FEDERALISM-E

Tailor-Made for Canada: Why Canadian Federal Elections Should Adopt a Mixed-Member Proportional System

Damian McCracken

Royal Military College of Canada

Federalism-E is founded by the Royal Military College of Canada and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University - ISSN 2562-3435

Federalism-E Vol. 21, No.2 (2020)
10.24908/fede.v21i2.14074

Federalism-e is an electronic student journal about federalism, multi-level governance, and intergovernmental relations put forth in collaboration between Queen's University and the Royal Military College of Canada. This annual journal will publish papers by undergraduate students, which are reviewed by an editorial board composed of their peers, in both English and French languages. It is a bilingual, undergraduate electronic journal with a mandate to provide a forum to encourage research and scholarly debate with respect to a wide variety of issues concerning federalism both within Canada and abroad.

Federalism-e est un journal électronique sur le fédéralisme, la gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux et les relations intergouvernementales, élaboré en collaboration avec l'Université Queen's et le Collège militaire royal du Canada. Ce journal annuel publiera des articles d'étudiants de premier cycle, qui seront examinés par un comité de rédaction composé de leurs pairs, en anglais et en français. Il s'agit d'un journal bilingue de premier cycle dont le mandat est de fournir un forum pour encourager la recherche et les débats universitaires sur une grande variété de questions relatives au fédéralisme au Canada et à l'étranger.

Editors-in-Chief/redacteurs en chef:

Officer Cadet/élève-officier Daniel Walcott, Royal Military College of Canada
Naval Cadet/aspirant de marine Jack Murphy, Royal Military College of Canada

Associate Editors/rédacteurs associés:

Officer Cadet/élève-officier Damien McCracken, Royal Military College of Canada
Charmaine Lee, University of British Columbia
Jenna Mohammad, University of Toronto
Srjan Sahu, University of Toronto
Mduduzi Mhlanga, University of Toronto
Reeba Khan, University of Toronto
Joyce Le-Yi Yang, University of Toronto
Hollis MacKenzie, University of British Columbia

Faculty Advisor/conseiller de la faculté:

Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College of Canada, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University

Contact Information:

Email/courriel – federalismeditors@gmail.com
Website/site web – <https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/fede>
Address/adresse – Royal Military College of Canada
13 General Crerar Cres
Kingston, ON
K7K 7B4

Federalism-E is founded by the Royal Military College of Canada and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University - ISSN 2562-3435

Federalism-E Vol. 21, No.2 (2020)
10.24908/fede.v21i2.14074

Introduction

Reform of Canada's electoral system has swung in and out of the political conversation for decades. Referenda have failed provincially, and the Liberal Party's campaign promise on reform was dropped from their agenda after taking office. While many voices have called for a change from our current First-Past-the-Post system (FPTP) to one that is proportional, the change they have sought for decades has never come. Despite Canada's failure on reform up to this point, the issue has surfaced again and again, and often in such a way that indicates widespread support, yet has never amounted to a new electoral system. The Liberals' promise of electoral reform in their 2015 federal election platform was broken. Provinces have held referenda numerous times, including British Columbia and Ontario, both of which have held these referenda upon the recommendations of Citizens' Assemblies.¹ Nonetheless, these have all failed, but it is more likely the issue will slowly accumulate support than fade away, especially considering the results for the NDP and Conservative parties in the 2019 federal election – each earning a much smaller share of the House of Commons' seats than their share of the popular vote.² The discussion always begins with the same issue: FPTP is an unfair electoral system that produces an inaccurate balance of seats in the legislature, and silences voters in constituencies whose preferred candidate does not win. Of the many proposed alternative systems, one of the most popular contenders has been Mixed-Member Proportional, and for good reason; upon researching this system, it almost seems tailor-made for Canada because it possesses the most important aspect of FPTP – local representation and accountability – and pairs it with the fair electoral system present in proportional representation (PR).

In this research paper, I investigate the suitability of a Mixed-Member Proportional Electoral System, one of the most regularly-proposed systems of proportional representation, and the good that could be yielded from adopting it.

