Contemplating Cosmopolitan Global Governance in Postcolonial Discourse Analysis

By Ajneesh Prasad*

* Ajneesh Prasad is in his final year of the B.A. (Honours) program in political science at Simon Fraser University. In September 2004 he will begin his M.A. degree in political science at Queen's University. Some of his previous research has been presented at the 2004 Canadian Studies Conference in Peterborough, Ontario (Trent University).

Résumé

Ce texte décrit les principes de la gouvernance globale cosmopolite afin de démontrer la supériorité du modèle institutionnel aux autres alternatives. L'auteur utilise une analyse du discours postcoloniale pour illustrer les espaces culturels négatifs qui empêchent la réalisation du modèle.

"When our lived experience of theorizing is fundamentally linked to the process of self-recovery, of collective liberation, no gap exists between theory and practice."

hooks 1994, 61

I -- Introduction: Mandate Unfulfilled and Paradise Lost

"The international community is at a crossroads" (Held, 1995a: 96). Since the conclusion of the Cold War and with the elimination of the bipolar world thereafter, many scholars have attempted to theorize, if only to evaluate, the transformations that have taken place within the realm of world politics in the last decade and a half. From Francis Fukuyama's argument, the "End of History" (1992), to Samuel Huntington's thesis-claim, the "Clash of Civilizations" (1993), there have been categorizing, and ultimately limiting, understandings of international affairs in the post-communist period. Consequently, discursive and explicit interstices of antagonistic tension continue to prevail and manifest into graphic demonstrations of hegemonic aggression and parochial actions of daily resistance. The international interstices of antagonistic tension continue to threaten immeasurable tragedy at the most globalized landscape. Remnants

of these present tensions go so far as to predicate the aggressive and resistant temperament of events like the aircraft attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.

It is for the above mentioned reasons that political bureaucrats and members of academia alike have engaged with critical discourse regarding the diverse possibilities of global governance, to resolve the destructive forces currently at work. Although many models of global governance have been proposed, it seems that cosmopolitan global governance, with its egalitarian nature, is the most tenable model within our conditions of world politics and lived realities. However, many impediments, which still exist and function to hinder the effective establishment of cosmopolitan global governance, need to be acknowledged and further deconstructed. I suggest that interjecting dimensions of postcolonial discourse analysis into the contemporary conception of cosmopolitan global governance elucidates many perplexities that encumber the creation and maintenance of global governance structures. Taking a prudent postcolonial perspective to the contentious debates surrounding global governance with embedded cosmopolitan values furthermore discloses the necessity to mediate the socio-political disparities that result from and facilitate the "North/South" and "East/West" divide. In sum, this paper will put forth the argument that without holistically positing the cultural concerns raised by postcolonial discourse analysis in the empirical framework of cosmopolitan global governance, the pragmatic institutions to which this concept makes reference lack a judicious foundation and a decisive socio-political impetus.

This paper is divided up into two thematic, yet mutually interdependent, sections. In the first section, the inherent values of cosmopolitan global governance are described; that is to say why cosmopolitanism suffices better than the other proposed models of global governance. Particular attention is given to understanding the multifarious tenets of the cosmopolitan model of global governance. This is logically followed by a contextual examination of the alternative methodology, which is presented by this model. The second section of this paper focuses on postcolonial discourse analysis as a means of accentuating the negative cultural spaces which function to prevent the realization of cosmopolitan global governance. It is recognition of the cultural dilemmas delineated by postcolonial discourse analysis that illustrates the socially constructed discord that exists between world citizens, nation-states, and cultures. As this paper will show, it is precisely the manifestations of this socially constructed discord that impedes the development of cosmopolitan global governance.

II -- Cosmopolitan Global Governance: An Unfinished Project

In *Governance in a New Global Order*, James Rosenau poses the question, “Why have ‘global’ and ‘governance’ become inextricably linked in public discourse?” (Rosenau, 2002: 72). Prior to 1998, in fact, there was not a single article published in a major political science journal with the term ‘global governance’ in its title. In the last half-a-decade, however, this term has gained significant prominence through its proliferation in scholarly communities and has emerged to encapsulate various dimensions of international relations, including traditional notions of international organization, multilateralism, and international regime. Although there is no cohesion amid academics in constructing a monolithic definition of the concept (Gilpin, 2002: 240), Held and McGrew have described the “institutional architecture of global governance” as being multilayered, pluralistic, structurally and complex. Global governance is made up of a variable geometry and maintains national governments as strategic sites (Held and McGrew, 2002: 9).

