Federal-Provincial Voting and Federal Integration in the Fourth Canadian Party System

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Federal arrangements in Canada, as in other federal democratic polities, divide governmental jurisdictions between at least two levels of governance and therefore result in at least two levels of electoral competition. These discrete levels of electoral competition raise the question of relations between both parties and voters at the national and sub-national levels of electoral competition. The concept of federal and provincial integration in Canada addresses these questions by examining linkages that exist between parties and voters at the federal and provincial levels.

This paper explores a particular form of federal-provincial integration, behavioral integration, in Canada since 1993. It argues that the nature of electoral politics and the party system in Canada since 1993 cannot be fully understood without an understanding of the nature and extent of federal-provincial party integration that occurs within it, especially with regard to differences in such integration between different federal parties and provinces. It argues more specifically that the traditional conception of “Affiliation Integration,” where federal-provincial integration takes place largely between federal and provincial parties of identical partisan affiliation, is still largely valid despite the 1993 electoral dealignment and the rise of two new parties in that election. In order to do so,

1 I wish to thank Dr. Anthony Sayers, Christopher Northcott, and David de Groot for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

the paper will first attempt to refine the term “federal-provincial integration” by constructing a typology of different forms of federal-provincial integration before reviewing the literature on the resulting four forms in Canada. In addition, this section will outline problems with the literature and how this paper addresses them. The second section will present the paper’s research design. In particular, it will outline the three measures of behavioral integration that will be utilized in the analysis section. The third section will test the paper’s hypotheses by measuring behavioral integration in a variety of forms. Finally, the paper will conclude by broadly evaluating federal-provincial integration in Canada since 1993 and by noting how a refined interpretation of such integration furthers our understanding of the Fourth Canadian Party System in general.

**Literature Review**

Federal-provincial integration might be defined simply as the linkages that exist between parties at the federal level and parties at the provincial level. The potential phenomenon that fall within such a broad definition, however, are both numerous and varied. As a result, it is necessary to be more precise in what form of integration is being addressed.

We can differentiate between forms of integration on the basis of two considerations: the primary entity addressed by the definition and whether it is the actions or the values of that entity that are being addressed. On the first basis, the entity addressed can be either a party as an organizational structure or an individual citizen. On the second basis, we can differentiate between entities on the basis of that entity's actions or values. Table 1 summarizes these different conceptions of federal-provincial party integration:
Table 1: Forms of Federal-Provincial Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Entity</th>
<th>Primary Entity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Organizational Behavioral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Ideological Cognitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four distinct forms of party integration emerge from the typology presented above: organizational, ideological, behavioral, and cognitive.

Organizational integration is concerned with the actions rather than the values of parties. It treats parties as organizational structures rather than as ideological vehicles or repositories of values or policy and is therefore concerned with the formal and structural links between parties at the federal and provincial level. Writing on U.S. parties, Huckshorn et al. provide an organizational definition of integration: "Integration involves a two-way pattern of interaction between the national and state party organization." Thorlakson concurs in her definition of party integration as "the organizational linkages between the state and federal levels of parties."

Organizational integration is the dominant form of integration studied in the literature on federalism. This is partially because party organization has been an important variable utilized by scholars to explain centralization or decentralization of party systems, an important topic following William Riker's assertion that federal

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4 Thorlakson, Lori. “Federalism and Party Organizational Adaptation: A Cross-National Comparison.” A presentation to the ECPR Joint Sessions. Grenoble, France. April 6-11, 2001. 2. I am grateful to Dr. Thorlakson for allowing me to cite this paper.
stability is linked to decentralization of the party system. Examples of this work include Campbell Sharman's testing of Riker's thesis by examining (among other things) party discipline in Australian party organizations across national-state lines, Donald Smiley engaging in a broad analysis of federal-provincial party relations in Canada in order to test Riker's thesis, and Amir Abedi and Alan Siaroff explaining dissimilarity between national and land elections in Austria by pointing to the decentralized organization of one of the main parties. In addition, party organization has been widely utilized as a dependent variable in studies of federalism. Thorlakson, for example, explains organizational relations between national and sub-national parties by utilizing two institutional factors, "the degree of centralization of resources and the method of power division," as independent variables. Thorlakson also examines policy distance between parties, but focuses predominantly on organizational integration.