I posit that Canada should implement a Mixed-Member Proportional system (MMP) as it achieves the following three goals: (1) the representation of every vote in the legislature; (2), the attenuation of sectionalism, and; (3) the creation of a cooperative multi-party legislature. I will begin this paper with an explanation of the MMP electoral system, including a description of what a Canadian version would look like, then proceed to offer criticisms of the old system and advocate for the new system under the three themes I named.

Overview of the Electoral Systems

FPTP is often referred to in the electoral systems literature as Single-Member Plurality. It is a simple system that divides a state into constituencies, each holding their elections simultaneously, and declaring the possessor of the most votes to be the local winner – normally

¹ Dennis Pilon, "A vote that might really change something," *Canadian Dimension*, 41, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2007), 21-22.

² "National: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results," Elections Canada, Accessed 20 April 2020, <https://enr.elections.ca/National.aspx?lang=e>

representing a party. This winner may not have the majority of the vote – merely, they have more votes than all the other contenders do individually. This is why it is termed a plurality – a true majority is not needed to win the local election. It is a system that is easy to comprehend, yet Canada has seen many problems emerge as a result of this system that have enraged voters and led to calls for reform.³

Criticism of Canada's electoral system is the continuation of a debate that has raged for decades in Canadian politics. Alan Cairns, a giant in this field, wrote a quintessential article in 1968 on electoral systems and what each means for Canada. Even today, it is offered in textbooks as foundational reading. In it, he states that it is the electoral system that has shaped party politics, and therefore, our democracy. In fact, the electoral system and party politics have exacerbated sectional divides within Canada.⁴ Most other Western democracies have implemented one of the many forms of PR, which attempt to make the composition of the seats in the legislature reflective of the proportion of votes each party receives nationwide – not dependent on local elections. However, FPTP's greatest aspect may be that it provides an accountable local representative. Many PR systems worldwide use a national Party List to fill seats in the legislature, which does not allow any local accountability.⁵ In a country as large and regionally diverse as Canada, this is a dealbreaker for any electoral system. Luckily, there are many variants of PR that strike a balance between local representation and proportionality. Based on my research, the most ideal system for Canada is MMP.

MMP is a system that combines local constituency elections with a larger party list election to produce results that are roughly proportional to the national vote – some proportionality is sacrificed in order to preserve local accountability, but not remotely as much as FPTP sacrifices. Under MMP, each voter gets two votes on their ballot – one for the local representative of their choice, and one for the party they would prefer to form government federally. Significantly, voters have the option of voting for a candidate of one party while supporting the governance of another. Once votes are collected, the proportion of winners of constituency elections are subtracted from the party's national vote, leaving the rest to be filled by party list candidates if there is room left.⁶ The system produces a legislature filled in part with locally-elected representatives, and in part with party list representatives who were introduced to balance the house's seat distribution according to the popular vote. There are varying degrees of proportionality depending on the required vote threshold to achieve party list seats, the balance

³ Dennis Pilon, "Understanding Electoral Systems," in *Election*, ed. Heather MacIvor (Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2010), 39-40.

⁴ Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1968), 55.

⁵ Pilon, "Understanding Electoral Systems," in *Election*, 39.

⁶ Ibid., 39-40.

of list seats to local seats, and on the division of list seats – whether they are national or regional. The latter issue is critical because as a federal power with distinct regions, Canada should pull list seats from a regional pool, so as to preserve regional representation. MMP is not as simple as FPTP, but its complexities arise from its corrections to the faults of FPTP. I will now provide arguments for MMP within the three-issue framework established in the thesis statement.

Representing All Votes

The question of which electoral system is preferred, between FPTP and PR, is one that is based on “democratic fundamentalism,” according to Cairns.⁷ The PR supporters’ arguments rest on the notion that every individual vote in a democracy should count toward building the legislature. It is simply true that many votes do not contribute, in any way, to filling the legislature under FPTP. In Canada, FPTP has led to practices by parties that have greatly increased sectionalism; small parties with local, concentrated support, are more rewarded under a FPTP system than a larger party with widespread support.⁸ Essentially, a party targets primarily that small, concentrated population who it knows can help them gain power. Meanwhile, the concerns of a larger, diffuse group may never even be addressed by any political party because under FPTP, they may not gain a representative. Essentially, a huge portion of Canadians’ votes do not matter when it comes to building the legislature. This is important both in principle and for a political reason. Of course, the notion that one’s vote may not count toward building the legislature is upsetting to many Canadians.

