground human intelligence collection and Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) paper forms with newer technologies like online watch centers, spatial mapping technology, data-mining algorithms, and information networks. The US Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security define fusion as the process of “turning information and intelligence into actionable knowledge” (US Department of Justice and US Department of Homeland Security 2008). The Department of Justice re-conceptualized national security post-9/11 to better integrate law enforcement with homeland security and facilitate partnership between military and nonmilitary intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is a direct result of this push. Like Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Center (see Monaghan and Walby 2012) and the incorporation of “Multi-Issue Extremism” schemes in British counterterrorism (see Harbisher 2015), NSI configures terrorism in a threat matrix that often targets dissent and protest and includes detailed procedures for categorizing the nature of suspicious threats.

Surveillance scholars have pointed out how Fusion Centers, the intelligence centers that process SARs, disproportionately target racial minorities for surveillance (Regan, Monahan, and Craven 2015; Newkirk 2010; Reeves 2017), but it has yet to be theorized why the Fusion Centers’ data aggregation is racializing itself. For instance, when a center analyst uses the search terms “Praise Allah” to mine social media data,
open leads, and add to existing cases, how might we explain that the very accumulation of information is part of a structure of racism? How do we best account for racializing surveillance as data aggregation so as to properly understand what Fusion Centers are engaged in? This paper offers one answer: the information network built for the surveillance of “suspicious” objects or subjects is founded on racial anxiety.

Frantz Fanon’s insights about “racial phobogenics” are useful for scholarship at the intersection of communication, race, data, security, policing, affect, and biopolitics (Foucault 2007; on Fanon’s surveillance by the FBI, see Browne 2015: 1–30). Phobogenics is the rhetorical process of making a raced body into an object of anxiety such that the body becomes fixed, meaning paralyzed from agentic movements—a phenomenon Fanon (1986: 34) defines as “lapsing into non-being.” While Fanon (1986: 34) seems to alternate between fear and anxiety as “aversive sensations,” he defines phobogenics as the reduction of a raced body to an object of anxiety (see Wynter 2001: 52). In other words, a raced body is an unsettler of objects. The body becomes a moving target, a target because it can move. This body is accused of upending the capacity of those integrated into whiteness to feel settled in time and space. In Black Skin, White Masks (1986) Fanon describes the positionality of black men, particularly with regard to French colonialization of the Caribbean, yet his discussion of racial phobogenics has wider applicability. According to Sylvia Wynter (2001: 31; italics in the original), Fanon’s works explore “what it is like to be, human.” The experiencing of what it is like to be human or dip below that threshold is an effect of how discourses create and manipulate subjectivities and affects. Fusion Centers codify racial phobogenics by housing phobogenic relations in institutional infrastructures (Wynter 2001: 60).

To read the extent to which fusion aggregates data by means of phobogenics, I closely read 120 hours of field observations and fourteen interviews conducted over the course of ten months (June 2017 to March 2018) in one Fusion Center in a moderately-sized US city in Texas.1 The Fusion Center is a local center that includes detectives, a crime monitoring team of police officers and military liaisons, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) liaisons, gang units, civilian data analysts, and a director. In order to see the extent to which practices of this center were reflected nationally, I conducted an additional thirty hours of observations during a three-day National Fusion Association Convention from November 7–9, 2017 in Alexandria, Virginia.2 I detail my fieldwork methodology below. While these data are limited to one center—and each center is different—it provides a telling snapshot into an oft-hidden analytic process. Most importantly, the findings herein—and their verification across fusion sites nationally—call into question the modus operandi of fusion: an affective infrastructure of transversal hypersensitivity to suspicious objects and bodies.

One critical task of a project concerned with the racial phobogenics of data policing is to question the essentializing creation of data skins, or digital epidermises. Simone Browne (2015: 109), building from Fanon, defines “digital epidermalization” as the imposition of race that converts a raced body into data. Digital epidermalization is one means of enacting “racializing surveillance,” which Browne (2015: 16) defines as the monitoring of racialized bodies that renders them out of place and leads to their discriminatory treatment. Browne provides the example of biometric data, such as fingerprint data, retina scans, and facial recognition, which are gathered and sorted according to prototypical whiteness. Strategies of capture to maintain transatlantic slavery predate these technologies. As Pauline Wakeham (2008: 22) writes, the consequence of digital epidermalization is that an “embodied subjectivity is dissected and reduced to a constructed ‘skin,’ or a synthetic, hollow shell, that is overwritten by the nefarious taxonomies undergirding white supremacy.” Taxonomies are systems of classification. They convert racist behaviors into the procedural work of data analysis and, in so doing, abrogate fusion’s responsibility for the reproduction of racial difference. For Wakeham (2008: 23), these “chromatics of skin” within taxonomies are not just visual but corporeal, that is, “semiotic, somatic, and affective” within systems of biopower, the control over life.

---

1 The notes and interviews total 416 pages of double-spaced, typed text.
2 The notes total thirty pages of double-spaced, typed text.
at the level of population. Digital epidermalization and racial phobogenics go hand in hand because the aggregation of anxiety on suspicious bodies further vacates those bodies of their embodiment.

In this paper, I argue that “situational awareness” taxonomizes race. “Situational awareness” is the trained ability respond to suspicious behavior and share the information with relevant parties practiced by Fusion Centers (The Bureau of Justice Assistant 2008; National Fusion Center Association 2014). “Situational awareness” taxonomies are affective, meaning they are redundant aggregations of anxiety surrounding phobic objects that become procedural replications or built into the interoperations of intelligence work. “Situational awareness” is a pedagogy of abnormal behavior. Fieldwork can provide an image of the biopolitics of fusing race, a system of intelligence about a suspicious species that installs racial phobogenics and makes race an object that law enforcement and homeland security can act upon. I outline how the biopolitics of fusing race has three features: an affective prelogic of phobogenics; continuous, trained installation of the prelogic; and regulation over the dosage of public anxiety. This study raises the question: Can the lateral surveillance of suspiciousness under the aegis of “situational awareness” ever become decoupled from racialization? In other words, is the cultivation of “situational awareness” an inherently racializing practice under our current threat matrix?