Hooghe and Marks have recently explicated three systematic and characterizing elements of multilevel governance systems (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3-4).¹ The first element describes decision-making practices as being shared by the actors of different government levels vis-à-vis decisions being made exclusively under the jurisdiction of a unilateral national government. The second element elucidates the idea that the new method of collective decision-making has undermined national state sovereignty. The third element pertains to the threats posed to the traditional separation between the national and the international realms of politics.² Regardless of the pressures referred to by Hooghe and Marks’ tripartite shift in authority in the international arena, proponents of global governance

¹ It need be noted that Hooghe and Marks’ multilevel governance systems apply particularly to the case of the European Union. It seems, nevertheless, that their examination of multilevel governance system is very relevant to the more broad and global arena.

² It need be noted still that realists like Robert Gilpin have put forth the argument that governance without government is an incorrect endeavor for a plethora of reasons. Gilpin makes this claim because “[national] governments continue to be the only institutions of legitimacy to employ force to achieve social objectives and to enforce agreements. More specifically, the three principal functions of government and the ones on which all other functions must rest are still largely the monopoly of states. These sovereign rights are: (1) coinage (money creation); (2) taxation; and (3) safeguarding national and individual security” (Gilpin, 2002: 240).

often assert that the pragmatic institutions to which the concept makes reference – i.e. the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – have the potential to alleviate the world’s population from unnecessary human suffering resulting from environmental problems, chronic poverty, human rights violations, civil conflict, financial instability, trade and investment inequalities, and state disputes.

On the other hand, it should also be understood that Hooghe and Marks’ tripartite shift in authority does not suppose that power is being usurped from national governments only for it to be consigned to a single institution, which exclusively constitutes the ideals of global governance. Rosenau has, for example, pointed out that global governance does not necessarily situate high-concentrated levels of power at the locus of any single international institution. Instead global governance engenders an intricate balance of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) functioning collectively in the decision-making process(es) (Rosenau, 1990). These actors are, therefore, working in tandem to implement a well oiled multifaceted ‘governance arrangement’ that operates for common social, economic, and political ends (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002: 50). Generally speaking, global governance attempts to reorganize governmental and non-governmental actors and their degree of power and legitimacy in constructing meaningful transitions in “globality” and “global social relations” (Shaw, 2000: 10-11).

Although it is crucial for there to be a paradigmatic shift in global social relations, there remain several mechanisms that inhibit this project. The most vital flaw in many conceptual frameworks for global governance is that such constructions are anti-holistic and partially idealistic. Such governance frameworks all too often make invisible the politics of, and negate the tensions between, race, ideological creed, regional variances, national economic disparities, and most importantly, cultural differences.³ In attempts to navigate through the faults of conventional forms of global

³ Although this is a polemical perspective, I argue that constructing posts to bridge antagonism amid cultural differences is by far greater the problematic task than finding the common grounds to curtail the other factors which pose threat to global governance. That is, with the internet, we are witnessing a condensation in the continuum that makes up ideological creed. Likewise, a redistribution of wealth has the potential to provide us with an alternative scope to national economic disparities. Cultural differences, however, often become accentuated when confronted with the existence of other and, in many cases, contrasting cultures where the dominant culture demands conformity from the subordinate culture(s), and sometimes even discursively solicits homogeneity or assimilation.

governance, many academics have become supporters of a model of global governance that has cosmopolitan principles categorically embedded into its foundation, a model promoted especially by the scholarship of David Held (see, for example, 1995a; 1995b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003). At the core of cosmopolitan global governance is an ethic of indiscriminate accountability to the international community and to all its global citizens. In sum, this archetype of global governance embraces an egalitarian value-system and renegotiates the privileges allocated to the world elite, and in the process, it franchises those individuals who are subjugated to a realm of marginalization.

'Cosmopolitan global governance' should not be rationalized into simplistic or apolitical categories due to its seemingly ethical nature. Individuals should not be acquiescent to the term's theoretical merits alone, but must also take cognition of its representative institutions in the broader empirical context. That is, cosmopolitan global governance requires its own postulation within the traditional international relations paradigm. In the following, I discuss the multifarious tenets of cosmopolitanism, and thereafter, I characterize the central methodology of cosmopolitanism in our contemporary reality.