However, a strict PR system would not be ideal for Canada. Being such a large country, with many distinct regions ranging from the provincial to the local level, a voter’s ability to hold a local representative accountable is essential to Canada’s unique democratic spirit. Thus, the mixed system that MMP offers is what makes it an ideal system. Not only does it consist of local representatives, it does so while also making sure every vote counts towards building the legislature, either locally or from the regional party list.

This has proved to be an important factor of MMP, not just because it makes a way for all votes to be represented, but because it eliminates the need for strategic voting. If a voter supports a local candidate but not the national party platform, they can split their ballot, voting for the local candidate of one party and supporting another party with their regional vote. This practice is significant in this system, as 37 percent of New Zealand’s first MMP ballots were split in this way – with the local vote being for a candidate of one party, and the party vote being for another.⁹ The reality of this system is that the parties who hold the most seats under FPTP will lose seats, while smaller parties are likely to gain more. Some defenders of FPTP argue that there are fringe voices that ought to be kept out of politics – both left and right. The Green Party and

⁷ Pilon, “Understanding Electoral Systems,” in *Election*, 39-40.

⁸ Ibid., 59.

⁹ Law Commission of Canada, *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada* (2004), 101.

the People's Party of Canada would both benefit from a PR system, even one as tame as MMP. However, we do not design electoral systems in order to elect governments of particular political stripes; we design with representation in mind – how seats should be given out compared to region and population. PR's goal is to be accurate to the national popular vote, and MMP's goal is to preserve local representation in this pursuit. MMP would also improve voter turnout, which is a well-documented result of PR electoral systems, since every vote is counted towards building the legislature. FPTP has been documented as one factor responsible for low voter turnout in Canada.¹⁰ MMP not only represents more votes that are already cast, but encourages more to be cast than before. The system is undeniably more representative of the population than FPTP.

Attenuating Sectionalism

Arend Lijphart writes that in societies with deep divides, a widely representative legislature is optimal – and PR is the best system for achieving that result. This is the principle of power sharing – centrifugal forces which threaten a country can be attenuated so long as they are given a formal voice, not silenced by the governing institutions.¹¹ In fact, Lijphart claims that the choice of electoral system is the most important one constitution-writers must make.¹² Canada's own divides certainly qualify it for a serious look at its electoral system. A Quebec-centred party holds a large number of seats in the house which are inflated by the FPTP system well beyond their percentage of the vote. In the west, separatist sentiments have been stirred by both a lack of consideration by Ottawa for the region's needs, and the overwhelming Albertan support for the Conservative party in the 2019 election – the party which did, in fact win the popular vote, but not the majority of seats in the House of Commons.¹³ Cairns' warning about Canada's electoral system guiding parties to increase sectionalism appears to have been proven true.

While FPTP values regions unequally, it can also grossly misrepresent a region's political leaning. Under the FPTP system, a region's constituency victories may grant one party dominance. However, this can be achieved without that party actually attaining anywhere near that proportion of votes – even a minority of votes can achieve this outcome. For example, in the

¹⁰ Henry Milner, "Electoral Systems, Integrated Institutions and Turnout in Local and National Elections: Canada in Comparative Perspective," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 30, no. 1 (March 1997), 90.

¹¹ Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy*, 15, no. 2 (April 2004), 99-100.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ "Electoral Districts: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results." Elections Canada. Accessed 20 April 2020. <https://enr.elections.ca/ElectoralDistricts.aspx?lang=e>.

1997 election, two-thirds of all Liberal seats were won in Ontario. However, they only won 48.5 percent of its vote. There were more votes cast in Ontario for the Reform party than there were in Alberta.¹⁴ The Ontarians that voted Reform, which constituted a huge number, were not represented in their legislature.