To answer, I first outline how biopolitics and phobogenics relate. The theorization of these concepts together, first, provides a theoretical tool to read racial dynamics in security studies and, second, helps analyze how biopolitical exercises of power operate through affect within settings overdetermined to be read as exercises of pure reason such as intelligence work. I then outline the method of fieldwork in greater detail. After doing so, I analyze the affective taxonomies of “situational awareness” within fusion: what is out of place and what is inflammatory. These taxonomies illuminate the biopolitics of fusing race along with its three predominant features. I end by considering the extent to which “situational awareness” can become uncoupled from its contemporary governance-structure.

### Biopolitics and Phobogenics

For Michel Foucault (2007: 44–55), biopolitics is a mode of power that proceeded from and was integrated with disciplinary power in at least three respects. First, rather than confine individuals in prison structures, biopolitics proliferates detainment-effects throughout the entire social field. Second, rather than target individuals, biopolitics’s object is the “species body,” the population. Third, rather than confine an individual to one set identity, biopolitics engages in continual assessment and change in whom subjects could become (45–45) (or Deleuze’s “dividuals” of “control societies,” Deleuze 1992: 3–7).

In much of the scholarship following on Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, theories of biopolitics are “taken up without its explicit grounding in racism,” according to Arun Saldanha (2012: 7). In recent years, biopolitics have been rethought along the lines of racial difference, or how “racial difference in itself... persists as a biocultural, biopolitical force amid other forces” (Saldanha 2012: 8; italics in the original). In addition to Arun Saldanha, Simone Browne (2015), Mel Y. Chen (2012), Jasbir Puar (2007; 2017), Kyla Schuller (2018), and Alexander Weheliye (2014) theorize biopolitics and race, which means departing from how Foucault and Deleuze articulate discipline, biopower, and control. Rather than rely on the exemplar of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon to theorize discipline and control, as Foucault does in Discipline and Punish (1977), Browne’s (2015) reinterpretation of power diagnostics positions the Brooks slave ship as an example of surveillant capture. Browne interrogates how the slave ship, as a floating prison, prefigures the panopticon and so shows how racism is an organizing logic for the terms surveillance studies inherits from Foucault (discipline, control, docility normalization). Browne opens surveillance studies “to think creatively about what happens if we center the conditions of blackness when we theorize surveillance” (33). Such re-centering has far-reaching effects for how we theorize discipline and biopolitics, not least of which is

---

3 Weheliye argues for abandoning biopolitics discourse in favor of “racializing assemblages.” I follow Saldanha in theorizing racial difference as a biocultural element in the exercise of power—hence, why I operate along the lines of biopolitics.
shifting practices of citation to recognize the contributions of black feminism and ethnic studies and under-and ill-considered bodies in history. Additionally, Browne’s revivalization illuminates how racism is endemic to discipline and biopolitics and that these modes of power, whether hard or soft, often aim toward racial capture. Schuller (2018: 50) explains that racism’s logic is to preserve the health of a population by “managing the variability of the species as it evolves by regulating the interactions among species’ members.” Racism makes race one of the social determinants of who is allowed to live and who is subjected to premature death, often through strategies of capture.

Even though Fanon works along psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic lines, his notion of “phobogenics” is useful for analyzing race in the context of biopolitics and security. Racial phobogenics are premised on continual failures of a self to gather itself together in a unity in the face of white supremacy and so the self becomes unfixed from its introspection and imposition. He puts Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler in conversation to describe foundational misalignments of a self: “I am willing to work on the psychoanalytical level—in other words, the level of the ‘failures,’ in the sense in which one speaks of engine failures” (Fanon 1986: 23). According to David Marriott’s (2011: 50) reading of Fanon, self-invention is a “kind of stricture (or endless deferral and compulsion).” A subject is made “black insofar as, paradoxically, it grasps its own impossible whiteness” (Marriott 2011: 60). This describes the affective bribe of whiteness: the hope that one can become human by becoming white, thus promising to alleviate anxious sidestepping between identity-masks. Phobogenesis has to do with the becoming of anxieties, or how anxieties secure anxious relations between bodies. It can therefore explain how security and surveillance practices operate through affective means while insisting on foregrounding analysis of their racializing, or even racist, effects.

Fanon (1986) writes that the phobic racial body is integrated into an epidermal racial schema. The epidermal schema is, as the name indicates, dermal. Its set of affordances and constraints work at the level of the skin and, according to Fanon, below the skin. The fixed look of whiteness gets under black skin through “introjection and imposition” (Marriott 2011: 85). Saldanha (2010: 2412) defines this representation as “a pattern of behavior, a set of capabilities and constraints dividing people on the basis of their skin color into two separate worlds: white colonizer or black Arab native.” Later, Browne (2015) usefully translates the language of epidermalization to a digital surveillance context (see also Noble 2018). Digital epidermalization is the process of introjection and imposition, stripping bodies of humanness qua an-other, through data categorization (Browne 2015: 109). Biometric technologies that scan traces of people’s identities (facial features) at borders are part and parcel of racializing surveillance. They render bodies that do not meet the thresholds of personhood or citizenship waylaid, delayed, and denied.

Whether digital or non-digital, the schema’s “complex system of coercions and complicities” is an aggregation of affect, “affects adding up” (Saldanha 2010: 2411, 2412). The aggregation of anxious affects between “natives” and “colonizers” operates below critical registers as, “it keeps both native and colonizer anxiously preoccupied with the impossibilities of their position towards each other. The former is doomed to incompleteness and envy—the latter to self-destructive decadence and paranoia” (Saldanha 2011: 2413). Affective aggregation installs epidermal schemas below conscious reach: “like all power relations, racism operates first of all through the materialities of desire and landscape far ‘below’ any mental or linguistic detectability” (Saldanha 2010: 7). In what follows, I explore the ways affective taxonomies related to race, including indicators of what is suspicious and what is inflammatory, become embedded in surveillance infrastructures such as Fusion Centers.