The Multifarious Tenets

The idea of cosmopolitanism extends back to the age of the Greek stoics and also reflects a dimension of classical liberal philosophical traditions. Immanuel Kant, for example, argues that to achieve a universal civil society – which, in Kant's philosophy, is an ambition of human nature – there must be democratic states actively pursuing cooperative decisions under rules of cosmopolitan law (described in, McGrew, 1997: 249-250; Held, 2002a: 308-310). It was not until recently, however, that cosmopolitanism and its multifarious tenets were articulated in a substantial manner. Scholars who have engaged with this discourse have had the complex task of disclosing the relevance of cosmopolitanism to the dominant conceptions of global governance. What has tended to happen in this engagement is a reexamination, which can also at times be understood as reaffirmation, of the concepts of democracy, globalization, and the universal cosmos. The three distinct concepts together have produced the highly integrated idea of cosmopolitan democratic law.

Cosmopolitan democratic law endeavors to mediate, albeit only partially, the disjuncture that exists between the core dogma of liberal democracy and the phenomenon of globalization. Held dedicates his book, *Democracy and the Global Order*, to grapple with and resolve this

disjuncture. Held puts forth the argument that there is a mandate – demanded by the current conditions of violence in all its encumbering dimensions – to create cosmopolitan democratic law. This type of law has legitimate validation and the power to "[transcend] the particular claims of nations and states and extends to all in the 'international community'" (Held, 1995b: 228). This form of law requires a far more structured and authoritative environment vis-à-vis our current examples of international covenants and soft law; it demands an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework (Held, 2002c: 33). As Daniele Archibugi has pointed out, thus far the hypothetical construction of a structured doctrine of cosmopolitan democratic law has allocated itself the right of intervention in any state's internal affairs to safeguard its own universally issued decrees (Archibugi, 1995b); therefore, cosmopolitan democratic law, being unequivocally global in its scope, moves above and beyond the realm of institutions like the UN (Archibugi, 1995a),⁴ which is very much hierarchal and Western-orientated.⁵

Cosmopolitan global governance moves beyond the orthodoxy of traditional international governance structures with the facilitation of the classical liberal principle of impartial reason. Held has elucidated the three most significant elements of cosmopolitanism (Held, 2002a: 310-311):⁶

⁴ Archibugi's argument regarding the UN is highly contentious. Fernando Cordoso states that "[t]he United Nations has played a key role in strengthening global governance by consistently promoting the participation of civil society in the processes of dialogue and deliberation leading to new forms of political regulation." Cordoso goes on to argue that the UN is a vital institution for the creation and implementation processes of cosmopolitan law (Cordoso, 2003).

⁵ The UN and many of its sponsored projects have commonly been sympathizers of Western ideals that attempt to reinforce Western hegemony over the remainder of the world's citizens and resources. The UN's work on women's issues provides a strong premise for this conclusion. For instance, third world women's experiences in cultural practices like female genital surgery (other scholars have employed more value laden terms like 'mutilation' or 'circumcision') are often appropriated by western feminists and bureaucrats alike, and thereafter, third world women's voices are systematically silenced and their bodies are made invisible (for more elaborate discussions on this occurrence, see, Spivak, 1996; Walley, 1997: 420-422). Institutions like the UN in this light can be viewed as a vehicle that authorizes the North's exploitation of the South in the overarching international arena. Hence, laws contrived by our current international system are neither cosmopolitan nor democratic in nature.

⁶ The notion of impartiality is highly contentious. Feminists have taken up the project of deconstructing impartiality to expose its fallacious nature. In 1995

egalitarian individualism, principal of reciprocal recognition, and impartial treatment of claim. Essentially, if there is a universal impetus to establish cosmopolitan global governance, these three elements must be incorporated into the cultivation of political processes.