Organizational integration has been a strong focus in the Canadian integration literature as well. Rand Dyck provides an example of a scholar that views integration as a whole primarily as organizational integration. Of the eighteen "factors measuring degree of integration" he presents, nine can safely be classified as measurements of organizational integration while another three could arguably be classified as such. In addition to Dyck, Edwin Black's pioneering study described the strains between the

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9 Thorlakson, Lori. 2.
10 Ibid. 6
federal and British Columbia Conservative parties in largely organizational terms.  
Organizational integration has also been the focus of studies that focus on the activities of party activists. For example, Henry Jacek et al. examine the behavior of party activists at both levels in Hamilton while David Rayside explores the extent to which federal arrangements were responsible for the behavior of Quebec Liberal activists at the federal and provincial level.

Ideological integration is concerned with the values rather than the actions of parties. Compared to organizational integration, ideological integration is understudied. Two reasons for this might exist. First, beliefs are more difficult than actions to both conceptualize and observe. This problem is exacerbated for parties; party ideology, especially since the development of the catch-all party model, is potentially malleable. Indeed, the notion of ideological integration presupposes that parties possess sets of values, a view that some might disagree with. Second, federal arrangements provide a greater incentive for ideological divergence between federal and provincial parties than for ideological similarity simply because federal and provincial parties appeal to different electorates. Donald Smiley notes that "a common and unifying ideology is not an

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13 It might appear that studies of party activists belong in the behavioral integration rather than the organizational integration category. I place such studies in the latter category because the activities of party activists under study, unlike those of voters or citizens that are examined in behavioral integration studies, are being performed in the capacity of workers for party organizations.
16 Ideological integration also addresses parties as the “membership organizations” outlined by Katz and Mair because it is this form of the party that accounts for how party policy is formulated. Katz, R., and Peter Mair.
17 For example, see Clarke, Harold D., et al. Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restructuring. 3rd ed. Toronto: Gage, 1996.
influence toward federal-provincial integration...the national and provincial wings conform to the...perceived requirements of electoral victory among their respective electorates."\(^{18}\)

Nevertheless, studies have utilized different methods to examine ideological integration. To begin, both Dyck and Smiley examine ideological similarity between federal and provincial parties; Dyck requires "basic ideological similarity" for two parties to be considered integrated while Smiley requires "a common ideology" between the parties.\(^{19}\) Thorlakson proposes "the similarity of the ideology and policy programs of the federal and state parties" as one of three measures of integration.\(^{20}\) These, however, are largely non-rigorous and impressionistic measures. Dyck, however, also utilizes policy disputes between federal and provincial parties as a measure of ideological integration while Smiley qualifies his earlier requirement by requiring that the ideology of integrated parties "distinguishes them from other parties in the political systems of both levels."\(^{21}\)

While these measures constitute improvements, they are impressionistic and demonstrate the difficulties inherent in examining ideological integration. Blake, employing a more sophisticated approach, argues that split-level identifiers may be motivated by ideological considerations since ideologically-similar parties at the federal and provincial levels are not always of an identical partisan designation.\(^{22}\)

Ideological integration, as a form of integration based upon values, is important because it is a potentially persuasive independent variable in explaining party integration.

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\(^{18}\) Smiley, Donald (1972). 92
\(^{19}\) Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972). 77
\(^{20}\) Thorlakson, Lori. 6
\(^{21}\) Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972). 77
based on actions. For example, sociological explanations to structured voting behavior over time would utilize ideological similarity between national and sub-national parties as an independent variable to explain behavioral integration between the two parties. For this reason, ideological integration should not be ignored despite the difficulties associated with its study. One potential avenue of such study might consist of applying Klaus von Beyme’s Familles Spirituelles framework to Canada at the federal and provincial levels.23

Behavioral integration is concerned with the actions of individuals as they relate to party integration. Given that I have previously classified activist activity as organizational integration24, the dominant action in the study of behavioral integration is voting.