Data and Method

Access to Fusion Centers is challenging, and this study’s persistent efforts to acquire access offer invaluable lessons (see Monahan and Fisher 2015). All seven centers in Texas considered allowing me to engage in observations and interviews as I doggedly pursued entry. Ultimately, one center decided to sign the paperwork to allow me to engage in fieldwork. I submitted my information to the center for a criminal background check because the center has “security” level clearance. I also elected to make my social media private so that the center directors would not make assumptions about my political leanings. Access has to
do with positionality, especially the extent to which a research subject can signal that she is non-threatening. As the sole researcher for the fieldwork, I engaged in emotional performances to preserve access, such as remaining friendly and available, maintaining flat affect, and refusing to disclose my political opinions.

Observations in the center involved walking around the center and taking written notes as well as sitting with analysts as they performed work functions and explained their work aloud. Interviewees were asked privately if they would be willing to sit for an interview. I recorded thirteen interviews and transcribed one interview by hand. The interviews averaged one hour in length, and I used four interview guides that were provided to interviewees ahead of the interviews. I interviewed one director, one high-level staff member with director-like responsibilities, one supervisor of a watch center, two data analysts (one specializing in social media and the other specializing in Suspicious Activity Report processing), one project manager, one event surveillance coordinator, three police officers, one FBI liaison, one military liaison, and two detectives. These are common positions in local Fusion Centers in Texas. Most of the research subjects interviewed were in their forties, though a handful of subjects were between twenty-five and thirty-five. I interviewed two women and twelve men. The center’s staff at the time was mostly male and white and my sample reflected this. Out of the fourteen interviewees, two interviewees were black, four were Hispanic, and one was Asian-American. The remaining seven were white.

To see the extent to which practices were reflected nationally, I attended a three-day National Fusion Association Convention in Alexandria, Virginia from November 7–9, 2017. During the conference, I had the chance to speak to a number of Texas Fusion Center personnel and see presentations by Texas Fusion Center employees, including one by the director of the Suspicious Activity Reporting program for the state. The conference is a key access point for research of opaque state practices because it was there that Fusion Center workers were much more willing to speak to me openly. There are a few reasons for this openness: They knew I had prior experience studying the fusion community because I was at the conference; their inhibitions were lowered by the conference’s open bar; and the setting allowed them to share knowledge about what they do and why it matters. The conference included keynote presentations by Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security Michael McCaul, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Jennifer Boone, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Lieutenant General Michael Nagata, and Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Their presence shows the extent to which fusion is an inimical part of national security strategy to generate cross-national “situational awareness.” As I show in the next section, “situational awareness” is a series of congealed affective taxonomies of racial anxiety concerning what is out of place and what is inflammatory.

Affective Taxonomies of “Situational Awareness”

“Situational awareness” is a psychological term found in behavioral cognitive science that denotes mental consciousness of relevant information within a situation. The US military cultivates “situational awareness” to enhance military readiness and intelligence. In domestic homeland security intelligence, “situational awareness” means having “an accurate understanding of what is happening on the ground” by integrating data and surveillance networks (Monahan 2010: 38; see Berkowitz 2008). One of the goals of the “National Strategy for Fusion Centers” for 2014–2017 was to increase situational awareness efforts: “Increase the overall connectivity between Fusion Centers and the federal government to strengthen analytic and information sharing capabilities and enhance situational awareness through collaborative efforts to protect the homeland” (National Fusion Center Association 2014: 13).

While the ACLU undercut the extent to which Fusion Centers could use live video feeds and facial recognition technology on videos, Fusion Centers host myriad databases and personnel are permitted access to databases hosted on private servers on an ad hoc basis, depending on partnerships between Fusion Centers and technology companies. Centralized databases are, in Browne’s (2009: 136) words, “techniques for knowing the body and behavioral traits through the accumulation of records.” A database’s identity documents “fragment individuals... into body components and features (sex, height, hair color, eye color...) ... for the purposes of reading, sorting, or categorizing the body, and sometimes for profiling and
preemption” (137). Fusion databases are digital elaborations of older paper police dossiers and profiles and they are extensive. Fusion workers communicate with each other via emails, a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), COPLINK, and Guardian databases (a threat-tracking system with different FBI and fusion-level programs, which replaced the controversial TALON Intelligence Program) (see Pincus 2007). The extent of access to databases and data repositories is difficult to track. However, at the national fusion conference in November 2017, one Fusion Center director in Texas boasted of hosting thirty databases within his Fusion Center.

Situational awareness, the collective consciousness provided by these databases, is hardly relegated to shared cognitive functions. In analyzing my observations and interviews, I isolate the taxonomies of hypersensitive anxiety that comprise “situational awareness.” These hypersensitivities revolve around, first, what is out of place and, second, what is inflammatory. I explore these taxonomies through particular fusion technologies: SARs, datamining, social media monitoring, and statistical analysis. If classificatory systems for terrorism deliberately fuse information about multiple groups and issues (Harbisher 2015; Monaghan and Walby 2012; Monahan 2009), we would do well to explore how the classifications thus permit the creep and spread of cultural phobias. Classification systems allow safe passage for the expression of racial anxiety and allow raced bodies to be imbued as phobogenic objects. In Saldanha’s (2010) terms, they allow for the aggregation of anxiety. While these taxonomies in question predate Fusion Centers, these affective taxonomies become the interoperations of intelligence through nationwide installation of Fusion Centers—an installation likely to continue.