The first element allocates moral concerns to individual human beings vis-à-vis states or other institutions of human association. Following from Rene Descartes idea of Cartesian dualism, this belief asserts that humans collectively belong to a single moral realm, which designates equal worth to each member of the collectivity. In short, this element is characterized as egalitarian individualism.⁷ To conceptualize people of equal worth presupposes that all individuals are free and equal beings who can make moral choices regardless of external and diverse social, economic, political, and physical conditions.⁸

The second element is very closely related to the first element in that it emphasizes the significance of universally recognizing all human beings as members of equal moral worth. Summarized as the principal of reciprocal recognition, it avers that each person has an equal stake in this universal ethical realm and is, accordingly, required to respect all other people's status as a basic unit of moral interest (Pogge, 1994: 90, as cited in, Held, 2002a: 311). If there are certain members or groups marginalized and relegated to the outside of the periphery of egalitarian individualism, they

Lorraine Code argued that the Western notion of the body/mind split "consistently bypasses the epistemic significance of early experiences of *other* people" (Code, 1995: 46). Similarly Seyla Benhabib put forth the thesis-claim that both Descartes philosophy and individualist epistemologies "ignore the primacy of knowing and being known by other people in cognitive development" (Benhabib, 1997: 85). It is without question that the body/mind split and its ideal of impartiality has been particularly problematic in its influence on liberal concepts of rights and justice. Feminists like Iris Marion Young have characterized the discursive interstices at which the liberal zest of impartiality fails (Young, 1990: ch. 4).

⁷ It need be noted that some philosophers, both Western and Eastern have rejected the idea of *egalitarian individualism*. For instance, the Taoist philosopher Chuang-tzu (369-286 B.C.E.) argued for epistemological relativism. Epistemological relativism urges that nothing can be done with absolute certainty. All truth claims are relative, including claims of morality. No one can know anything for certain. Truth is relative to one's perspective, one's likes and dislikes (refer to: Zeuschner, 2001: 184-186, 190).

⁸ The possibility of this form of egalitarianism is quite suspect, however, it maintains some validity. David Hume, regarding this prospect of egalitarianism stated, "[i]t may appear withal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly *useful*, is not altogether *impractical*" (Hume, 1999; [1751]: 230).

will be able to participate less in the processes that shape the quality of their lives. Accordingly, it is essential that all individuals have equal status to function properly within the decision-making institutions of their community.

The third and final element demands that the equality of status and reciprocal recognition render each person impartial treatment of their claim. Much like Kant's description of the categorical imperative, this element encourages the construction of principles upon which all members of society can participate. These three elements, collectively, form a moral framework for cosmopolitanism or what I have described as its multifarious tenets.

The Central Methodology

Different levels of typological governmental structures have been proposed. However, as Roseneau clearly observes, "in each case they are amplified by the state" (Roseneau, 2002: 79). It is imprudently presupposed then that the authoritative and hegemonic presence of the state acts as the only factor, which allows and limits the cultivation of multilateral global governance organizations. Thus, for these organizations to exist in an substantive manner it would be necessary to employ a neoteric theory and praxis of democracy that is not congenial to a national political ideology. There is a demand to articulate new dimensions of democratic theory, as traditional conceptions of democracy have become outdated. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), among other Stoics, defined democracy strictly in terms of the Greek city-state model, which calls for direct participation from each of its complete citizens. Even early classical liberal theorists, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), predicated the desire of the general will on a conceptualization of democracy that aligns itself to parochial standards. The nineteenth-century philosopher, John Stuart Mills (1806-1873), transcended traditionally held beliefs on political life to describe democracy as an institution pragmatically relevant to the national level via representatives. Representative democracy still upholds the nation-state as central to the successful maintenance of democratic principles, although it does not completely take into account the practical sources of democracy within the international context.

As mentioned above, cosmopolitanists have endeavored to grapple with the precepts of state, democracy, and global governance. Under the guise of "legal pacifism," Archibugi points out the weaknesses of the UN and suggests strategic areas for reform (Archibugi, 1995a: 124-127). The discursive position augmented by this discourse signifies the central

methodology conjectured in the construction of cosmopolitan global governance. That is to say, cosmopolitan theorists have taken up the project to question, if not to undermine, the state and its parameters of direct and hegemonic authority in the realm of international affairs. It is precisely this premise of significant consociationalism that sets cosmopolitanists apart from other commentators of global governance. Significant consociationalism, moreover, acts as the central methodology of discerning the cultural and universalistic nature of cosmopolitanism. Essentially, the new world order to which this refers to “is not based on the uncontested will of sovereign states, but on universally agreed principles and norms” (Cordoso, 2003).

Mary Kaldor has argued that sovereign states in the international arena equate to socio-political and socio-economic rivalries (Kaldor, 1990). To contextualize these rivalries into the grand international schema, Kaldor undertakes the cosmopolitanist project, asserting that the violent nature of contemporary states is a consequence of the unsuccessful process of global integration (Kaldor, 2000). To comprehend additional reasons for why global integration has failed, it is crucial that we turn to the cultural dilemmas expressed by postcolonial discourse analysis.