Behavioral integration exists in the Canadian integration literature, but studies examining this phenomenon are often restricted to very small samples, usually a single constituency in a single election, and are oftentimes concerned with discovering explanations for individual-level voting behavior rather than with federal-provincial integration. Two studies utilize the same research design in surveying voters in proximate federal and provincial elections: John Courtney and David Smith for Saskatoon in 196425 and George Perlin and Patti Peppin for Eglinton and Wellington in 1967.26 In these cases, the authors were primarily concerned with vote-switching from one election to another. Exceptions to this tendency toward studies of such small scope, however, exist: Donald

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24 See footnote 11.
Blake briefly addresses British Columbians' propensity to vote for different parties at the federal and provincial levels, but does so partially to demonstrate differences between the federal and provincial party systems. Richard Johnston addresses dissimilarity between federal and provincial elections that occurred between 1908 and 1974, but his approach is flawed by the necessity of shared partisan designations between parties in his index of dissimilarity.

Cognitive integration is concerned with the thoughts of individuals and how they relate to both federalism and federal and provincial parties. Research in this area has tended to consist of examinations of voter identifications at the federal and provincial level at the expense of other forms of research more interested in federal-provincial integration specifically.

Federal arrangements provide a unique challenge to the concept of voter identification: how does participation in two distinct political systems affect one's identification with parties? Does federalism encourage voters to develop unique cognitive orientations that are the result of "blending" of the two levels of governance, or does it encourage a "dual citizenship" mindset where voters see themselves as living in "two political worlds"? Samuel Beer contributed to the blending thesis with his view of representational federalism, within which he claims that federal voters possess "at all levels of government common symbols which focus sentiments of party identification and ideas of party principle." Within parties, sub-national sentiments "mutually reinforce..."
one another, instead of merely finding expression in separate spheres.”

Marianne Stewart and Harold Clarke added precision to Beer's theory by arguing that performance evaluations and voter ID at both levels are intertwined: "Other-level performance evaluations influence the dynamics of party identification at a particular level of the federal system.” On the other hand, Donald Blake, utilizing British Columbia as an example, argued that distinctive federal and provincial party systems and a large numbers of split-level identifiers resulted in the creation of two largely autonomous electoral arenas; with regards to the proximate federal and provincial elections in 1979 Blake claims that "they (British Columbians) appeared to make a complete distinction between the two elections.”

Any study of linkages between national and sub-national parties in federal states must seek out commonalities between these parties in order to provide either independent or dependent variables to explain degrees of integration between the two parties. In the Canadian literature, this commonality has overwhelmingly been identical partisan designation and, by default, the subsidiary similarities that have flowed from this. This is especially true in studies of organizational and ideological integration. For example, Dyck's wide-ranging article on integration in Canada (published in 1991), briefly describes organizational relationships between federal parties and provincial parties of different partisan affiliation, but treats these as deviant cases. The literature on behavioral and cognitive integration has included works on vote-switching and dual-level

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31 Blake, Donald (1982). 710
32 Dyck, Rand. 132
identifiers respectively. But these works rarely situate such phenomenon within the wider spectrum of party integration, instead focusing on their relationships to, for example, voter instability and the decline of party identification. 33 Indeed, such behavior has been associated with irrationality, provoking a protest of sorts from Donald Blake, who described dual-level identification as rational in certain circumstances. 34

This preoccupation with partisan designation is a relic from the first three Canadian party systems where such designations were oftentimes literally true and, later, still meaningful predictors of integration between national and sub-national parties. Early Canadian parties were usually largely integrated parties that moved toward confederal and split status slowly. 35 In fact, Edwin Black first made the point in 1965 that "Canada's major parties do not fit the model of unified country-wide parties with hierarchically inferior provincial subdivisions." 36 Carty, Cross, and Young note that the third federal party system, which began in the 1960s, saw a "disentangling of federal and provincial party organizations" and alienation of parties from their counter-parts on the other level, even to the extent that "national and provincial party organizations of the same name (were) in opposing political camps." 37 Donald Smiley traced the de-integration of parties of identical partisan designation by differentiating between an integrated party system where "national and provincial parties of the same designation" are integrated in all forms (excepting cognitive) and a confederal system where parties of the same name possess largely autonomous organizations, espouse largely distinct ideologies, and have

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34 Blake, Donald (1982). 692
35 For a description, see: Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union. 3rd Ed. Toronto: Gage, 1989.
36 Black, Edwin. 317
"significantly different bodies of voter allegiance.\(^{38}\) He concludes from his analysis that "the Canadian party system has developed from the integrated form to confederalism.\(^{39}\) Addressing the decline in integration between parties of identical partisan designation in 1980, Johnston remarked that "In a province a party's ideological and power positions may differ radically between provincial and federal levels, and, to be consistent, a voter may have to switch between parties."\(^{40}\) A move away from integration on the basis of partisan designation clearly existed and reached its apex in the 1993 federal election, which spawned the fourth federal party system.\(^{41}\) However, it is not clear that federal-provincial integration either on the basis of partisan designation or as a whole has declined in the fourth party system.