What is Out of Place

I argue here that Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are digital skins for racial minorities that fix them in the sense that law enforcement can keep tabs on racialized bodies with greater ease and with more longitudinal methods. The affective taxonomy of SARs is hypersensitivity to missing terroristic threats in myriad categories of criminal activity. As my observations and interviews indicate, anxieties about missing threats concentrate around racialized objects, namely Orientalized objects (Said 1981). The affective taxonomy of hypersensitivity shows that the affective economy of threat surrounding Middle Eastern and South Asian nationalities as well as Muslims is embedded in intelligence infrastructures (see Ahmed 2004). Embeddedness is an effect. Fusion spreads responsibility for judging the credibility of threats to the JTTF and the FBI. Contrary to their spoken role of vetting out racial stereotypes—a common fusion refrain—fusion allows safer passage for racial anxieties between residents, police, and security personnel. The anxious lateral surveillance of, “If You See Something, Say Something,” is made to be a well-oiled machine; the anxiety of threat gets pushed to higher authorities where it can take on a more fixed position. Even when analysts in the particular center I studied knew the report is based on a racial stereotype, they pass the information along to others in case it could be credible.

Regan, Monahan, and Craven (2015) write that it is rather shocking that Fusion Centers still rely on SARs, given that they are relatively anachronistic. The reports are slow to fill out, provide general knowledge, and lack clear indicators of suspicious behavior. They do initiate circuits of follow-up with residents and police to see if the initial reporter has any more detailed or actionable information to provide, such as a photograph of a vehicle. SARs range in terms of suspicious activity categories; there are typically more than ten categories for suspicious behavior on SARs (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Surveillance scholars know little about how SARs invite racial profiling, but one audit of LA County indicated that they disproportionately targeted racial minorities (see Reeves 2017: 155–159). Within the SARs, abbreviations were used for the racial makeup of suspects. Through SARs, police or resident suspicion is transferred to Fusion Centers and, after vetting, transferred to semi-permanent databases. The report sits there in case the information can become useful within the five years the Fusion Center is allowed to hold it (Texas Fusion Center 2011).
In Texas, police can submit SARs through an online portal and residents can submit SARs through an online application or on the Texas Department of Public Safety website (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In 2016, there were 2,347 reports filed into the TX DPS sites in the SARN statewide (Quinney 2017). Of these, 1,173 were categorized under “pre-operational surveillance.” The second highest number was 430 for “drug/narcotic offenses” and the third highest was 279 for “alien smuggling.” Using the SAR Data Repository, SAR analysts provide real-time data analytics (Figure 3: SAR analysts can map patterns spatially and temporally. At the national fusion conference, the director of the SAR program statewide provided a success story that involved working with a Walmart in Texas to disrupt a criminal pattern in late 2014. Digital analytic systems like COPLINK provide detailed pattern visualization, such as when suspects (labeled as Person 10 and Person 11) showed up at the parking lot in Walmart and when two suspects appeared together. In Texas, tips also come in through Crime Stoppers through which residents could get paid for providing tips. As a supervisor recounts: “We’ll vet that information. We might even get our investigators involved. And then they will go out to validate information.” Mission creep, the responsibility of Fusion Center staff to perform a variety of monitoring activities, means that they obtain SARs related to a range of activity (see Monahan and Palmer 2009).

---


**Figures 1.1 and 1.2:** One model of law enforcement SARs reporting, pages one and two. Police Records Request W164861-041617, May 12, 2017.
The intelligence value of SARs has been called into question numerous times by others writing about Fusion Centers (see Graphia-Joyal 2010; Stalcup 2015), yet one predominant reason it should continue to be questioned is how it acts as a form of digital epidermalization per phobogenics. Through lateral surveillance under, “If You See Something, Say Something,” the embodied presences of individuals and populations are data skins. Police and security procedures can supersede ownership over one’s “own” skin and so can downplay the terrorizing effects of racial profiling as part of the job. Joshua Reeves (2017: 139) writes, “Given the ambiguous signs of terrorism that circulate among the public, the intelligence value of lateral surveillance is more dubious than ever.” I discuss two examples of dubious digital epidermalization inspired by phobogenics.

In the first case, I observed in my field notes police officers in the Fusion Center watch center discuss an event for which another officer later made an SAR:

[A fusion] police officer... heard murmurings of “Islamic paperwork” that was found at a bus station. “Some Islamic writing or whatever”—a worker had to email people at the FBI or JTTF to alert them. Maybe an hour after these murmurings, a[no]ther police officer, who these four men have not met, it seems, brings in the paperwork in question. There are two copies of The Qu’ran. When explaining why he brought the materials in, the cop explains “The Qu’ran, ok whatever,” and seems interested in the odd addresses on the recovered letters. He says there’s some “crazy stuff in there” “some weird stuff is going on”—and believes the individual who the letters belong to might be trying to “recruit” others. Recruit for what? I wonder... Another agent, who I later learn likes watching the live camera footage from around the building because he “got into it,” suggests there might have been cameras in the Greyhound station where the letters were found. The police officer keeps repeating that he does not even know if the person to whom the items belong was even present at the scene.
The police officer momentarily deactivates anxiety surrounding the Qu’ran (“ok whatever”) but, curiously, the threat-event first reached the Fusion Center as “Islamic paperwork.” The suspicions find a taxonomized category (“Islamic”) around which absences, pseudonyms, and murmurs can cling. Anxiety builds. A case is opened. And the case can remain open for at least five years.