III -- Postcolonial Discourse Analysis and the Failure of Cosmopolitan Global Governance

If there is a sincere desire to establish cosmopolitan global governance as a substantive reality vis-à-vis implementing fruitless attempts to tackle the cultural conflicts posed in global social relations, it is imperative that there be an inclusion of postcolonial discourse analysis in the debates over the politics of globality. Postcolonial discourse analysis in this context illustrates how the dominant/subordinate relationship signified by power politics at the most macro-level is fused within the framework of global social relations. It is in fact, the cultural dilemmas that have been covertly delineated by postcolonial discourse analysis that alludes to the neglected intricacies in the current conception of cosmopolitan global governance.

Three particular cultural dilemmas hold special relevance when it comes to understanding the hindrance of the effective enactment of institutions of cosmopolitan global governance. These cultural dilemmas include: (i) the maintenance of subalternity, (ii) the prevailing Oriental misconception, and, (iii) the hegemonization of liminality. When employed collectively, these interdependent cultural dilemmas clearly explicate the often-redundant dispositions, which make cosmopolitan global governance

a very difficult, if not an impossible endeavor, without dramatic shifts in globality's social, economic, and political paradigms.

i) Maintenance of Subalternity

The term “subaltern” was originally employed to characterize members of the British Royal Air Force who occupied inferior ranks. The term was later adopted by Antonio Gramsci to refer to those groups in society who are subject to the hegemony of the dominant classes. The subaltern, therefore, includes those individuals who are not in societal positions to access hegemonic power. Gramsci argued that economic and political hierarchies are manifested and perpetuated in the central realm of the state where power is being produced and distributed and reproduced and redistributed (Gramsci, 1972).

Gayatri Spivak has appropriated subaltern from Gramsci's reference of class categorization. Spivak, however, cautioned for the inaccurate and over simplistic comprehension of the term as subaltern is not “just a classy word for oppressed, for [the] ‘Other,’ for somebody who's not getting a piece of the pie.” Gramsci used subaltern to depict the proletariat as a group whose voice was systematically silenced, if not erased, by the bourgeois writing of history.⁹ In a 1996 interview with Leon de Kock, Spivak has extended, if only to reiterate Gramsci's explanation by arguing that, “everything that has limited or no access to cultural imperialism [and social mobility] is subaltern -- a space of difference.” She goes on to postulate the question, “[n]ow who would say that's just the oppressed? The working class is oppressed. It's not subaltern” (de Kock, 1992: 29-47).

The subaltern embodies the silenced voice and the invisible ahistorical body of the colonized class. It is interjected into the political realm by the colonizer's need for socio-political justification of conquest and occupation. Even their very definition remains dependent on the international or local maneuvering of the dominant subjects: colonial and bourgeois-nationalist elites. To maintain their position in the dualistic raced and gendered hierarchy, the politicized and ahistoricized subaltern subject is forcefully taken from the private sphere and compromised in the public,

⁹ Gramsci was very interested in the historiography of the subaltern classes. He has described a six point plan for studying the history of the subaltern classes which included: (i) their objective formation, (ii) their active or passive affiliation to the dominant political formations, (iii) the birth of new parties and dominant groups, (iv) the formations that the subaltern groups produce to press their claims, (v) new formations within the old framework that assert the autonomy of the subaltern classes, and (vi) other points referring to trade unions and political parties.

where it is a more accessible object for colonialist utilization.¹⁰ Spivak described colonialist utilization of the subaltern subject with her empirical discussion surrounding the Hindu practice of Sati. Sati loosely translates to “widow-sacrifice” and makes reference to a wife’s self-immolation on a husband’s funeral pyre. The British, who had otherwise upheld Hindu religious law as a matter of colonial state policy, outlawed the practice in India in 1829. Sati in British India embodied the discourse of “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1993: 613). This discourse, however, is not limited to early nineteenth-century India. Christopher Wise explains the perverted and pervasive nature of this discourse with an applicable case analysis:

In the days leading up to the US invasion of Afghanistan, the question of the Taliban’s treatment of women filled the airways, an issue of remarkable urgency—when it helped to justify the certain loss of American lives in faraway lands. Gayatri Spivak has aptly referred to this phenomenon as “white men saving brown women from brown men...”; that is, the history of imperialism teaches that gender oppression is a powerful ruse to legitimate the crassest adventurism (Wise, 2003).