This paper seeks to address these problems as well as explore the nature and extent of federal-provincial integration in the fourth federal party system, particularly the comparative extent to which non-truncated and truncated federal parties integrate with parties at the provincial level. Of the four forms of integration, this paper seeks to help correct the imbalance of the literature by focusing on behavioral integration. In order to address the view that federal integration as a whole has declined as a result of the rise of truncated parties and the decline of more integrated parties in the fourth federal party system, this paper’s thesis is that Canadian federal parties continue to integrate voters more effectively through parties of identical partisan designation than through parties of different partisan designations.


\(^{39}\) Ibid. 117

\(^{40}\) Johnston, Richard. 153

Research Design

This section outlines the research design of the paper. In addition to outlining the methods that will be utilized in the paper’s analysis, it will also address potential weaknesses in the research design.

The intent of the paper is to examine behavioral integration in the fourth Canadian party system, which Carty, Cross, and Young define as beginning with the dealigning 1993 federal election. In order to do so, I utilize survey data from the 1997 Canadian Federal Election Study, specifically the post-election mail-out survey. Respondents’ answers to two questions are utilized. These questions ask respondents, first, what party they voted for in the federal election and, second, what party they voted for in the last provincial election in their respective provinces. The second question relies upon respondents’ memory of the party they voted for in the last provincial election, which in turn results in lower response levels for this question.

Utilizing data from only the 1997 federal election and preceding provincial elections, however, may not accurately measure integration in the fourth party system as a whole. However, it does provide a measure of the character of integration following the collapse of the third party system. In addition, the results of the 2000 federal election demonstrate that the 1993 and 1997 federal elections were not simply deviating elections; rather, 1997 and 2000 demonstrated a solidification of both the number of parties in the new system and the strength of the two new parties rather than a return to the old two and a half party system and a potential resurgence of the two old parties. On this view, the 1997 election, which followed the dealigning 1993 election, is the ideal first election to

\[42\text{ Ibid. 3}
\[43\text{ Data from the Canadian Election Study can be found at: <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces- eec/ces.html> (November 19, 2002).}]}
begin analyzing trends in federal integration in this new party system. A similar objection is that a set of single elections cannot be utilized because of the importance of short-term factors in determining voting choices.\textsuperscript{44} Voting in the fourth party system, however, has proven to be fairly structured. Stability existed between the 1993 and 1997 elections at the individual voting level: Neil Nevitte et al. found that “two out of three voters voted for the same party they had supported in 1993.”\textsuperscript{45} They subsequently explain this in light of different voting structures which are unique for each party.

Three measures of behavioral integration between federal and provincial parties will be used in the analysis section. The first is the percentage of a single federal party’s voters in a single province that also voted for a single provincial party, or the federal vote measure. For example, this measure for the federal Liberal Party and the B.C. Liberal Party is 49.3%. In other words, 49.3% of federal Liberal Party voters in B.C. also voted for the B.C. Liberal Party. This measure is helpful on a single-variable basis (when the percentage is calculated as a national rather than a provincial total), but is less useful when federal parties as a whole are utilized as the units of analysis because the measure is influenced by the number of provincial parties included in the measure. The second measure is the average percentage of selected provincial parties’ voters that also voted for a single federal party, or the average provincial vote measure. Using the previous example, the provincial vote score for the federal Liberal Party in their relationship with the B.C. Liberal Party would be 37.4%, or the proportion of B.C. Liberal voters that voted for the federal Liberal Party. This measure is applied to individual federal parties