In the second case, a police officer filed a Suspicious Activity Report over a homeless man’s machete that the police officer reported had “Arabic writing” on the side. As a fusion analyst explained to me, the data analysts at the Fusion Center realized the phrase on the machete was in Kurdish. The analysts’ contextualized the written phrase because they believed it to be a common cultural phrase. They explained to me their logic: that violence is part of the Kurdish culture where they “cut off hands,” in the words of the analyst. They decided to send the report along to Homeland Security but advised in the report to “take it with a grain of salt.” Edward Said (1981: 7) elaborates how labels like “Islam” and “Arab” are “[i]deological and shot through with emotion” in Orientalism, a social discourse, ideology, and area of study that takes “the Orient” (the “East”), particularly articulated in contrast with the “Occident” (or “West”), as its object (see Said 1978). The machete becomes Orientalized, meaning imbued with the mythical, terrifying features of “the Orient,” at all stages of its circulation. A thin layer of a person stands in for the rest of the individual who might carry such an object. Jasbir Puar (2017: 232) points out that the “tremors” of Islamophobia could be felt well before 9/11. Said (1981) indicates that over this time period, particularly following the Iranian revolution and Western allyship with Israel, policymakers and academics allied themselves toward geopolitical control over Islam. The data skins available for those coded as South Asian are brittle and hollow from over fifty years of “terrorist” threat discourse from Western allied forces (see Kundnani 2015). A host of affective prelogic is built into such threat discourse, helping to secure the manner of objects’ arrival. Even when fusion staff knew the object could be relinquished of some anxiety over this overdetermined phobic energy, they decided to fuse anxiety to the object and diffuse responsibility for the threat further. They kept the anxiety alive, sustained it, by passing it along to other judges.

The push for racial, ethnic, and religious profiling became less implicit in some of my observations, which demonstrates that phobogenics permit the creation of affective truths about suspects. I interviewed one supervisor in the Fusion Center who wanted to explain something to me:

> The conversation turned to “common sense” policing, and I felt my stomach drop. I knew what was coming and dreaded it all the same. The fusion center workers took turns explaining why the police should be able to use markers like race, ethnicity, and religion, which, they explained, the police can use in Europe. The supervisor I interviewed explained that... [in the] Bronx... people know what is out of place. He pointed to the other worker, a white man—or this worker pointed to himself—who was wearing a bright orange short sleeve button-down, and said that he would be out of place... A duck in a turtle pond?

The analogy of the duck does not correlate with racial, ethnic, and religious profiling except as a depoliticized justification. Within the context of “common sense” policing, markers permit the creation of “ontological insecurity of a body made out of place” by refracting the body through others who frustrate its movements (Browne 2009: 134). This refraction, argues Fanon (1986) and Browne (2009: 134), is the denial of this being’s “humanness.” Browne further points out that, in terms of digital epidermalization, markers of race, ethnicity, and religion become archivable evidence of an affective truth about the epidermalized body to keep it in a more indefinite state of “certain uncertainty” (135). The epidermalization is an “exercise of power” (135).

One key exercise of power performed by the “If You See Something, Say Something” public training is the power to lower the threshold for all parties reporting suspicious activity. Under lateral surveillance, an object or person need not be dangerous; they only need the potential to be dangerous. As such, “[a]n individual can be taken outside the bounds of law... by giving an impression of off-putting activity” (Ritchie 2015: 232).
As one high-level staff member told me, the justification for pursuing surveillance under “situational awareness” is that it “doesn’t hurt”:

The beauty of that is that we tried to tell our officers on our department that are taking reports like this that look use your common sense and see that they’re okay. There’s something wrong here and let us have it. Let us have it, let us into it. And then if it looks like it needs to go up we’ll set it up and it’s not really a—a manner of or we judge and jury on. If something should go further, there’s nothing wrong with sending it up and having them look at it. If they log in and said there’s nothing here, then there’s nothing there. We have a record of it.

The reflexive justification that “If nothing is here, there’s nothing there” is important. With this justification, the effects of the initial instance of profiling and its subsequent diffusion disappear. There is simply nothing to see here. Move along. Keep it moving. This logic is the *sin qua non* of police activity and, while this Fusion Center serves “two masters” (the local government and the police), it adopts the surveillance justification of the police. Notably, an analyst gave me an example of a Trump supporter who frequently reported racial minorities at one bank in the city and the analyst felt obligated to take the information down, follow up on the report, and give an “FYI” to supervisors. Fusion keeps the information flowing, moving from one suspicion to the next, often without knowing whether the suspicions were credible. The credibility of a suspicion hardly matters at the level of affect; as a police officer explained, “all threats are credible threats” until disproven.

Fusion workers are therefore more sensitive or susceptible to anxiety than those their information serves. Because Fusion Centers are responsible for making sure other more senior security and police officials do not miss crucial information, they are “hypersensitive” to the information coming in. As the Fusion Center director explained:

Now, we were real hypersensitive to things. You’re going to write a report. And if it rises to the level that it doesn’t fit that we’re—we’re—we’re asking guys let us know. There’s nothing wrong. You see something, say something... It’s a clichéish now in a way... It’s getting people conditioned to not be afraid to say something because I think a lot of people have over the years been conditioned in a way of not to report things. They don’t think it’s their place.

The director indicates that there is nothing the matter with writing a report and sending it up if the threat turns out to be either debunked or confirmed by the JTTF or the FBI. The structure is such that fusion is not “judge and jury.” Fusion’s inhibitions for passing information along are almost as low as the general public’s. For instance, Fusion Centers often do not make conclusions about criminal motives. The director explains, “That’s more of really, like, deep, deep stuff. Ours is more surface.” They perform a similar hypersensitivity to suspicious behavior as employees who work in the private sector to protect critical infrastructure. They “feel for/as the state” meaning they experience “certain bodies as out of place, so as to encourage state action to police or detain them” (Ritchie 2015: 193). These reflexive sensitivities are the “legitimating feelings of state surveillance” for event higher level authorities (194). The hypersensitivity takes place with a little pressure from anxiety.