In sum, because one group (read: the West) has the agency to imperialize and to be mobile in another’s (read: the Other) cultural space, a slave/master relationship embedded in values of paternalism is construed.

ii) Prevailing Oriental Misconception

In 1978, Edward Said described the Oriental as a person being interrogated by Orientalized thinking.¹¹ The Oriental man is conceived to embody a feminized masculinity, albeit, he simultaneously poses sexual threat to the virtue of white womanhood. The Oriental woman, on the other hand, is juxtaposed in roles of the extremely subjugated and the statically exotic. Accordingly, Said urges us to “respect and try to grasp...the sheer knitted-

¹⁰ To successfully construct colonial discourses, colonial powers had to first dehistoricize the female subaltern body to render their precolonial consciousness in a state of cultural paralysis, and secondly, they had to politicize the same body as a victim needing to be saved from the flaws of their civilization. For Spivak, the latter is explained in terms of, “White men saving brown women from brown men.”

¹¹ The Orient signifies a system of representations framed by political forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and Western empire. The Orient exists for the West and is constructed by and in relation to the West. It is a mirror image of what are inferior and alien (“Other”) to the West.

together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions” (Said, 1978: 6). This argument is primarily predicated on the depictions of Arab world as being irrational, untrustworthy, dishonest, anti-Western, and essentially monolithic. These conceptions are, furthermore, utilized in the construction of Occidental ideologies. In spite of the fact that, Said discusses the Orientalist discourse as being relevant to the experiences of Arabs, this discourse very much encapsulates the Western gazes upon almost all non-Western citizens.

The prevalent myth of the Orient reinforces biological generalizations, cultural constructions, and racial and religious prejudices. In sum, Orientalists fabricate and codify the salient nature of the “West” and the “Other.” Therefore, as Said purposes, there must be a transition in conceptualizing the unknown from the mythical vision to the authentic narrative, which truly represents the dynamic variety of human experience. Still, however, rejecting Orientalist thinking does not entail a denial of differences between the West and the Other, but rather, an evaluation of these differences with a more critical and objective criterion is required. Today, Orientalism manifests into a political drive that actively promotes the West/Other distinction in a manner that engenders considerable ideological consequences.

iii) Hegemonized Liminal Spaces

Victor Turner introduced the term liminality to characterize the perplexed nature of the cultural realm, where daily experience is transformed in “communitarian” experience, and which subsequently produces shifts in the individual subject’s lived reality (Turner, 1974).¹² The daily experience is rooted in our socialization of religious consciousness, while simultaneously, representations of the subject’s lived reality manifests into a seemingly coherent political identity. Accordingly, Homi Bhabha, a postcolonial theorist and a professor of English at Harvard University, has described liminality as a space where negotiations between and amongst cultures are taking place; a bona fide cultural space that crosses socially constructed human barriers.

Bhabha argues that it is at the discursive interstices, which have been displaced by the realms of difference “that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value

¹² Martin Heidegger provides an elaborate and original analysis if an occurrence he terms “phenomenological psychology.” Phenomenological psychology very closely mirrors Turner’s concept of liminality with regards to the manifestations of experiences in the cultural realm (Heidegger, 1993; [1927]).

are negotiated” (Bhabha, 1994: 2). Cultural identities cannot, therefore, be understood as fixed references, nor can they be comprehended as monolithic traditions predicated on the definite conventions of a particular ethnicity. For Bhabha, culture nor societal position exist without the presence of another subordinate or dominant culture or societal position that substantively interjects politicized dimensions of contrariety. Accordingly, “[t]he very concepts of homogenous national cultures, the consensual or contiguous transmission of historical traditions, or ‘organic’ ethnic communities - as the grounds of cultural compativism - are in a profound process of redefinition” (Bhabha, 1994: 5; emphasis in original). This redefinition process is ideally confined to the unpoliticized spaces of liminality.