\textsuperscript{44} Harold D. Clarke et al. summarize this argument: “…many voters respond to the highly volatile short-term forces that define the substance of successive election campaigns.” Clarke, Harold D., et al.. 94

and has two advantages. The first is that, unlike the first measure, it can account for a federal party’s integrative relationships without being influenced by the number of such relationships. The second advantage is that the measure communicates a benefit for a federal party by summarizing the votes it receives from different provincial parties; thus it is accurate to say that a federal party that receives a higher value than another has been more “successful” in integrating voters between the two parties. The third measure is a statistical measure of correlation, Kendall’s tau-b. Tau-b measures both the strength and direction of the association between two variables. In addition, the measure is adaptable; it can be applied to relationships between both individual parties and different groups of parties. This measure is appropriate because the two questions outlined above were subsequently recoded into ordinal variables.

The first hypothesis requires that relationships between federal and provincial parties be distinguished between non-truncated (parties at different levels which are of the same partisan designation) and truncated (parties of different partisan designations) parties. Measuring integration between non-truncated federal and provincial parties requires simply utilizing parties of the same name. The measurement of integration between truncated parties, however, is more difficult, since criteria for selecting which provincial parties will be included in the analysis is required. For this paper, the threshold for provincial parties to be considered for a potential truncated voting relationship with a federal party is for it to receive 35% or higher on the federal vote measure. This threshold reflects that federal parties may integrate in a meaningful sense with more than a single provincial party in a single province, but is not so low as to render the measure essentially meaningless. In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons between non-
truncated and truncated integration, non-truncated provincial parties that did not receive 35% or higher on the federal vote measure were similarly deleted from the analysis.

**Analysis**

Appendix one summarizes the pairs of federal and provincial parties in significant integrative relationships which meet the 35% federal vote measure threshold. It also summarizes the relationship (non-truncated or truncated) and, if the relationship is truncated, then what provincial party is paired with the federal party; the federal vote measure of integration and the provincial vote measure of integration; and Kendall’s tau-b measure of association between the vote shares of the two parties in the provincial (rather than the federal) electorate.

In order to test the extent to which federal parties integrate voters through non-truncated or truncated parties, the admissible relationships between federal and provincial parties must be divided into non-truncated and truncated categories. Table two presents the measures of integration for the federal parties’ non-truncated and truncated relationships. For these measures, the national electorate rather than provincial electorates are used:
Table 2: Non-Truncated and Truncated Voting Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Fed. %</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Prov. %</th>
<th>Tau b</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Truncated Fed. %</th>
<th>Truncated Prov. %</th>
<th>Tau b</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.C.</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.P.</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Q.</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of the federal and provincial vote measures, non-truncated parties integrate voters to a greater extent than do truncated parties. For every federal party except Reform, voters for a federal party were more likely to vote for a provincial non-truncated party then they were for a truncated party of a different partisan label. In addition, every voter for a provincial party was more likely to vote for a federal counterpart with an identical partisan label rather than another party. Only federal Reform voters were more likely to vote for a truncated provincial party, and this low score may have resulted from there being only a single provincial Reform Party. Provincial Reform voters, however, were more likely to stick with the non-truncated federal Reform Party. The tau-b measure tells a similar story: all of the relationships between non-truncated voting are significant and (with the exception of Reform) higher than the relationship between voting for non-truncated paired parties. The exception is Reform voters, where an equal relationship between non-truncated and truncated voting existed. On the basis of these measures of behavioral integration, it must be concluded that parties integrate

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46 Neither the federal nor the provincial vote percentages presented in this table are the federal or provincial vote scores described in the previous section. Rather they are the percentage of shared votes as a percentage of the national vote.
voters more effectively through non-truncated counter-parts at the different levels rather than through truncated parties at the other level.