The anxiety attached to the phobic objects of the Qu-ran or the Kurdish machete does not dissipate when the JTTF or FBI clears it of credible threat. The alarm “creates the affective reality” of the so-called “suspicious” object and body (Ritchie 2015: 191). Fusion intelligence is jumpy; it moves quickly from object to object, body to body, trying to touch as many as it can in the off chance that one becomes threatening later. The classification system of SARs generates a suspicious species body that is “off” from the rest of the normal species body. The “awareness” of this body is affective awareness in the body of intelligence workers. Another awareness revolves around threat-inflammation.
What is Inflammatory?
The Fusion Center engages in digital epidermalization by monitoring what is inflammatory on social media. Fusion is an affective taxonomy of hypersensitivity to inflammation. The center uses an information processing program called Dataminr, which I was told by the director was “used in Lebanon” before becoming available to Fusion Centers. Dataminr is a real-time information discovery platform. I sat with a data analyst as he interfaced through five screens with different analytic systems that gather information for him. There seemed to be lenience in terms of what search terms this center can use. Because of attacks in Brussels, this center monitored social media where suspected terrorists disseminated kill lists. Other monitored terms include “Allahu Akbar” and “praise’ or some shit,” in the words of one analyst. Additionally, I heard from this analyst that another center in Texas, “gets a lot of ‘Praise Allah.’” These markers’ function is reductive; they allow for the aggregation of information about suspects in workers’ stations and databases on the basis of inflammation, or the inflammation of language beyond a normal, acceptable intensity of discourse.

In September 2017, DHS revealed that it monitors the social media of immigrants, including naturalized citizens, and users who interact with them. DHS clarified that these powers are not new; they are just making transparent, under a Privacy Act, what they already do (Novak 2017). Available records include social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results. Fusion Centers can see names, handles, and aliases, and many centers hope to form information sharing agreements with social media companies (one lament at the conference is how Facebook and Twitter partner with private companies but not law enforcement).

The political motivations behind “inflammatory rhetoric” matter little to an analyst; the analyst’s job is to discern whether the rhetoric has enough likelihood to become a threat-event and raise concerns to superiors. The analyst I observed uses an interface called Bluestacks to scan and review many social media platforms at once. The analyst showed me an “extremist” video of a man, who lives outside of Texas, preaching online in Arabic through WhatsApp. We then clicked over to Bluestack’s Facebook monitoring capacities. We clicked through a profile of one suspected terrorist, as I recount in my field notes:

I see his son, a small black boy, he has his arm over his son in his cover photo on Facebook; I see another body, small. Is that his other son on his other side? I see he’s married. I see he’s commented on what happened in Las Vegas with the shooting. I am told by the analyst he is a Black Muslim man. I wonder what he’s done to warrant this type of monitoring. The data analyst tells me that they only monitor people who have credible threats associated with them, but I also know that all it takes to trigger the center’s monitoring is inflammatory rhetoric online. Was this man in the TERRORISM folder? Is he just someone they check in on now and then? I can’t stop thinking about that little boy’s face, staring at the camera. Who am I to look in on his father, from this setting? It is out there in the world, it is the cover photo on Facebook, but now his father has been marked, by me, in this space. I’m seeing this not through the white Facebook screen but here everything is inverted; the screen shows up black through Bluestacks.

I am mortified at the distance between my position in the center and this man who is unaware that I am seeing his life, his sons, and his face. He has been marked as a suspected terrorist. Fanon (1986: 101) remarks on the black man’s unassimilability, which Fanon describes in terms of a disjuncture in time: “You come too late, much too late. There will always be a world—a white world—between you and us.” Bluestacks allows for the strengthening of this white world between those viewing him from the center and his life. I gathered details about him, even from the little time the analyst and I scrolled through his profile. You can tell he is critical of anti-black racism in the US. I see he studied rhetoric and at one point lived in Morocco. In older pictures, his two sons hold guns in the woods. He has posted videos of police vehicles stopping residents, one with a caption referencing Trayvon Martin. He arrives on the screen too late to be understood by the Fusion Center and by me watching him.
The logic that justifies preemptive monitoring, or “keeping” threats “on the radar,” as an analyst recounted, is the idea that the profile is already public and so those surveilled consented to the monitoring. If a person did not want to be monitored, so one staff member says, the person should know to make a profile private:

[W]e have… restrictions as to what we can collect on people and there has to be—there has to be defined criminal practically associated with things like that way. But in the same respect we’re not—we’re not discounting the people’s behavior to—to post things online that they want people to know about. You know if you’re—if you’re a local junior thug… and you want to post on Facebook or Instagram your pictures with—with a giant pile of weed and all the guns that you have accumulated… It’s in the public forum. I mean it’s not like we’re collecting things on you that you haven’t put out there yourself.

This was reflected in further comments from a supervisor:

[I]f you commit a crime it’s usually hard for you to keep it inside. You wanna tell somebody. So these criminals and these people tend to be open and just flaunting it out they’re not thinking anybody’s looking or not understanding that what they’re doing is—is open to the public which is good for us because it helps us identify people who are doing bad things.

The given reason for monitoring is that those monitored are already out in the world on social media and the inflammatory nature of their public presence itself opens them up to speculation. Showiness, braggadocio, and criminal flaunting are invitations for police and fusion surveillance. The inflammatory rhetoric from suspected criminals tempts and tests the Fusion Center.

At a local level, the spatialization of crime and production of criminal statistics based on the movements of crime means that data statistics determine threat-affect. Using statistics, the police can more efficiently move across the city to meet pockets of crime. The director recounts, “And we’re—we’re moving officers to those areas to do some high, high visibility enforcement to kind of deal with those issues. So it’s like a little invading army that will go occupied neighborhood for three, four, or five days.” The question is not whether to deploy police but “an appropriate dosage of police activity,” according to the director. The Fusion Center is aided not just by local police but the Sheriff’s office, troopers, and deputies who can be part of the force against areas with more threat-intensity. Police are “force-against-force,” and the initial forcefulness is determined by irregularities in data statistics across a territory (Massumi 2015a: 76). Fusion taxonomizes these intensities through statistics and threat mapping.