Other issues stem from the FPTP; as stated earlier, policy is geared toward ridings that can be swung by parties, and diffuse support groups, albeit large, do not yield the seats their numbers should. This results in some regions benefiting while others do not. A region that votes for one party in large numbers, coupled with more diffuse support for that same party in another region, may still not be enough to yield a seat count that is even close to proportional. The 2019 election demonstrates this phenomenon, as Alberta's staunch Conservative support joined more diffuse nation-wide Conservative votes and won the popular vote, yet the party fell behind on riding victories and ended up with 36 fewer seats than the Liberals.¹⁵ The notion that regions on a whole are protected from majoritarian interests by FPTP is simply not defensible when observing the data.

Simply, while FPTP can claim to protect regional interests, it only protects *some* regions' interests, so long as they align with a party – which, if one examines the popular vote of that region, may not even be the case. MMP, on the other hand, treats regions equally – especially if the party list candidates which make it proportional are determined on a provincial basis – as is the case under one of MMP's forms.

Cooperative Governments

FPTP has been defended in Canada on the grounds that it brings with it an inherent stability, a trait of governments that is valued in Canada – keeping the proponents of electoral reform at bay for the last few decades. Those who defend this facet of FPTP also condemn PR for lending itself to instability due to its tendency to diversify the legislature with more, smaller parties and to produce minority governments. However, the evidence for this was selective when crafting this argument.¹⁶ While it may be true that FPTP is stable, there are a couple of issues with this argument: first, it is selective in its view of instability in PR-run countries, and second, it ignores the flaws that come with the supposedly stable FPTP. The instability that is cited in defences of FPTP usually has to do with minority governments being the norm, and that the government may change hands between parties too often within too short a period for it to be characterized as stable. However, the record for FPTP in Canada is not so admirable. Of all 27 federal elections between 1921 and 2008, barely over half of them which were majority governments; in that time, just under half of FPTP's governments have been minority

¹⁴ Henry Milner, "Is it time to change Canada's Electoral System?" *Beaver*, 81, no. 6 (2002), 6.

¹⁵ "National: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results." Elections Canada.

¹⁶ Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965," 56.

governments, which its defenders often claim is the worst aspect of PR. The track record of PR shows, rather, that it tends towards a stable minority government or a stable coalition government.¹⁷

Even if one decides to characterize FPTP as uniquely stable despite evidence to the contrary, one has to ask what the consequences of that stability are. The fact is that because of the system's design, the norm is for the government to change hands continually between two parties, with the occasional regional party gaining large enough support to make them sweat. Two things occur from this – one is that the government has a sluggish response to rising support for new policies, and the other is what is called “policy lurch”. A former federal Clerk of the Privy Council, Alex Himelfarb, wrote of the tendency for new governments to spend a great portion of their early years undoing the policies introduced by the previous government. He writes:

“They undermine our capacity for long-term planning, even long-term thinking, and waste considerable legislative time effectively going around in circles. Such policy lurches are far less common in countries with more proportional systems, where cross-party cooperation is the norm.”¹⁸

Policy lurch is a contributor to instability – while policies stand a better chance of being preserved under a PR system. Policy lurches are possible because of the likelihood of FPTP to produce majority governments, despite the majority often being artificial, making it difficult to describe FPTP as stable.

There is also a fear that policymaking is sluggish under a PR system, even one like MMP, because consensus-building is a slow process, requires consensus, and therefore a bill is under constant threat of being shot down by the opposition parties. First, this is the point of a minority government – it is more democratic if the majority of the house, be they the government or not, disallows a bill's passage though it may be preferred by the government. Second, as stated earlier, the trend has been that PR systems produce stable coalition governments, not minority governments who cannot achieve any legislation.¹⁹ Additionally, non-government parties who may align with the government are motivated to partner with them, evidenced by British Columbia's partnership between the NDP and Green Party.²⁰ In other words, though the

¹⁷ Pilon, “Understanding Electoral Systems,” 45-46.

¹⁸ Seth Klein, “Pro rep leads to better public policy,” Policynote.ca, 8 November 2018.

¹⁹ Pilon, “Understanding Electoral Systems,” 46.

²⁰ Rob Shaw, “Despite differences, Greens and NDP still in it together a year after their deal to govern,” *Vancouver Sun*, June 8, 2018.

policymaking may require more deliberation and consensus-building, this is far preferable to policy lurches. Good-quality policies take time to create, and because a PR system tends towards forming cross-party partnerships, it is more representative of the wider national population.