Federal and provincial parties, however, integrate voters to differing extents and in different ways. To help determine differences in the nature and extent of integration between federal parties, such parties are classified according to: the number of relationships in general, the number of non-truncated and truncated links with provincial parties, the strength of these links, the imbalance between shared votes, and the territorial distribution of these integrative linkages. Table three summarizes some of these measures for the five federal parties:

Table 3:
Measures of Integration (By Party)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Links (%)</th>
<th>Truncated Links (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average Provincial Vote</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Prov. Vote</th>
<th>Truncated Prov. Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>7 (87.5)</td>
<td>1 (12.5)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.C.</td>
<td>5 (55.6)</td>
<td>4 (44.4)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.P.</td>
<td>6 (85.7)</td>
<td>1 (14.3)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Q.</td>
<td>1 (100.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>1 (11.1)</td>
<td>8 (88.9)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The federal parties do not differ greatly in the total number of relationships they share with provincial parties; they range from a low of seven for the N.D.P. to a high of nine for the P.C. Party. The exception to this is the Bloc Quebecois, which operates only in Quebec and integrates voters only through the provincial Parti Quebecois. Differences, however, exist in the nature of these linkages. It is possible to differentiate between four groups of parties on the basis of nature of integration. First, the Bloc Quebecois’ single integrative relationship with the Parti Quebecois is non-truncated. Second, the Liberal Party and the N.D.P.’s integrative relationships are strongly non-truncated, with 87.5%
and 85.7% of such relationships being non-truncated respectively. Third, roughly half (55.6%) of the P.C. Party’s integrative relationships are non-truncated. Finally, the Reform Party is almost a completely a truncated party, with 88.9% of its integrative relationships being truncated.

Referring to table two, the strength of these integrative relationships between parties also differs. The statistical relationship between BQ and PQ voters is the strongest. The Liberal Party and the N.D.P.’s non-truncated relationships are next strongest. The strength of the P.C. and Reform parties’ non-truncated relationships, however, is comparably low. The strength of truncated relationships as a whole is significantly lower than that of non-truncated relationships. The Reform Party exhibits the strongest truncated relationship, although it is only as strong as its non-truncated relationship. While statistical relationships between federal and provincial P.C. and N.D.P. voters exist, these relationships are weak. The result for the Liberal Party is not statistically significant while the B.Q. has no truncated integrative links.

The integrative relationships between the parties can also be measured with the provincial vote measure. The B.Q. receives the highest level of support from its one integrative relationship: the PQ. The Liberal Party was the next most likely to receive votes from provincial counterpart voters, followed by the N.D.P., Reform, and the P.C. Party. In all cases, federal parties are more likely to receive provincial support from their non-truncated counterparts then from truncated provincial party voters. This is especially true for the federal Reform Party, which received strong support from provincial voters for its one non-truncated relationship (B.C. Reform). In addition, the Liberal and Reform parties’ truncated provincial vote scores are significantly higher than the other parties’
scores and are almost identical to one another. Both parties benefited from the support of voters for provincial parties that were in truncated integrative relationships.

Two dimensions of party integration result from this analysis. These are the extent of party integration (the number of significant linkages between parties) and the nature of this integration (whether it is non-truncated or truncated). Figure one plots the five federal parties on the bases of these considerations. The x value is determined by taking the percentage of total relationships for each party out of a potential total of ten (one for each province):

Figure 1:
Federal Parties Plotted by Number of Relationships and % of Truncated Relationships

The five parties occupy three different cells on the diagram. The Bloc Quebecois has a low percentage of total links, but a high percentage of non-truncated linkages. The
Liberals, N.D.P., and P.C. parties have, to differing degrees, a high percentage of linkages in general and a high percentage of non-truncated relationships. The Reform Party, almost the mirror image of the Bloc Quebecois, has a high percentage of links but a low percentage of non-truncated parties. It appears that the integrative nature of the two party system invaders in 1993 was radically different from that of the traditional parties, and radically different from one another.