Fusion is not always able to be preventative (it is still largely reactive to emergencies), yet anxiety about missing threats pulls the center toward more preventative tactics, even while these measures can be ineffectual and harmful (see Ferguson 2017). I asked a high-level, civilian worker about the preventative status of Fusion Centers directly. He answered that the value of intelligence-led policing is not to be found in mimicking Minority Report: “it’s not Minority Report and the red ball and the three people in Jell-O. That doesn’t always exist.” Still, there is a viscous, diffuse affect that pulls fusion workers to prevention, sometimes through police demands and sometimes through the threat status of the event. Anxiety is the glue, the goo, the Jell-O. The anxiety pressing on fusion staff is to “not drop the ball,” as this response by a high-level civilian worker to my question makes clear. I asked about Fusion Centers’ capacity to do prediction-based policing and the civilian-worker explained the anxiety surrounding threat-identification:

Q: How do you feel like fusion centers, can, though… do that preventative, I mean, prediction-based policing as well… that people have wanted fusion centers to do, in terms of terrorism?

A: It’s like anything else. They’ve found a sufficient amount of Monday morning quarterbacking on events that have been high profile… in the Boston marathon bombing.
other events that have happened that there was a significant amount of chatter that existed and was generated before those events happened. So, the idea is that you just need to be aware and address that chatter when you become aware of it. And fully vet the threats. And if they’re determined not to not to be valid, you move on to the next one... But the biggest challenge is not to drop the ball and not discount threats that are viable threats.

Fusion staff feel the pressure to never discount a threat and so their tactics become more preventative. Threats are abnormalities in crime as well as potential traces of terrorism, like spikes in homicides or increased chatter online about a target. While fusion is responsible for not dropping the ball, it also extends responsibility for crime-abnormalities across a wider field. As one police officer stationed in the center told me, because bulletins go out across the board, “Now who’s going to point a finger at who?”

**Fusing Race**

The biopolitics of fusing race refers to the soft power over raced bodies exercised by nationwide fusion intelligence. The public security pedagogy, reflected in “If You See Something, Say Something,” along with the informational systems in place between business, police, and security partners comprise the plane on which race can be fused, meaning brought into “situational awareness,” in repetition. Fusing race means making race into an actionable item for law enforcement and homeland security. In this sense, this Fusion Center is one profiler among a host of profilers nationwide. The biopolitics of fusing race has three features: an affective prelogic of phobogenics, trained installation of the prelogic to render it continuous, and regulation over the dosage of public anxiety.

**Affective Prelogic**

Fusing race is the adoption of affective prelogic inherent in racial phobogenics. In Fanon’s (1986: 133) words, “In the phobic, affect has a priority that defies all rational thinking. As we can see, the phobic is a person governed by the laws of prelogical rationality and affectivity.” The biopolitics of fusing race relies on affective prelogic. Larsson (2016: 94) writes that suspicion has become “integrated” as a technique in participatory policing. Suspicion, however, is more than a technique for policing. It is the affective prelogic of the fusion-intelligence matrix: the necessary anxiety that predetermines what matters. As Fanon (1986: 133) writes:

> The choice of the phobic object is thus overdetermined. Such an object does not come out of the void of nothingness; in some situations it has previously evoked an affect in the patient. The phobia is the latent presence of this affect on the core of his world; there is an organization that has been given a form. For the object, naturally, need not be there, it is enough that somewhere the object exists: is a possibility. Such an object is endowed with evil intentions and with all the attributes of a malefic power. (italics in the original)

Phobic objects are overdetermined, meaning anxiety accumulates on them and calls them back during future moments of anxiety. Even if the object is not there (and, of course, we know that anxiety’s object is nowhere), it is enough that it could be too present. Phobia’s affective prelogic is an exercise of power. Massumi (2015b: 64–65) writes that affect becomes a form of political decision. It is especially pressing that homeland security has engaged in a “colonization of the micro-perceptual” through situational awareness because the effects become more insidious. As Massumi (2002: 25) writes, “the skin is faster than the word.”

**Continuous Profiling**

A primary effect of housing phobogenics in Fusion Centers is to render profiling continuous across public and private sectors, between governmental and corporate entities. Instead of tracking independent groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, or Hamas in US states, Fusion Centers track sympathizers. Puar (2007: 198)
describes how homeland security makes anxiety fluid across sites such that, “the profile disperses control through circuits catching multiple interpenetrating sites of anxiety.” When asked what the Fusion Center needs most, the director told me he needs more time with the data because five years is too short a time to build a case. The data becomes irrelevant after five years and then the center has nothing on suspects. According to the director, Fusion Centers should aim toward more permanent profiles or continuous digital epidermalization.

Sharing information through databases to further “situational awareness” has become justification to conflate military and nonmilitary intelligence. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 contained measures to mobilize law enforcement against terroristic threats. Fusion Centers are an extension of this immediate impulse to couple security, police, and military intelligences. Homeland security personnel begin to “capitalize on what patrol officers already did when dealing with the general public” (Stalcup 2015: 70). The cops are the eyes and ears for homeland security and military intelligence. As one Fusion Center worker explained to me, the cops “don’t have time to have absorbed what happened on CNN or Fox News or on the internet.” The Fusion Center opens police officers to sharing information (“let everybody nibble at your cheese,” in the words of one director). The Fusion Center I observed has a military liaison sit in the center twice a week to catch wind of any intelligence that may affect the military installations in the city.

The cultivation of situational awareness in Fusion Centers allows for blurred interests between private sector security and public security. As the ACLU documented in 2008, security groups gain access to Fusion Centers because Fusion Centers can access databases beyond any accountability. According to the ACLU, “fusion centers often have subscriptions with private data brokers such as Accurint, ChoicePoint, LexisNexus, and LocatePlus, a database containing cellphone numbers and unpublished telephone records” (German and Stanley 2008: 3). Fusion Centers share information with private companies as well. For instance, through one partnership, the Fusion Center I observed can access bank cameras. Blurred interests between public and private intelligence matters insofar as Fusion Centers can render their monitoring more continuous, which can extend phobia.