Issues	FPTP	MMP
Representing All Votes	<p>Winner-takes-all system ignores losing parties' supporters.</p> <p>Policy is geared towards independents and swing ridings.</p>	<p>All votes count toward building the legislature.</p> <p>Policy and platforms are geared toward a larger electorate.</p>
Attenuating Sectionalism	<p>Treats regions unequally, as some may possess more important votes for a party.</p> <p>Misrepresents a region's interests on the federal level by disproportionately electing MPs from one party.</p>	<p>Forces parties to appeal to the whole country, and treats all regions equally.</p> <p>Regional list MPs allow minority voices in regions to be heard.</p>
Cooperative Government	<p>FPTP creates majority governments with little oversight and few limitations.</p> <p>Policy lurches are common due to a new majority government undoing the work of the previous one.</p>	<p>Minority governments and coalitions lead to consensus-building.</p> <p>As governments require more consensus from the House, policy lurches are far less likely.</p>

Table 1: A summary of the arguments in favour of MMP.

Proposed System

There are multiple variants of MMP, each with unique ways of balancing list seats. For Canada, I propose a system based on data and the experiences of Germany and New Zealand – Germany because it is a bicameral, federal state like Canada, and New Zealand because it was a Westminster-style government that recently made the change to MMP. New Zealand had its own challenges to overcome before implementing MMP, including its own series of referenda and the

calling of a Royal Commission to investigate the possible outcomes of a new electoral system.²¹ Canada, too, has seen multiple government-sponsored investigations into the merits of electoral reform. The Law Commission of Canada published a thorough evaluation of all possible voting systems called *Voting Counts* in 2004, which recommended the implementation of an MMP system federally.²² The findings also evaluated the types of MMP used in other countries, with the common deviations being: the portion of the legislature's seats reserved for party list victors, and the use of regional or national party lists. In a country like New Zealand, which is unitary, the party list is national, while in Germany, which is a federal state, it is regional. To both reflect the federal system and ensure that regional representation is present, Canada should adopt regional party lists.²³

With regard to constituency seats and regional list seats, German-style MMP has an even split between the two. New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales all have legislative bodies with a slight majority of constituency seats. Italy, on the other hand, has one quarter of its house represented by party list members.²⁴ Considering the large variations, it is important to find the best version for Canada. The Commission recommended that 33 percent of the House of Commons' seats be reserved for party list members, and the other 66 percent be for constituency victors. Not only does this land between the 25-50 percent of Italy and Germany respectively, but it is reflective of data; findings show that large parties tend to see a 25-30 percent inflation of their popular vote in the House of Commons.²⁵ Finally, on the issue of voting thresholds, the Commission recommended that Canada set a regional threshold of 5 percent of the vote that a party would have to achieve in order to receive party list seats.²⁶

²¹ Jonathan Boston et al., "Why did New Zealand adopt German-style proportional representation?" *Representation*, 33, no. 4 (1996), 134-137.

²² LCC, *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada*, 101.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 94-96.

²⁵ LCC, *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada*, 94-96.

²⁶ Ibid., 91.

House of Commons Seats: Canadian Federal Election 2019 (FPTP)

Chart 1²⁷

House of Commons Seats: Canadian Federal Election 2019 (MMP)

Chart 2²⁸

Upon reading the recommendations, one naturally asks what this would really look like for Canada. While it can be difficult to track down simulations of MMP elections that match with the exact system recommended above, the German-style MMP system has been simulated with the data from the 2019 Canadian federal election (Chart 2) and has been compared with the results in reality under FPTP (Chart 1). MMP yields a far more diverse legislature for Canada – one that is truly representative and that would entice more cooperation.

New Zealand’s experience is one that Canada can learn from. The effects of MMP have been overwhelmingly positive. Turbulence did occur shortly after its implementation; 4 parties became 7, and memberships shuffled. Before long, New Zealand has experienced every type of government possible: single party majority, single party minority, coalition majority, and coalition minority. It was certainly a steep learning curve. However, the benefits are not hard to see. In one instance, the government was defeated and had to accept a private members bill that was supported by the majority of the legislature. Its indigenous population, which previously had

²⁷ “National: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results.” Elections Canada.