Liminal spaces fundamentally demand egalitarian forms of cultural relations. However, when one culture obtains the illegitimate prerogative to superimpose their norms onto another culture, it is at this point when liminal spaces become dangerously hegemonized. In her recent book, *Death of a Discipline*, Spivak provides a thorough examination of this process in operation. Spivak’s argument centralizes on the threats posed to comparative literature; a discipline made up of a plethora of languages and linguistic variances, as well as a discipline personifying the presence and affects of globalization. With the normalization of the English language as the medium of global communication, Spivak questions the relevance and cultural value which diversity in language presents (Spivak, 2003). Without a doubt and sadly, the hegemonization of liminality goes beyond the level of cultural asset loss. It in fact presents an excessively politicized forum that allows discord between subjects of different cultures to flourish.

Taken collectively the maintenance of subalternity, the prevailing Oriental misconception, and the hegemonization of liminal spaces significantly inhibit the realization of cosmopolitan global governance. Thus, each of these cultural dilemmas rendered by postcolonial discourse analysis must be deconstructed to achieve the three primary tenets of cosmopolitanism: egalitarian individualism, the principle of reciprocal recognition, and impartial reason of human claim. Currently the above-mentioned cultural dilemmas do nothing more than reconfigure traditional paradigms and buttress Western-dominated power politics at the global level. If there is a sincere impetus to negotiate the economic bridge that exists amid the North and the South, concerns raised by postcolonial theorists must be incorporated into the debates over future (cosmopolitan) global governance structures.

IV -- Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism for Future Prospects

In a paper presented as a Miliband Lecture at the London School of Economics, Robert Keohane concluded on the note that, “[c]osmopolitan democracy is a distant ideal, not a feasible option of our time” (Keohane, 2002). The pessimistic overtones expressed in Keohane’s words are by no means unwarranted or premised on irrational conclusions. It is without question that with our current power hierarchies, structures and institutions representative of cosmopolitan democratic values are very difficult, if not impossible, to construct and implement. Notwithstanding this, cosmopolitan organizations and, in particular, cosmopolitan global governance, are crucial projects that we must collectively take on.

With the abrupt interjection of globalization in the early 1970s our world encountered a paradigmatic shift, which made global relations ever the more socially and culturally fragmented (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 54-83). Postcolonial discourse analysis endeavors to discursively accentuate various forms of this fragmentation. The viable solution that has been proposed to mediate the international bridge of difference is cosmopolitan global governance. This type of governance brings with it an allocated political impetus and a sensitivity towards the diversity in global social relations.

This piece of scholarship amplifies the significance of postulating concerns delineated by postcolonial discourse analysis into the construction and implementation processes of cosmopolitan global governance. Large segments of this grand project remain neglected, however. There must first be a conscious effort to retheorize democratic theory in terms of establishing its substantive relevance to the international arena. It is now up to political philosophers to step in and fill the ideological void that remains attributable to democracy’s inapplicability to globality. I suggest that it is a retheorization of democracy that will transcend the definition of what realists so strongly adhere to: the sovereign state. The sovereign state and its lack of integration to establish judicious models of global governance networks have produced an unprecedented amount of violence in modern history. Simply, global peace and the sovereign state, as understood in their traditional and contemporary conceptions, should be viewed in terms of a perilous paradox. That is, global peace and the sovereign state have invariably been in competition. We discern this reality by comprehending that the primary responsibility of the state as being, not to secure global peace, but instead, to establish a sense of national security for its own citizens

(Koenig-Archibugi, 2002: 46).¹³

The multipolar world seen prior to the Second World War, the bipolar world experienced during the Cold War, and our current predicament of a unipolar world have each proven inadequate to establish global peace. Each of these models exhibits the pervasive nature of the state and its inability to maintain positive currents of entente. Cosmopolitan global governance has the potential to recognize the variances in the global cultural continuum in a manner that no single state can. Critics may argue that cosmopolitan global governance has been conceived exclusively at the normative level, and therefore, no empirical evidence exists to substantiate conclusions presented in this paper. Others still, may argue that cosmopolitan global governance attempts to fruitlessly synthesize political ideologies which are fundamentally divergent (see, for example: Hirst, 2002). I welcome criticism such as this and encourage further discourse that expands on these ideas. Aside from scrutinizing the practicality or the affectability of cosmopolitan global governance within our current socio-cultural and political framework, one assertion I do make with certainty is that the realist state-dominated model of world order has failed. As we enter the new millennium other more globally cogent and culturally inclusive alternatives must be sought out. ■

References Cited

Books, Chapters & Articles

Archibugi, Daniele. (1995a). From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy. In David Held and Daniele Archibugi (Eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New Global Order (pp. 121-162). Cambridge: Polity Press.