Do differences in the extent and nature of behavioral integration exist between the provinces? Table four summarizes the measures of integration utilized above but uses provincial boundaries as a method of differentiating between different integrative relationships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Links (%)</th>
<th>Truncated Links (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average Provincial Vote</th>
<th>Non-Truncated Provincial Vote</th>
<th>Truncated Provincial Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3 (75.0)</td>
<td>1 (25.0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>3 (75.0)</td>
<td>1 (25.0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>3 (75.0)</td>
<td>1 (25.0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>2 (40.0)</td>
<td>3 (60.0)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>3 (50.0)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant differences in the numbers of integrative parties between the provinces do not exist. Only three groups can be differentiated in this regard: British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces include six integrative relationships, Quebec has five, and Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario have four. Table five summarizes these groups:
### Table 5: Provinces Included in Groups by Integrative Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ontario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These groups of provinces demonstrate similarity in the proportions of those relationships that are non-truncated and truncated. In all the provinces of the first group, half of the linkages are non-truncated while half are truncated. Quebec’s proportion of linkages is 60% for truncated and 40% for non-truncated. For all of the provinces in the last group, 75% of the relationships are non-truncated. Group one is therefore characterized by the highest number of relationships and a comparably moderate proportion of truncated links. Group two is characterized by a comparably moderate number of cases and a high proportion of truncated links. Group three is characterized by the lowest number of integrative relationships and the lowest proportion of truncated links. Figure two summarizes the average non-truncated and truncated provincial vote scores for these groups of provinces:
With regards to non-truncated relationships, supporters of provincial parties in groups one and three were similarly likely to vote for the parties represented in those relationships at the federal level (45.1% and 48.0%). Group two (or Quebec) exhibits the strongest non-truncated relationship. Groups one and two differ in the strength of their truncated relationships; group three is significantly stronger in this area than is group one. Group two exhibits the weakest truncated provincial vote score and the greatest divergence between non-truncated and truncated relationships.

The above finding cautions against utilizing only the number of links in each province as a measure of integration in that province. On the provincial vote measure, group three integrated voters more effectively through both non-truncated and truncated relationships despite that the provinces in group three contained four significant linkages each while the provinces in group one contained six.

Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis and utilized to help further our understanding of the fourth federal party system. First, non-truncated integrative relationships between federal and provincial parties in general were stronger.
than truncated relationships. Voters were still more likely to vote for parties of identical partisan affiliation at the federal and provincial levels rather than for parties of different partisan affiliations. Second, significant differences exist in the extent to which this is true for voters for the different federal parties. The five parties did not differ greatly in the number of significant integrative relationships they shared with provincial parties (with the exception of the B.Q., which shared only a single integrative relationship). They did, however, differ in the proportions of total significant non-truncated and truncated relationships, with the three older parties more likely to exhibit non-truncated relationships and the Reform Party more likely to exhibit truncated relationships. Third, differences exist between the character of provinces in the extent and nature of their integrative relationships. While group one provinces contain the highest number of linkages and the highest percentage of truncated relationships (excluding group two, which contains only a single province), group three provinces integrate voters in both on the basis of the provincial vote measure most effectively in both non-truncated and truncated relationships.

Conclusion

Carty, Cross, and Young point to two dealigning features of the 1993 federal election in particular in justifying their view that that election in Canada marked the emergence of a new party system. First, the 1993 election saw the decline in vote and seat shares for two older parties, the P.C. Party and the N.D.P., and the emergence of two new parties, the B.Q. and the Reform Party. Results from the 1997 and 2000 federal elections indicate

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47 Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. 6
that these results were not the product of a deviating election.\textsuperscript{48} Second, the Canadian Parliament was largely regionalized as the five parties “developed distinctly regional bases.”\textsuperscript{49} What are the results of this paper’s findings for this widely-accepted view of contemporary Canadian electoral politics?

First, the introduction of two new parties to the federal party system has not resulted in the replacement of “affiliation integration” with integration between truncated parties. Voters for federal parties are still more likely to vote for parties of identical partisan affiliation at the provincial level than they are for parties of different partisan identifications. Federal-provincial integration in the form of “affiliation integration” appears to be one string of continuity through the 1993 dealignment and the many significant changes to federal electoral politics that accompanied it.

Second, the introduction of two new parties to the federal party system has altered traditional patterns in federal-provincial integration and resulted in significant divisions in both the extent and form of integration between federal parties. The Liberal Party, which has changed the least from the third party system, has retained a traditional base of voting relationships with non-truncated provincial counter-parts. The other older parties, the P.C. Party and the N.D.P., have similarly retained a large number of non-truncated voting relationships with provincial counter-parts, but these relationships are generally weaker than those of the Liberal Party. Decreased levels of electoral support for the P.C. Party and the N.D.P. are replicated in their patterns of integration. The comparably low levels of non-truncated integration between federal and provincial P.C. and New Democratic parties, particularly as demonstrated by their comparably low provincial vote