²⁸ Mélanie Meloche-Hulobowski and Naël Shiab, “How would proportional representation have Shaped this election’s results?” CBC/Radio Canada, Oct 23, 2019.

only some reserved seats in parliament, elected more members.²⁹ Overall, the country had a legislature that more accurately reflected its voters' wishes, even if it meant that the government and other parties had to work harder to build consensus and create policy.

Conclusion

Although the purpose of this paper was not to investigate the likelihood of a MMP being implemented in Canada, one is nonetheless tempted to ask what its chances are. The numerous referenda, commissions, and citizens' assemblies have done nothing but cast words onto deaf ears in Parliament. It is known that the two parties that have exchanged power for Canada's history would lose power in most cases where electoral reform is concerned, so it is not in their interest to carry it out. However, there are situations in which reform could occur.

I contend that electoral reform almost certainly will be implemented sometime in the near future, and there are scenarios that may help it come about. One proposed by Boix is that the old dominant parties will lose ground to new ones, leading them to implement PR because it becomes the only way to hold onto seats.³⁰ This may seem unlikely, given the stability of the ruling two political parties in Canada. Even Justin Trudeau's Liberals, who made electoral reform a campaign promise following their massive defeat in the previous election, never fulfilled it. The situation I see as most likely is similar to what brought healthcare to the federal level – a province will finally successfully implement MMP, and spur the rest of the country to demand it in large numbers. Despite failed referenda in the past, it may only require a provincial legislature to show severe enough distortions that disadvantages the voting majority to spark the conversation again. Then, if the province demonstrates a functional and stable government under a new system (a result that would emerge from instituting MMP), the rest of the country's confidence in reform is likely to rise.

Whatever the future holds for electoral reform, MMP is the ideal electoral system for Canada. With its centrifugal forces, regional divides, history of successful minority governments, and large number of parties, Canada suits the system perfectly. The balance struck between local and proportional representation is superbly achieved by this system, and it is my hope that electoral reform returns to the federal political spotlight again – hopefully, with lasting impact.

²⁹ Jonathan Boston et al., "Why did New Zealand adopt German-style proportional representation?" 134.

³⁰ Carles Boix, "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 93, no. 3 (1999), 609.

Bibliography

- Boix, Carles. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review*. 93, no. 3 (1999). 609
- Boston, Jonathan et al. "Why did New Zealand adopt German-style proportional representation?" *Representation*. 33, no. 4 (1996). 134-140
- Cairns, Alan C. "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1968): 55–80
- Klein, Seth. "Pro rep leads to better public policy." Policynote.ca. 8 November 2018. Accessed 18 April 2020. <https://www.policynote.ca/pro-rep-leads-to-better-public-policy/>
- Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy*. 15, no. 2 (April 2004). 96-109.
- Meloche-Hulobowski, Mélanie and Shiab, Naël. "How would proportional representation have shaped this election's results?" CBC/Radio Canada. Oct 23, 2019. Accessed 19 April 2020.
- Milner, Henry. "Electoral Systems, Integrated Institutions and Turnout in Local and National Elections: Canada in Comparative Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 30, no. 1 (March 1997). 89-106
- Milner, Henry. "Is it time to change Canada's Electoral System?" *Beaver*. 81, no. 6 (2002). 6
- Pilon, Dennis. "Understanding Electoral Systems," in *Election*, ed. Heather MacIvor (Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2010), 35-56
- Pilon, Dennis. "A vote that might really change something." *Canadian Dimension*. 41, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2007). 21-22
- Shaw, Rob. "Despite differences, Greens and NDP still in it together a year after their deal to govern." *Vancouver Sun*. June 8, 2018.
- "Electoral Districts: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results." Elections Canada. Accessed 20 April 2020. <https://enr.elections.ca/ElectoralDistricts.aspx?lang=e>
- Law Commission of Canada. *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada* (2004).
- "National: October 21, 2019 Election: Election Results." Elections Canada. Accessed 20 April 2020. <https://enr.elections.ca/National.aspx?lang=e>