The profiling available through fusion databases could become a mainstay of local policing especially at the border. Partnerships between Fusion Centers and ICE, including one center in Texas who houses an ICE liaison, show the extent to which profiling could become part of fusion’s functioning. As an indicative example, an article by security scholars Carla Lewandowski, Jeff Rojek, and Victor M. Manjarrez (2017) called “Using a Fusion Center Model to Manage and Improve Border Security” makes the case for using fusion to “secure” the US–Mexico border (see Buch 2012). Fusion could continue to market to end users that categorize illegal behavior. Fusion has the potential to make profiling accessible across local, federal, and state levels.

Anxiety Dosage
In order to normalize profiling, fusing race requires approximating the proper dosage of public anxiety. Multiple interviews confirmed that the center does not want the public too on edge. The center “need[s] to signal that they [the public] are safe but do not want it to get ridiculous,” according to one director. One police officer explains that his job is to shield me, a member of the public, from “the ugly stuff,” while still educating the public about trends. Police and fusion staff therefore have an inside glimpse on anxiety inspiring events that they hope to disseminate to the public. The director indicates that making sure that police personnel and cameras are visible for the public at events would create the impression of public safety for them. These concerns revolve around anxiety dosage: how much anxiety can the body of the public take before it becomes destructive to them and to fusion intelligence?

Regulation of anxiety dosage is not up to the public, according to the rhetoric of this Fusion Center. The administration of anxiety and safety is a matter of fusion-signaling—signaling to the public the familiar markers of safety. The Fusion Center does not know if it gets the dosage right; there is little feedback that comes from the public or its partners about how it has administered anxiety. But the Fusion Center allows for open experimentation with the city’s health in terms of whether it feels safe or unsafe. A dose of police
in a flared–up area, a dose of intel to the police during a meeting, a dose of reassurance to private sector partners—these are experimental. Fusion Centers attempt to control the proper timing and proportion of activation, when and how the public becomes anxious over threats, yet they react to these ever-modulating panics.

One of the justifications for Fusion Centers before and after 9/11 was how their local nature meant they could be modular. They could test security out over a smaller territory than other intelligence centers. There is no model of a Fusion Center so this particular center changes through trial and error. One research subject with knowledge of how this center opened jokes, “Congratulations, ‘You’re a fusion center.’ What now? There’s no ‘How-To’ for dummies.” Fusion Centers are local testing sites for different dosages of public anxiety. Through disseminating reports to the public, hosting private partners, providing briefings for police, and responding to real-time threat events, they modulate the urgency of threats based on the perceived needs of a small territory.

Conclusion

At the outset, I asked if the lateral surveillance of suspiciousness under the aegis of “situational awareness” can ever become decoupled from racialization. Because they are one node along a long line of lateral surveillance Fusion Centers could partially deactivate the anxiety surrounding phobic objects, bodies, and chatter. What if the data analyst had not sent up the report about the machete? What if the search engines did not prompt automatic threat surrounding racialized terms? As Noble (2018: 2) writes, the mathematical formulations of search engines seem neutral because of their ostensible automaticity. We could instead come to see that “[t]he people who make these decisions hold all types of values, many of which openly promote racism, sexism, and false notions of meritocracy.” Challenging the fusion of race means dismantling the taxonomies that organize and dictate the affective prelogic of policing and policers.

Unpacking taxonomies of race in counterterrorism surveillance infrastructures demands more precise theorizations of race and biopolitics. Such accounts make departures from literature that defines racism too generally, marginalizes histories of racial study, and does not ground its studies in the psychic and physical lives of those racialized. According to Saldanha (2010; 2012), racial difference is a biocultural element in the management of risk and raced bodies are collectively embodied. Fanon’s “phobogenics” speaks to the process of rendering populations patterned by racial anxiety—rendered less capable and constrained by collective affects. The biopolitical management of population attempts to skin collectives of black and brown people of their embodiment. Fusion as a soft power does this in seemingly neutral, cognizing spaces: at desks, in police departments, in meetings, at a conference panel, in a database, over email. These spaces pulsate with phobogenic energy.

The formation of terroristic threats in “an aggregate threat matrix” helps account for the diffusion of phobogenic prelogics (Monaghan and Walby 2012: 133; see Harbisher 2015). If the identity of a terrorist is an aggregation of interlocking, multi-agency intelligence, phobogenics can become continuous across surveillant spaces. The object of fear in post-9/11 governance, Massumi (2015a: 175) argues is threat, a potential for dangerousness that exhibits “formlessness and contentlessness.” Assessing threat is a matter of tracking “quasi-causality,” the extent to which a threat has the virtual power in the future to affect the present (175). The object of anxiety in fusion’s taxonomies—adopted by much more extensive taxonomies reflected in national rhetoric—is something even more upending than Massumi’s “threat” in our current affective taxonomies: the potential for a raced body, in its potential movements, to scramble the switchboards of US intelligence. The crafting of data skins in lateral threat matrixes grasps at this potential. Racism encoded within the matrix is epidermal and haptic, that is, a matter of making raced bodies feel touched or out of touch. Digital racializing surveillance allows analysts, law enforcement, and homeland security an ease of touching black and brown people and returning them to themselves seen and touched by whiteness: introjected and imposed. It does so through procedures of segregation, categorization, and supervision. SARs, Dataminr, and other analytic methods dictate the qualities of blackness and brownness: the refraction of a body through its conversion into data. These technologies provide the affective reality of anxiety; they
ring the alarm. They issue the performative utterance, “Look!” at a raced body. The moment of stricken anxiety from the hail, Fanon (1986: 93) writes, fixes: “My body has returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day.”

References


Surveillance & Society 18(1) 28