_____. (1995b). Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace. European Journal of International Relations, 1(4): 429-56.

Benhabib, Seyla. (1987). The Generalized and the Concrete Other. In S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (Eds.), Feminism as Critique. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

¹³ We need only turn to the Bush administration's response to the Kyoto Agreement to premise this conclusion. Bush has made it clear that he and his Republican government will not sign Kyoto, due to the fact that it may harm the interests of American citizens (read: voters).

Bhabha, Homi. (1994). The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge.

Castles, Stephen and Alastair Davidson. (2000). Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. New York: Routledge.

Code, Lorraine. (1995). Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. New York: Routledge.

de Kock, Leon. (1992). Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation Writers Conference in South Africa. A Review of International English Literature, 23(3): 29-47.

Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books.

Gilpin, Robert. (2002). A Realist Perspective on International Governance. In David Held and Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (pp. 237-248). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gramsci, Antonio. (1972). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith. New York: International Publishers.

Heidegger, Martin. (1993; [1927]). Being and Time. Trans. D.F. Krell. New York: Harper Collins.

Held, David. (1995a). Democracy and the New International Order. In Daniele Archibugi and David Held (Eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New Global Order (pp. 96-120). Cambridge: Polity Press.

_____. (1995b). Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

_____. (2002a). Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Deficits. In David Held and Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (pp. 305-324). Cambridge: Polity Press.

_____. (2002b). Globalization, Corporate Practice and Cosmopolitan Standards. Contemporary Political Theory, 1: 58-78.

_____. (2002c). Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty. Legal Theory 8: 1-44.

_____. (2003). Cosmopolitanism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Held, David and Anthony McGrew. (2002). Introduction. In David Held and

Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (pp. 1-21). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. (2001). Multilevel Governance and European Integration. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

hooks, bell. (1994). Teaching to Transgress: Education as a Practice of Freedom. New York: Routledge.

Hume, David. (1995; [1751]). The Impossibility of Equality. In M. Rosen and J. Wolff (Eds.), Political Thought (pp. 229-231). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel. (1993). Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Kaldor, Mary. (1990). The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict. Oxford: Blackwell.

Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias. (2002). Mapping Global Governance. In David Held and Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (pp. 46-69). Cambridge: Polity Press.

McGrew, Anthony. (1997). Democracy Beyond Borders: Globalization and the Reconstruction of Democratic Theory and Politics. In Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Transformation of Democracy?: Globalization and Territorial Democracy (pp. 231-267). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rosenau, James. (1990). Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. (2002). Governance in a New Global Order. In David Held and Anthony McGrew (Eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (pp. 70-86). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Said, Edward W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon.

Shaw, Martin. (2000). Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Social Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spivak, Gayatri. (1993). Can the Subaltern Speak?. In Charles Lemert (Ed.), Social Theory: The Multicultural and Classical Readings (pp. 610-614). Boulder: Westview Press.

_____. (1996). "Women as Theatre": United Nations Conference on Women, Beijing 1995. Radical Philosophy, 75(1): 1-7.

_____. (2003). Death of a Discipline. New York: Columbia University Press.

Turner, Victor. (1974). Drama, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action of Human Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walley, C.J. (1997). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate Over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, 12(3): 405-438.

Young, Iris Marion. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zeuschner, Robert B. (2001). Classical Ethics East and West: Ethics from a Comparative Perspective. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Conference Papers and Internet Sources

Cordoso, Fernando. (2003). Civil Society and Global Governance. Paper presented at the High-Level Panel (2-3 June). New York. Also refer to: <http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/cardosopaper13june.htm#two>

Hirst, Paul. (2002). Democracy and Global Governance. Paper presented at the Forum on Identity and Democracy (20 September). London. Also refer to: <http://www.londonconsortium.com/hirst/dgg.doc>

Kaldor, Mary. (2000). Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence. Paper presented at the Conference on Conceiving Cosmopolitanism (27-29 April). Warwick. Also refer to: <http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010kaldor.htm>

Keohane, Robert O. (2002). Global Governance and Democratic Accountability. Paper presented as a Miliband Lecture at the London School of Economics (17 April). London. Also refer to: <http://www.poli.duke.edu/people/Faculty/docs/millpaper.pdf>

Wise, Christopher. (2003). Honor Killing and Representation. The Star: Jordan's Political, Economic and Cultural Weekly, 155(14). Also refer to: http://star.arabia.com/article/0,5596,290_8969,00.html