\textsuperscript{48} For an elaboration of this argument, see appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. 7
scores; demonstrate that these parties may not be able to count on votes from supporters of their provincial supporters in the future. Replicating the differences between the old and the new parties, the invaders differ greatly from both the old parties and one another in the extent and form of their integration with provincial parties. The Reform Party, while similar to the old-line parties in its number of integrative relationships with provincial parties, is an almost completely truncated party. The B.Q., on the other hand, while similar to the old-line parties in its low rate of truncation, shares an integrative relationship with only a single provincial party. Nor is this a result of these parties’ relative immaturity; both parties have demonstrated that they are committed to the current extent and forms of their integrative relationships. In this regard, then, as in others, the two new parties have altered electoral politics in Canada since 1993.

Third, the regionalization of party support that became apparent in the 1993 election has also been replicated in the extent and nature of integration in the different provinces, although these groups of provinces are not identical in their composition. Carty, Cross, and Young’s dominant regions include the west (especially British Columbia and Alberta where the Reform Party was strongest), Ontario (the Liberals’ primary base of support), and francophone Quebec (where the B.Q. was naturally

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50 See table five. This point is well-illustrated by the non-truncated provincial vote scores for these parties. Only 31.5% of voters that cast their ballots for provincial P.C. parties voted for the federal P.C. Party, while this figure for the N.D.P. is 46.6%.

51 For a graphical summary of the differences in these parties, see figure 1.

52 The B.Q. naturally has no interest in creating relationships with parties outside of Quebec. The leadership of the Canadian Alliance and the Reform Party before it, on the other hand, has consistently opposed the creation of non-truncated provincial counter-parts. For an early example of both former Reform leader Preston Manning and Alliance leader Stephen Harper’s opposition to provincial counter-parts, see: Brunner, Paul. “The Provincial Question: An Alberta Temptation.” Alberta Report, July 9, 1990. On the other hand, the Canadian Alliance has welcomed the possibility of creating new truncated relationships with different provincial parties. Tom Flanagan noted that “The Canadian Alliance will be a merger of the Reform Party with political activists from the provincial Liberal Party of British Columbia, the Saskatchewan Party, and several provincial Progressive Conservative Parties.” Flanagan, Tom. “From Reform to the Canadian Alliance.” Party Politics in Canada. 8th Ed. Eds. Hugh G. Thorburn and Alan Whitehorn. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001. 280-291. 290
While the N.D.P. and the P.C. Party lacked strong regional bases, both these parties became competitive in the Atlantic region in the 1997 election. Regions based upon patterns of integration, however, cut across these party lines. B.C., Saskatchewan, and the Atlantic region were characterized by both a high number of linkages and a comparably high rate of truncated linkages. Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario were characterized by a lower number of linkages and a lower rate of truncated linkages, but these relationships in general were stronger than in the other provinces. It would appear that the first group of provinces has moved further from the traditional model of “affiliation integration” than the second, and that the resulting high number of truncated linkages has weakened integration in general in these provinces as a result of the generally weaker nature of truncated relationships compared to non-integrated relationships. Whether the first group is more “developed” in its apparent movement away from the traditional model of integration, however, remains to be seen. A strengthening of truncated relationships in the first group and a movement toward more truncated relationships in the second group would substantiate this view.

The conclusions that have been drawn from this paper’s analysis are limited by the paper’s focus on the behavioral form of integration and its confinement to the 1997 federal election and preceding provincial election. Its conclusions could be either further substantiated or challenged by expanding this paper’s scope to other forms of integration or to different elections since 1993. Federal-provincial integration in Canada, while affected by the 1993 electoral realignment, contains themes of both continuity and change. In both cases, the examination of federal-provincial integration contributes to an

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53 Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. 7
54 See table 2 and the following discussion.
understanding of Canada’s new party system and to the discussion of current federal electoral politics. Further changes to patterns of integration are likely to follow further changes to the federal party system as a whole, adding another dimension of importance to the discussion of the 1997 and 2000 elections as either deviating or realigning elections.
## Appendix 1: Individual Voting Relationships by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Federal Party</th>
<th>Provincial Party</th>
<th>Federal Vote</th>
<th>Provincial Vote</th>
<th>Tau b</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>\</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.D.P.</td>
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<td>92.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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<tr>
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Bibliography


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